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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the legal theoretical and practical implications of the incorporation 
of frontal lobe rehabilitation treatment (hereinafter ‘FLRT’) for impulse-control 
management in the rehabilitation of criminal offenders, with a view to achieving an 
overall reduction in crime (both in prison population and recidivism). 
 
An initiative born of ‘neurolaw’ — an emergent area combining neuroscience (the 
empirical study of the brain and nervous system) with law — FLRT involves the non-
invasive detection of brain structure and function. Based on the prevalence of poor 
impulse-control among criminal offenders, the treatment allows users to strengthen the 
influence of their prefrontal cortex, which specializes in long-term decision-making and 
impulse-control. FLRT utilizes real-time brain imaging to monitor a person’s brain 
activity when resisting a particular stimulus. Neural activity is visually displayed in a 
scanner and shown directly to an individual so that person can attempt to modify it. By 
strengthening the neural pathways concerned with long-term consideration and control 
over impulsivity, FLRT enables offenders to receive neurofeedback to retrain their brains 
towards pro-social behaviour. 
 
Consonant with the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence — ‘the study of the role of the 
law as a therapeutic agent’i — FLRT emerges from the union of neuroscience and 
diversion from punishment into treatment: ‘NeuroDiversion’. It is argued that responsible 
incorporation of this rehabilitative mechanism advances the therapeutic jurisprudence 
agenda and its attendant concepts. Promoting a rehabilitative rather than a punitive 
response to criminal behaviour, therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship is concerned with 
therapeutic outcome-maximization through collaborative treatment and individual 
rehabilitation to further the well-being of the offender. 
 
                                                 
i
  David B Wexler and Bruce J Winick (eds), Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press, 1996) xvii. 
 
ii 
 
The central analysis of the thesis examines existing court-mandated opportunities for 
offender-rehabilitation through mental health diversionary mechanisms and the regular 
criminal justice system in Australia. FLRT-utilization for categorized impulse-control 
management within this existing framework is then explicated. The emphasis on mental 
health diversion courts specifically is in recognition of the prevalence of mental illness 
among offenders and the implication of impulsivity as a specific diagnostic criterion in 
many mental disorders.  
 
This thesis argues for diversifying FLRT by widening its jurisdictional ambit beyond the 
existing framework. Suggestions to fill the gap for treating someone suffering from poor 
impulse-control in the absence of a mental illness are proffered. Amendments to 
sentencing protocols for inclusion of FLRT as part of court-mandated rehabilitative 
treatment, not as full diversion, for major indictable offences in higher courts are 
advocated. The use of FLRT in tribunals and other diversionary schemes, including 
police diversion, drug diversion and indigenous-specific diversionary programs is 
promoted. Youth offenders may also benefit from FLRT — in a diversionary capacity, as 
well as in detention and post-release. The value of FLRT in adult custodial programs and 
post-release programs is also acknowledged. 
 
Diverting offenders from the criminal justice system into treatment for impulse-control 
management directly targets the significance of impulsivity in the aetiology of offending. 
NeuroDiversion is proffered as a means to enhance the rehabilitative ideal of therapeutic 
jurisprudence by bolstering the rehabilitative efforts of court systems, providing people 
with an opportunity to receive more informed sentencing, counselling, and rehabilitation, 
and ultimately increasing the likelihood of staying out of the prison system in support of 
productive societal reintegration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is submitted to Bond University in fulfilment of the requirements of the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This thesis represents my own original work towards this 
research degree and contains no material that has been previously submitted for a degree 
or diploma at this University or any other institution, except where due acknowledgement 
is made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed _________________ 
Emma V Cooter 
 
 
Date _________________ 
 
 
  
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
It is with considerable pleasure that I acknowledge sincerely the guidance and dedication 
of my supervisors. I would like to thank Associate Professor David Field for his 
encouragement, direction and belief in me. My gratitude also extends to Associate 
Professor Katarina Fritzon whose expertise in the field of psychology assisted invaluably 
in the development of this thesis and enabled its interdisciplinary foci. I thank Professor 
Rick Bigwood for his ardent support and I am truly humbled by his tireless editing and 
resolute commitment. 
 
The contributions of other Bond University faculty members — both past and present — 
are also acknowledged in order of involvement: Rosa Riedl, Professor Michael Weir, 
Professor Patrick Keyzer, Professor Ken Levy, Assistant Professor Jodie O’Leary, 
Professor Geraldine Mackenzie and Assistant Professor Francina Cantatore. Thanks are 
also due to Dr Nigel Stobbs of Queensland University of Technology for his contribution. 
 
I would also like to thank expert and Director of the MacArthur Foundation Research 
Network on Law and Neuroscience, Professor Owen Jones, for so kindly meeting with 
me at his institution, Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. I am truly grateful 
for his encouragement and continued communication with me. 
 
It is with further gratitude that I acknowledge neuroscientist and Director of the Initiative 
on Neuroscience and Law, Dr David Eagleman. His work inspired much of this thesis 
and it was a privilege to visit him at Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Texas, to 
discuss my research. 
 
My semester-attendance at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 2013 
was deeply enriched by the instruction of Professor Richard Wolman in his class, ‘Why 
People Change: The Psychology of Influence’. A truly gifted and inspirational academic, 
I thank him sincerely for the knowledge so generously imparted in class, and for his 
guidance and interest in my research. I am honoured by his continued communication and 
support. 
 
I am also grateful for the sustained support of my mentor, criminal prosecutor Brenton 
Illingworth. His long-standing involvement in my legal career and academic pursuits has 
been unparalleled. 
 
It is with heartfelt thanks that I acknowledge the ever-faithful encouragement and support 
of former colleague and very dear friend, Emma Petherick. I also thank my loyal friend, 
Sharna Gordon, whose unfaltering support was ever-buoying and wholly treasured. 
 
It is finally with the deepest gratitude that I thank my family. I thank my Godmother, 
Katrina Sitzler, for her steadfast love and cherished counsel. Thank you to my parents 
Rodney and Nola, and my sister Anna — I remain eternally humbled by your enduring 
love and grateful for your unwavering support.  
  
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CASES CITED…………………………………………………………………………. xii 
GLOSSARY…………………………………………………………………………… xiii 
 
CHAPTER 1 ...................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
I Thesis Enquiry ............................................................................................................ 1 
A The Current Problem Stated.................................................................................... 2 
B Previous Solutions to the Problem .......................................................................... 3 
C Thesis Solution........................................................................................................ 5 
1 Frontal Lobe Rehabilitation Treatment ............................................................... 6 
2 Impulse-Control .................................................................................................. 7 
D Brief Overview of the Literature............................................................................. 8 
1 Current Neurolegal Discourse............................................................................. 8 
(a) Insanity Defence ........................................................................................... 10 
(b) Volition ......................................................................................................... 10 
(c) Brain Death ................................................................................................... 11 
(d) Nootropics ..................................................................................................... 11 
(e) Acquired Paedophilia and Drug Addiction ................................................... 11 
(f) Lie Detection, Unconscious Bias, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility........... 12 
(g) Criminal Responsibility and Free Will ......................................................... 13 
E Fertile Ground ....................................................................................................... 14 
II A Note about Methodology ...................................................................................... 16 
A Scope ..................................................................................................................... 18 
B Structure ................................................................................................................ 18 
 
CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................... 21 
CLARIFICATORY MATTERS: THESIS BASES .......................................................... 21 
I Introduction ............................................................................................................... 21 
II Therapeutic Jurisprudence ........................................................................................ 22 
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Introduced .................................................................. 22 
1 The History of Therapeutic Jurisprudence ........................................................ 23 
2 Therapeutic Jurisprudence Operationalized ...................................................... 27 
3 Mental Health Diversion Courts (MHDCts) ..................................................... 29 
4 Therapeutic Jurisprudence Concepts ................................................................ 30 
III Neurolaw ................................................................................................................... 31 
A Neuroscience ......................................................................................................... 34 
B Neuroplasticity ...................................................................................................... 36 
C Neuroimaging Technology ................................................................................... 38 
IV Frontal Lobe Function............................................................................................... 40 
A Impulse-Control .................................................................................................... 40 
1 Neurobiology .................................................................................................... 41 
2 Neuroscientific Underpinning ........................................................................... 43 
V Frontal Lobe Rehabilitation Treatment (FLRT) ....................................................... 44 
VI Impulse-Control Defined .......................................................................................... 48 
vi 
 
A Diagnostic ............................................................................................................. 48 
1 Key Terms Defined ........................................................................................... 48 
(a) Mental Health................................................................................................ 48 
(b) Mental Illness ................................................................................................ 49 
(c) Mental Disorder ............................................................................................ 49 
VII Impulse-Control Categorized ................................................................................ 51 
A Facet of Personality (C1) ...................................................................................... 52 
1 Discretionary NeuroDiversion Test .................................................................. 53 
B Impulse-Control Disorder (C2) ............................................................................. 55 
1 Disruptive, Impulse-Control and Conduct Disorders ....................................... 55 
C Impulse-Control as Part of Diagnostic Criteria for a Disorder (C3) ..................... 57 
1 Neurodevelopmental Disorders ........................................................................ 57 
2 Bipolar and Related Disorders .......................................................................... 57 
(a) Bipolar I Disorder ......................................................................................... 57 
(b) Bipolar II Disorder ........................................................................................ 58 
3 Trauma- and Stessor-Related Disorders ........................................................... 58 
(a) Posttraumatic Stress Disorder ....................................................................... 58 
(b) Acute Stress Disorder ................................................................................... 58 
4 Personality Disorders ........................................................................................ 59 
(a) General Personality Disorder ........................................................................ 59 
(b) Antisocial Personality Disorder .................................................................... 59 
(c) Borderline Personality Disorder ................................................................... 60 
(d) Histrionic Personality Disorder..................................................................... 60 
(e) Personality Change Due to Another Medical Condition .............................. 60 
D Impulse-Control as an Additional Significant Problem (C4) ............................... 61 
1 Depressive Disorders ........................................................................................ 61 
(a) Unspecified Depressive Disorder ................................................................. 61 
2 Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders ..................................................... 61 
E Incommensurability of FLRT with Certain Mental Disorders ............................. 62 
1 Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders ................................. 62 
2 Neurocognitive Disorders ................................................................................. 62 
3 Psychopathy ...................................................................................................... 63 
VIII Mental Illness and Offending................................................................................ 64 
IX Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 67 
 
CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................... 69 
FLRT AND THE GOOD LIVES MODEL OF OFFENDER-REHABILITATION........ 69 
I Introduction ............................................................................................................... 69 
II Theories of Criminal Conduct .................................................................................. 69 
III Good Lives Model of Offender-Rehabilitation (GLM) ............................................ 72 
A Relevance of Positive Psychology ........................................................................ 72 
B Psychological Flexibility ...................................................................................... 75 
C Good Lives Model of Forensic Mental Health (GLM-FM) .................................. 76 
IV Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) Model .................................................................... 77 
A Risk ....................................................................................................................... 79 
B Need ...................................................................................................................... 79 
vii 
 
C Responsivity .......................................................................................................... 80 
D Crime Prevention Jurisprudence (CPJ) ................................................................. 82 
V FLRT as a Recognized Treatment Program .............................................................. 84 
VI Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 86 
 
CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................... 89 
FLRT-UTILIZATION FOR IMPULSE-CONTROL MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE 
AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ........................................................... 89 
I Introduction ............................................................................................................... 89 
II Mental Health and the Criminal Justice System in Australia ................................... 89 
III Types of Diversion .................................................................................................... 91 
A Mental Health Diversion Courts (MHDCts) ......................................................... 91 
B Court Diversion and Liaison Services .................................................................. 92 
IV Diversion-Appropriate Offending ............................................................................. 94 
V FLRT-Utilization within the Existing Australian Legal Criminal Justice System ... 96 
A Existing Offender-Rehabilitation Mechanisms..................................................... 97 
1 The Northern Territory ..................................................................................... 98 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) .......................................................................... 98 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) .... 98 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) .. 99 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Options .......... 100 
2 The Australian Capital Territory ..................................................................... 100 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) ........................................................................ 100 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) .. 101 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 101 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) ........ 102 
3 Queensland ...................................................................................................... 102 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) ........................................................................ 103 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) .. 103 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 103 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) ........ 104 
4 New South Wales ............................................................................................ 105 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) ........................................................................ 105 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) .. 108 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 109 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) ........ 110 
5 Victoria ........................................................................................................... 110 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) ........................................................................ 110 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) .. 112 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 113 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) ........ 114 
6 South Australia................................................................................................ 114 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) ........................................................................ 114 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) .. 118 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 118 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) ........ 119 
viii 
 
7 Western Australia............................................................................................ 119 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) ........................................................................ 120 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) .. 121 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 121 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) ........ 122 
8 Tasmania ......................................................................................................... 123 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) ........................................................................ 123 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) .. 124 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 125 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) ........ 125 
VI Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 126 
 
CHAPTER 5 .................................................................................................................. 135 
APPRAISAL AND OPTIMAL FLRT-UTILIZATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ................................................................................... 135 
I Introduction ............................................................................................................. 135 
II Discretionary NeuroDiversion Test Applied .......................................................... 135 
III Appraisal: FLRT-Utilization in The Existing Australian Legal Criminal Justice 
System ............................................................................................................................. 137 
A All Together Now: The Diagnosis, The Offence and The Existing Criminal 
Justice System ............................................................................................................. 137 
B Offenders Eligible for Diversion but Overlooked .............................................. 138 
C Offenders Return to General List ........................................................................ 139 
1 Insanity ............................................................................................................ 140 
(a) Unsound Mind ............................................................................................ 140 
(b) M’Naghten’s Case ...................................................................................... 141 
IV Optimal FLRT-Utilization in the Australian Legal Criminal Justice System ......... 144 
A Nation-wide MHDCts ......................................................................................... 144 
B Broadening of Jurisdictional Utility.................................................................... 145 
C FLRT-Utility in the Commonwealth .................................................................. 146 
D FLRT-Utility in Tribunals................................................................................... 148 
E FLRT-Utility in Other Diversionary Schemes .................................................... 150 
1 Police Diversion .............................................................................................. 150 
2 Drug Diversion................................................................................................ 152 
3 Indigenous Diversionary Programs................................................................. 153 
4 Young Offender Diversion ............................................................................. 155 
5 Other Forms of Diversion ............................................................................... 157 
F FLRT-Utility for Young Offenders .................................................................... 157 
1 The Northern Territory ................................................................................... 159 
2 The Australian Capital Territory ..................................................................... 160 
3 Queensland ...................................................................................................... 160 
4 New South Wales ............................................................................................ 160 
5 Victoria ........................................................................................................... 161 
6 South Australia................................................................................................ 161 
7 Western Australia............................................................................................ 162 
8 Tasmania ......................................................................................................... 162 
ix 
 
G FLRT-Utility in Youth Detention Centres .......................................................... 163 
1 The Northern Territory ................................................................................... 163 
2 The Australian Capital Territory ..................................................................... 164 
3 Queensland ...................................................................................................... 164 
4 New South Wales ............................................................................................ 165 
5 Victoria ........................................................................................................... 165 
6 South Australia................................................................................................ 166 
7 Western Australia............................................................................................ 167 
8 Tasmania ......................................................................................................... 168 
H FLRT-Utility for Young Offenders Post-Release ............................................... 169 
1 The Northern Territory ................................................................................... 169 
2 The Australian Capital Territory ..................................................................... 169 
3 Queensland ...................................................................................................... 170 
4 New South Wales ............................................................................................ 170 
5 Victoria ........................................................................................................... 170 
6 South Australia................................................................................................ 171 
7 Western Australia............................................................................................ 171 
8 Tasmania ......................................................................................................... 172 
I FLRT-Utility in Custodial Programs .................................................................. 172 
1 The Northern Territory ................................................................................... 175 
2 The Australian Capital Territory ..................................................................... 175 
3 Queensland ...................................................................................................... 176 
4 New South Wales ............................................................................................ 176 
5 Victoria ........................................................................................................... 178 
6 South Australia................................................................................................ 179 
7 Western Australia............................................................................................ 179 
8 Tasmania ......................................................................................................... 180 
J FLRT-Utility Post-Release ................................................................................. 181 
1 The Northern Territory ................................................................................... 181 
2 The Australian Capital Territory ..................................................................... 181 
3 Queensland ...................................................................................................... 182 
4 New South Wales ............................................................................................ 182 
5 Victoria ........................................................................................................... 182 
6 South Australia................................................................................................ 183 
7 Western Australia............................................................................................ 183 
8 Tasmania ......................................................................................................... 183 
V Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 184 
 
CHAPTER 6 .................................................................................................................. 185 
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL PERMISSIBILITY OF INTEGRATING FLRT INTO THE 
AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ......................................................... 185 
I Introduction ............................................................................................................. 185 
II The Concept of Punishment .................................................................................... 187 
A The Retributivist Theory of Punishment............................................................. 188 
B The Utilitarian Theory of Punishment ................................................................ 189 
C Adversarial Compatibility — Condemnation ..................................................... 191 
x 
 
D The Reduced Condemnatory Emphasis in Non-Adversarialism ........................ 192 
III The Concept of Rehabilitation ................................................................................ 196 
A The Rehabilitation Theory: Features of an Effective Forensic Rehabilitation 
Model .......................................................................................................................... 197 
1 Recidivism-Reduction..................................................................................... 198 
IV Human Rights ......................................................................................................... 200 
B The Universality of Human Rights ..................................................................... 206 
1 Offender-Rehabilitation Management ............................................................ 208 
2 A Human Rights Framework and the GLM ................................................... 209 
3 Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence ............................................... 210 
4 Human Rights and Ethical Offender Assessment and Treatment ................... 211 
V The Grey Matters of Neuroethics ........................................................................... 213 
VI Rule-of-Law Principles ........................................................................................... 215 
A Supremacy of Regular Law over Arbitrary Powers ............................................ 216 
B Privileging Judicial Process ................................................................................ 217 
C Equality Before the Law ..................................................................................... 218 
1 Generality ........................................................................................................ 218 
2 Aspirational Rule-of-Law Adherence ............................................................. 221 
3 Beyond Therapeutic Jurisprudence Beneficence ............................................ 223 
VII Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 225 
 
CHAPTER 7 .................................................................................................................. 229 
ON THE PRACTICALITIES OF INTEGRATING FLRT INTO THE AUSTRALIAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ................................................................................... 229 
I Introduction ............................................................................................................. 229 
II Natural Justice and Therapeutic Justice Compared ................................................ 230 
A The Hearing Rule and Therapeutic Lawyering Compared ................................. 231 
B The Bias Rule and Therapeutic Judging Compared ........................................... 234 
1 Paternalism and Coercion ............................................................................... 243 
2 Guilty Plea — Unnecessary ............................................................................ 246 
C The No-Evidence Rule and Therapeutic Evidence Compared ........................... 247 
D Judicial Integrity ................................................................................................. 248 
1 Independence .................................................................................................. 248 
(a) Therapeutic Jurisprudence Interdependence ............................................... 250 
(b) Multidisciplinary and Collaborative Treatment .......................................... 250 
(c) Therapeutic Outcome-Maximization .......................................................... 252 
(d) Individual Rehabilitation ............................................................................ 254 
2 Certainty .......................................................................................................... 256 
(a) Therapeutic-Jurisprudence-Enhanced Discretion: Potentially Inequitable 
Decisions Threaten Certainty .................................................................................. 257 
E The Incommensurability of Therapeutic Justice with Natural Justice ................ 260 
III Sentencing ............................................................................................................... 261 
A General Deterrence ............................................................................................. 261 
B Rehabilitation ...................................................................................................... 262 
C Treatment Reports ............................................................................................... 264 
IV Limitations of FLRT-Integration ............................................................................ 265 
xi 
 
A Cautionary Remarks about FLRT-Integration .................................................... 267 
B FLRT-Administration ......................................................................................... 269 
C FLRT is Not an Immediate Cure ........................................................................ 271 
V Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 273 
 
CHAPTER 8 .................................................................................................................. 275 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................... 275 
I Thesis Summary...................................................................................................... 275 
II Future Recommendations — Shaping the Future of Neurolaw .............................. 279 
A Neurolegal Harmonization .................................................................................. 280 
B Public Education ................................................................................................. 281 
C Judicial Education ............................................................................................... 281 
D Toward Collaboration between Lawyers and Scientists ..................................... 283 
E A Neuroscientific Basis to Aid Clarification of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Ambiguity ................................................................................................................... 284 
F The Existing Best Practice Guide ....................................................................... 286 
III Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................... 288 
IV BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 291 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xii 
 
CASES CITED 
 
Baker v Vermont, 744 A 2d 864, 888 (1999) 
Confos v DPP [2004] NSWSC 1159 
Director of Public Prosecutions v El Mawas [2006] NSWLR 93 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys [1977] AC 1 
Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 343 
Dokowicz v Police [2008] SASC 154 
DPP v Albon 2000 NSWSC 896 
Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] QB 729 
In re Gault, 387 US 1, (1967) 
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 
Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2009) 239 CLR 531 
Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1992] 2 AC 349 
M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & F 200, 8 ER 718 
Mann v O’Neill (1996–97) 191 CLR 204 
Mason-Stuart v R (1993) 61 SASR 204 
Murray v Legal Services Commission (1999) 46 NSWLR 224 
Paparone v The Queen (2000) 112 A Crim R 190 
Parsons v State, 81 Ala 577, 2 So 854 (1886) 
R v Foy [1960] Qd R 225 
R v Maddeford (2001) 120 A Crim R 497 
R v Porter [1933] HCA 1 
R v Presser (1994) 181 CLR 230 
R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7 
R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 
R v Scognamiglio (1991) 56 A Crim R 81 
R v Trindall (2002) 133 A Crim R 119 
R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269 
Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 
South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 
United States v Riggs, 370 F 3d 382 (4
th
 Cir, 2004), vacated by 125 S Ct 1015 (2005) 
Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 
Woodbridge v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 503 
  
xiii 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
ACC   Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
BOLD   Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent 
C1 Category One (Facet of Personality — poor impulse-control 
in the absence of a defined mental disorder) 
C2 Category Two (Impulse-Control Disorder — poor impulse-
control as a defined mental disorder) 
C3 Category Three (Poor impulse-control as a diagnostic 
criterion for a mental disorder) 
C4 Category Four (Poor impulse-control as an additional 
significant problem to a mental disorder) 
DSM-5 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth 
Edition    
FLRT   Frontal Lobe Rehabilitation Treatment 
fMRI Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
GLM    Good Lives Model of Offender-Rehabilitation 
GLM-FM  Good Lives Model of Forensic Mental Health 
GNG    Go/No-Go Impulse-Control Task 
MHDCts Mental Health Diversion Courts 
MRI    Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
NeuroDiversion The union of neuroscience to diversion from punishment into 
treatment 
Neurolaw The intersection of neuroscience and law 
Neuroplasticity Changes in neural pathways and synapses 
PFC  Prefrontal Cortex  
RNR Model Risk-Need-Responsivity Model of Offender-Rehabilitation 
rt-fMRI  Real-Time Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
vmPFC  Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Educate your children to self-control, to the habit of holding passion and 
prejudice and evil tendencies subject to an upright and reasoning will, and you 
have done much to abolish misery from their future and crimes from society.’ 
— Benjamin Franklin 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Self-control might be as passionate and as active as the surrender to passion ...’ 
— W Somerset Maugham, Of Human Bondage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘The enemy is within the gates; it is with our own luxury, our own folly, our own 
criminality that we have to contend.’ 
— Marcus Tullius Cicero 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1  
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I THESIS ENQUIRY 
 
The topic of this thesis, ‘NeuroDiversion’1 integrates and synthesises themes and 
knowledge from within the following:  
 
 the emergent area of neurolaw, reflecting the intersection of neuroscience and 
law; 
 the prevalence of mental illness among offenders; 
 the role of impulse-control in offending; 
 the ineffectiveness of incarceration based on recidivism rates; and 
 Mental Health Diversion Courts (hereinafter ‘MHDCts’), which are predicated 
on therapeutic jurisprudence and advocate offender-rehabilitation and societal 
reintegration. 
 
This thesis seeks to examine the theoretical and practical implications of the 
incorporation of frontal lobe rehabilitation treatment (hereinafter ‘FLRT’) for impulse-
control management in the rehabilitation of criminal offenders, with a view to achieving 
an overall reduction in crime (both in prison population and recidivism). 
 
An initiative born of ‘neurolaw’ — an emergent area combining neuroscience (the 
empirical study of the brain and nervous system) with law — FLRT involves the non-
invasive detection of brain structure and function. Based on the prevalence of poor 
impulse-control among criminal offenders, the treatment allows users to strengthen the 
influence of their prefrontal cortex, which specializes in long-term decision-making and 
impulse-control. The treatment is designed to improve long-term consideration and 
                                                 
1
  A portmanteau created by the author combining ‘neuroscience’ and ‘diversion’, pertaining 
specifically to diversion from punishment into rehabilitative treatment. 
  2  
control over impulsivity, to enable offenders to receive ‘neurofeedback’ to retrain their 
brains towards pro-social behaviour, thereby reducing their proclivity toward criminal 
behaviour and offending. 
 
Consonant with the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence — ‘the study of the role of the 
law as a therapeutic agent’2 — FLRT arises from the union of neuroscience and diversion 
from punishment into treatment: hence the term ‘NeuroDiversion’. This thesis argues that 
responsible incorporation of this rehabilitative mechanism advances the therapeutic 
jurisprudence agenda and its attendant insights, concepts and benefits. 
 
 
A The Current Problem Stated 
 
 
The impetus for FLRT was born out of recognition of over-crowding in prisons and high 
recidivism rates
3
 — matters that problematically pervade both the Australian4 and the 
American legal systems. The United States of America is the ‘incarceration leader of the 
world’,5 which is extremely expensive in both monetary and human terms.6 This thesis 
examines a potential strategy for enhancing Australian offender-rehabilitative 
mechanisms, with a view to ultimately contributing to the current policy trend
7
 of 
                                                 
2
  David B Wexler and Bruce J Winick (eds), Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press, 1996) xvii. 
3
  David M Eagleman and Sarah Isgur Flores, ‘Defining a Neurocompatibility Index for Criminal 
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diverting offenders from prison. In the impassioned words of Eric Holder, Attorney-
General of the United States of America: 
 
this is our solemn obligation, as stewards of the law, and servants of those whom it protects and 
empowers: … [t]o fight for the sweeping systemic changes we need.8 
 
 
This thesis identifies the utility of FLRT in both mainstream courts
9
 and diversionary 
schemes or problem-solving courts, which are underpinned by the concept of therapeutic 
jurisprudence. The emphasis on MHDCts specifically is twofold: the prevalence of 
mental illness among offenders;
10
 and the notion that although poor impulse-control is 
not in itself a mental illness, impulsivity is implicated as a specific diagnostic criterion in 
many mental disorders and/or is considered an additional significant problem for 
someone with a mental disorder. Relevantly, this thesis also identifies the (lack of) 
existing provisions in the regular criminal justice system for treating someone suffering 
from poor impulse-control in the absence of a mental illness that is sufficiently serious to 
qualify them for regular diversionary processes. 
 
 
B Previous Solutions to the Problem 
 
 
Rehabilitation, upon which there is a growing emphasis,
11
 as opposed to incarceration — 
‘a spectacular failure in terms of deterrence and rehabilitation’12 — is a more cost-
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effective solution in the long term.
13
 However, the question of how to rehabilitate 
mentally ill offenders has remained problematic. The United States of America typifies 
the costly and deleterious effects
14
 of these commonalities. It stands to reason that: 
 
Many critics, including judges, are eager to find better approaches for dealing with the mental 
health offender problems that are implicated in such a large part of the criminal courts. They are 
also eager to find new diagnostic and prediction tools that can enable society to do a better job 
distinguishing between those for whom some treatment model may work and those for whom 
incarceration is the best option. Current approaches and explanations are not doing the job.
 15
 
 
Various jurisdictions around the world have responded with measures aimed at diverting 
individuals with mental illnesses away from the criminal justice system.
16
 Examples of 
such alternative criminal justice processes are MHDCts and diversion programs.
17
 In the 
United States of America alone there are 280
18
 mental health diversion courts in 
operation. MHDCts are a product of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship, which 
promotes a rehabilitative rather than a punitive response to criminal behaviour.
19
 
 
For offenders suffering from a mental impairment,
20
 MHDCts ascertain the reasons 
behind the individual’s criminal behaviour and offer treatment programs to address his or 
her offending, thereby creating alternative sentencing options for the judiciary. Such 
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courts meet the needs of individuals who have committed minor and summary offences. 
By facilitating the involvement of community-based service providers in addressing the 
behaviours linked to the offending, MHDCt treatment programs engage the criminal 
justice system with the health and disability service system.
21
 
 
C Thesis Solution 
 
 
There is a growing body of research in neuroscience that promises significant potential 
for offender-rehabilitation. Indeed, it has been argued that ‘this intersection of different 
technologies, analytic methods, and legal contexts may ultimately allow for a more 
effective and fair legal system’.22 Presently, no guide exists for the theoretical and 
practical matters that should be considered when determining whether and how this 
emergent scientific research is to be incorporated in the legal arena: ‘it remains unclear 
how the legal system — at the courtroom, regulatory, and policy levels — will resolve 
the many challenges that new neuroscience applications raise’.23 
 
The neural understanding of behaviours has the potential to redefine this rehabilitation, 
tackle recidivism and address mental illness in offenders. A new model of treatment is 
facilitated through the concept of neuroplasticity and interpreted through neuroimaging. 
Neuroplasticity refers to the plasticity or changeability in neural pathways and synapses 
due to changes in behavioural, environmental and neural processes. No longer is the brain 
considered a physiologically static organ; both its structure and functional organization 
can change. Neuroscientific research has shown that humans possess the ability to rewire 
their brain by re-sculpturing how they think (and behave) through conscious effort and 
‘neurological exercises’.24  
                                                 
21
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Neuroimaging enables the study of the ‘structure and function of living brains in situ, 
with hitherto-unprecedented detail’.25 Viewing neural activity26 provides insights into the 
psychology and cognition of the brain, as well as a deeper insight into thought processes. 
Behavioural testing and neuroimaging evidence offer a potentially accurate method of 
predicting human behaviour.
27
  
 
This thesis thus advocates FLRT as a treatment in keeping with the Good Lives Model 
(GLM) of offender-rehabilitation and then identifies the utility of FLRT in mainstream 
courts and diversionary schemes or problem-solving courts as underpinned by therapeutic 
jurisprudence. 
 
1 Frontal Lobe Rehabilitation Treatment 
 
The frontal lobe is located in the area of the brain that is responsible for, among other 
things, impulse-control and long-term decision-making. The ‘prefrontal work-out’,28 as 
termed by neuroscientist Dr David Eagleman, capitalises on the ‘inner parliament’29 of 
the brain and is designed to cultivate ‘reflection before action’.30 This ‘rehabilitative 
strategy gives the frontal lobes practice in squelching short-term circuits’.31 It relies upon 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a neuroimaging procedure using 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology that measures brain activity by detecting 
associated changes in blood flow.
32
 This technique harnesses the association of cerebral 
blood flow and neuronal activation: when an area of the brain is in use, blood flow to that 
region also increases.  
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Developed by Assistant Professor Stephen LaConte, a pioneer in the development of real-
time feedback in fMRI, and Assistant Professor Pearl Chiu, an expert in psychology and 
addiction who has led experiments employing the technology to cure cigarette smokers of 
their addiction, the ‘prefrontal work-out’ engages real-time feedback in brain imaging to 
facilitate this treatment.
33
 
 
2 Impulse-Control  
 
Poor impulse-control is a hallmark characteristic of the majority of criminals in the prison 
system.
34
 Offenders generally know the difference between right and wrong, and 
understand the seriousness of punishment, but are hamstrung by an inability to control 
their impulses and choose socially acceptable actions. ‘[T]heir actions override reasoned 
consideration of the future’35 because ‘the frontal lobe circuits representing long-term 
considerations do not always win elections against short-term desire when temptation is 
present’.36 Frontal lobe treatment is a technique to allow users to strengthen the influence 
of their prefrontal cortex, which, as stated above, specializes in long-term decision-
making and impulse-control.
37
 An example of ‘technological developments that allow 
non-invasive detection of brain activities’,38 the neural activity can be shown directly to 
an individual so that they can see when their brain is craving, and learn how to lower that 
neural activity by strengthening other, long-term, decision-making mechanisms. This 
                                                 
33
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frontal lobe treatment would enable offenders to receive customized ‘neurofeedback’39 
treatments designed to retrain their brains towards pro-social behaviour, all the while ‘the 
individual [is] in the driver’s seat of his own neural circuitry’.40 ‘The approach leaves the 
brain intact — no drugs or surgery — and uses the natural mechanisms of brain plasticity 
to help the brain help itself.’41 
 
D Brief Overview of the Literature 
 
 
[A] revolutionary idea about the brain: the ability of mere thought to alter the physical structure 
and function of our gray matter.
42
 
 
 
The neologism, ‘neurolaw’,43 was first coined in 1991. Combining neuroscience — the 
empirical study of the brain and nervous system
44
 — with the law, ‘neurolaw’ places 
legal matters within a scientific construct. This enhances the potential for the law, which 
is inherently concerned with regulating human behaviour,
45
 to be informed by 
neuroscientific explanations of human behaviour arising from brain activity. 
 
1 Current Neurolegal Discourse 
 
It is the duty of every academic to argue for the importance of their field, and to tout the recent 
advances and expansion that it has undergone. Despite the clichéd ubiquity of this pattern, … 
neuroscience and our understanding of the functioning of the brain has undergone a particularly 
dramatic example of this expansion.
46
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The topography of neurolegal discourse originated from, and remains concentrated in, the 
United States of America. Neuroscience itself, through imaging and lesion studies, is 
helping to identify injuries or other impairments to functional brain systems that can be 
identified through scanning.
47
 Damage to certain regions associated with empathy, rules-
compliance, and moderating aggression or triggering inhibition has been found in 
subjects exhibiting antisocial behaviour. This kind of damage can be due to childhood 
maltreatment
48
 or post-traumatic or other stressors, and can result from alcohol or other 
substance abuse.
49
  
 
Damage can be the result of physical trauma, as in the classic historical case of Phineas 
Gage.
50
 Arguably the most famous patient in the history of neuropsychology, Gage was a 
young railroad foreman who sustained an incredible injury when a premature explosion 
drove a tamping iron through his left cheek and out of the vault of his skull. His 
prefrontal cortex ‘was selectively destroyed … and it transformed him, virtually 
overnight, from a taciturn, reliable foreman’51 to being 
 
fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was not previously his 
custom), manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when it 
conflicts with his desires .... A child in his intellectual capacity and manifestations, he has the 
animal passions of a strong man .... His mind was radically changed, so decidedly that his friends 
and acquaintances said he was “no longer Gage”.52   
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Today, prefrontal cortex dysfunction is most relevant to legal matters, namely, when the 
frontal cortex is damaged.
53
 This is because of its role in higher mental functions, such as 
cognition and comprehension. Since the era of Gage, extensive literature links prefrontal 
cortex damage with impulse-control, antisocial behaviour and criminality.
54
 
 
(a) Insanity Defence 
 
Existing research includes the application of neuroscience in the courtroom, how 
neuroscience can and should be used legally, and how the law is created and applied.
55
 
Specific areas of investigation include the neuroscientific contribution to the insanity 
defence, where the claim is that the brain ‘made someone do it’. In such cases, the 
argument is based on an understanding that decisions are made before the accused person 
is able to consciously realise what is happening. More research on control and inhibition 
envisages further modifications to the insanity defence.
56
  
 
(b) Volition 
 
Other areas of research include impaired functioning of the prefrontal cortex. Individual 
variations that impair the prefrontal cortex are detrimental to the decision-making 
process, and expose an individual to a greater likelihood of committing a crime that he or 
she would otherwise have not committed.
57
 Researchers argue that contemporary 
neuroscience can assist lawmakers to decide whether to adopt or retain the defence 
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known as the ‘irresistible impulse’ defence or the ‘control’ or ‘volitional’ test for 
insanity.
58
  
 
(c) Brain Death 
 
Injuries or illnesses that lead to a persistent vegetative state have come to the forefront of 
ethical, legal and scientific issues regarding brain death.
59
 Research to determine a 
person’s cognitive state has helped develop an understanding of the vegetative state. 
Engaging fMRI technology, there is potential for medical imaging to be used to 
understand the implications of brain death, and to elucidate legal, scientific and ethical 
questions pertaining to brain death.
60
 
 
(d) Nootropics 
 
Neurolaw has also extended its ambit to the consideration of nootropics, calling into 
question the legality of medications that specifically target and alter brain function
61
 and 
assessing the right to substance experimentation to modify individual cognition.
62
 
 
(e) Acquired Paedophilia and Drug Addiction 
 
Thoroughly documented areas include ‘acquired paedophilia’63 resulting from damage to 
the orbital prefrontal cortex, indicating a deficit in the acquisition of moral and social 
rules.
64
 In relation to addiction and drugs, Eagleman anticipates the ‘[m]andated response 
of society through law to a convicted addict may be significantly changed when 
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considered from a neurolaw perspective’.65 Indeed, neuroscience is providing new 
perspectives on addiction in the drug context
66
 and upon drug courts
67
 where new 
evidence-based practices are being applied to the post-conviction supervision and 
treatment for addicts.
68
 These efforts are furthered by the supply of prescription drugs, 
such as naltrexone, ‘that can, at least in many sufferers, effectively counteract the 
chemistry of addiction in various contexts’.69 
 
(f) Lie Detection, Unconscious Bias, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility 
 
Neuroscientific research in the area of lie detection has analysed specific regions of the 
brain to uncover patterns of truth-telling, deception and false memory.
70
 Further 
experiments have considered the presence of ‘unconscious bias’ and its potential use in 
screening jurors or judges for the presence of bias.
71
 Other areas of research include brain 
development and criminal responsibility in adolescents.
72
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(g) Criminal Responsibility and Free Will 
 
The overwhelming majority of literature in the area of neurolaw considers matters 
surrounding criminal responsibility and free will. It has been argued that ‘discoveries of 
neuroscience undermine common assumptions about free will and, with that, assumptions 
about both responsibility and autonomy’.73  
 
Like Eagleman, there are those who believe that neuroscience may ultimately force us to 
accept a revolutionary new conception of criminal responsibility. Justice Ian Donald, 
chairman of the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s Education Committee, suggests that 
‘[w]e might have to face up to a profound change in our concept of criminal 
responsibility’;74 indeed, 
 
the law ought to abandon concepts like responsibility and guilt, concepts that arose from a naive, 
pre-scientific understanding of human behavior. … [T]he fact remains that responsibility and guilt 
are anachronisms, antiquated concepts that must vanish alongside our disappearing free will.
75
 
 
However, this thesis will not perpetuate the argument over the eradication of guilt and 
criminal responsibility. The notion of ‘a world of criminal justice in which there is no 
blame and only prior causes’76 is not advanced. Stephen Morse, Professor of Law and 
Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, suggests that causation is not an excusing 
condition and that neuroscience ‘is just another part of the full causal explanation of 
human behavior’.77 Just because a defendant has a cause that is not under his control does 
not mean he is not responsible for his crime. A person can suffer from a severe and 
persistent mental illness and yet still, under the law, be responsible for his actions 
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because he does not meet the legal criteria for an excuse. This thesis does not advance a 
‘neuro-reductive explanation’78 of human behaviour and criminal responsibility. 
In line with the experiments of Benjamin Libet,
79
 revealing human beings to be ‘helpless 
automatons’, neuroscientist Vilayanur Ramachandran concluded that we have not free 
will but rather ‘free won’t’.80 However, the thesis will adopt the notion that brains do not 
commit crimes — people do.81 And even if a brain scan can confirm a particular 
condition, it is unlikely that it would be able to provide a strict yes or no answer 
regarding whether a defendant was responsible for an act.
82
 Free will approaches are not 
ultimately helpful in considering questions of criminal responsibility and punishment, 
because, in law, ‘philosophical questions of whether or not humans have free will are not 
relevant’.83 Thus, this thesis does not subscribe to the ‘fundamental psycho-legal error’,84 
that is, the error of thinking that causation of behaviour excuses an actor from 
responsibility for that behaviour. 
 
E Fertile Ground 
 
 
According to Goodenough and Tucker, mental illness ‘is a field of study ripe for law and 
neuroscience collaboration, but, with the exception of a few bright spots, so far relatively 
                                                 
78
  Walter Glannon, ‘The Limitations and Potential of Neuroimaging in the Criminal Law’ (2014) 18 
Journal of Ethics 153, 157. 
79
  Benjamin Libet et al, ‘Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity 
(Readiness-Potential) — The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act’ (1983) 106 Brain 
623; Benjamin Libet, ‘Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary 
Action’ (1985) 8 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 529. 
80
  V S Ramachandran, The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us Human (W 
W Norton, 2011). 
81
  S J Morse, ‘Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note’ (2006) 3 
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 397, 400. 
82
  Kayt Sukel, ‘Will Neuroscience Challenge the Legal Concept of Criminal Responsibility?’ (Briefing 
Paper, The Dana Foundation, May 2011). 
83
  The Royal Society, ‘Brain Waves Module 4: Neuroscience and the Law’ (Policy Document No 
05/11, Royal Society Science Policy Centre, December 2011) 12. 
84
  Stephen Morse, ‘Culpability and Control’ (1994) 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1587, 
1592; Michael S Moore, ‘Stephen Morse on the Fundamental Psycho-Legal Error’ Criminal Law 
and Philosophy, published online 26 February 2014 
 <http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/438/art%253A10.1007%252Fs11572-014-9299-
0.pdf?auth66=1401938880_fbd0a48e4a425ea9ab6f80ff95c08d12&ext=.pdf>. 
  15  
little has occurred’.85 The research that has taken place has often been linked to such 
criminally important conditions as psychopathy
86
 and paedophilia.
87
 What has been 
largely missing in neurolaw is an effort to engage with the legal problems of chronic 
mental illness of a less spectacular kind, such as depression, schizophrenia
88
 and 
behavioural problems caused by brain injury. Responses by the legal system, such as 
mental health diversion courts, hold promise for putting this new knowledge to work in 
positive ways.
89
 
 
The development of tailored responses such as those advanced by mental health diversion 
courts
90
 ‘shows a desire to get away from incarceration … as the principal weapon in the 
anticrime arsenal’.91 These developments had been underway before the genesis of 
neurolaw, but neuroscience has the potential to increase their effectiveness and accelerate 
their growth and influence.
92
  
 
Having identified fertile ground in the hitherto unharvested soil of the field of neurolaw
93
 
in relation to MHDCts, as well as acknowledging that an ‘Australian voice has been 
almost completely absent from this field within the international community of neurolaw 
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researchers’,94 the novel contribution of this thesis will be in the application of 
documented research in the neuroscience discipline as an aid to improve the law. 
 
A ‘neurocompatible’ criminal justice system, ‘aligned with current knowledge about 
human brain science and psychology’95 would ‘translate … biological understanding into 
customized rehabilitation’.96 Such a system acknowledges different brains and utilizes 
specialized court systems that ‘embed expertise with … mental illness’.97 New 
rehabilitative strategies can be forged by a ‘biologically informed jurisprudence’,98 where 
individual rehabilitation is customized commensurate with neuroplasticity capability. 
This thesis will identify suggestions in response to ‘the truly vexing problem of 
incorporating neuroscience responsibly into our criminal justice system’.99 Neuroscience 
may provide an ‘adjunctive or supportive role’100 to court-mandated treatment, yet the 
integrity of the law must be upheld so that it remains consistent with ‘established 
principles of fairness and justice’.101 Among similarly relevant considerations, the crux of 
this research lies in the reconciling of neural nuances with established legal principles, 
the intersection of which, original contribution to the knowledge and understanding of 
neurolaw is forged. 
 
II A NOTE ABOUT METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology of this thesis is uncomplicated and considers law as a therapeutic agent. 
Differing from rigorous methodologies peculiar to other social science disciplines or pure 
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science disciplines, this legal methodology looks at FLRT as an initiative born of 
NeuroDiversion to reduce the anti-therapeutic consequences of law in this context. In the 
words of the late Professor Winick: 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence builds on the insight that the law itself can be seen to function as a kind 
of therapist or therapeutic agent. Legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such 
as lawyers and judges) constitute social forces that, whether intended or not, often produce 
therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. Therapeutic jurisprudence calls for the study of these 
consequences with the tools of the social sciences to identify them and to ascertain whether the 
law’s antitherapeutic effects can be reduced, and its therapeutic effects enhanced, without 
subordinating due process and other justice values.
102
 
 
 
As a methodology or ‘distinct paradigm of inquiry’,103 therapeutic jurisprudence is 
‘designed to produce scholarship useful for understanding the human impact of law in the 
broadest sense and with the ultimate purpose of being useful for legal reform’.104  Based 
on this, the methodology involves the explication of incorporating neuroscience into both 
mainstream courts and MHDCts to enhance therapeutic outcomes. Examined are the 
therapeutic (and anti-therapeutic) outcomes of incorporating emergent customized 
neuroscientific frontal lobe rehabilitation treatment in those courts with specific reference 
to the implications upon legal rules, legal procedures and the role of legal actors (lawyers 
and judges).  
 
It is argued that a therapeutic jurisprudential methodology represents ‘a path to greater 
enlightenment about the law’.105 In support of this, the thesis terrain comprises a mix of 
theoretical, doctrinal, practical and normative issues and analysis. The jurisprudential 
method of theoretical research, along with law reform and policy-based research, has 
been employed.
106
 Both soft-copy and hard-copy sources such as scholarly articles and 
commentary, books, case law and legislation further inform this research.  
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A Scope 
 
 
This thesis considers mainstream courts and diversionary schemes within Australia, and 
due to the fact the United States of America is the lead country in neurolaw, 
predominantly American literature informs the analysis. 
 
 
B Structure 
 
 
The following chapter, Chapter 2, encapsulates the foundational bases of the thesis. The 
concept of therapeutic jurisprudence as a premise whereby the law assists an offender, 
which in turn assists society, is discussed. FLRT, a product of neuroscience and diversion 
from punishment into treatment, is considered as a means to enhance the rehabilitative 
ideal of therapeutic jurisprudence. The challenge posed by therapeutic jurisprudence to 
the regular criminal justice system, and the rule of law principles upon which it is based, 
are considered.  
 
The neuroscientific basis of the thesis is then established. This includes the definition and 
history of neuroscience, neuroplasticity and neuroimaging technology. The frontal lobe 
treatment is further explored and the relevance of impulse-control to the treatment is 
expounded. 
 
Consideration is then given to the relationship between impulse-control and mental 
illness. An analysis of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth 
Edition (DSM-5),
107
 reveals four categories of impulse-control. The link between mental 
illness and offending is then explored. 
 
Chapter 3 advocates FLRT as a treatment concordant with the predominant model of 
offender-rehabilitation, the Good Lives Model (GLM). The theory of criminal conduct 
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and the universally recognized Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) Model of offender-
rehabilitation are also examined. The relevance of FLRT is argued with particular 
emphasis on the role of impulse-control in the aetiology of offending. This is identified as 
a shortfall in the existing system, whereby at present the importance of poor impulse-
control — and its consequent treatment — in the aetiology of criminal offending is 
insufficiently considered. The formalities of FLRT becoming a recognized, accredited, 
prescribed rehabilitative treatment are also outlined. 
 
Chapter 4 then turns to address the different options available to offenders with mental 
illnesses within the six States and two Territories of Australia. The role of diversion is 
examined, as well as the varying types of diversion. The central analysis of the thesis 
commences with a review of the existing court-mandated opportunities for offender-
rehabilitation through mental health diversionary mechanisms and/or the regular criminal 
justice system in each State and Territory in Australia. FLRT-utilization (compatible with 
the GLM) for categorized impulse-control management within this existing framework is 
then explicated. 
 
In Chapter 5, a critique of FLRT-utilization within the existing framework elucidates the 
argument for diversifying this therapeutic practice by widening its jurisdictional ambit. 
The utility of FLRT as part of court-mandated rehabilitative treatment, rather than full 
diversion, for major indictable offences in superior courts is advocated. The use of FLRT 
in tribunals that assess the continued detention of both civilly committed and forensic 
patients, as well as those that determine issues of mental responsibility, are also 
considered. Optimal FLRT-utilization may extend to other diversionary schemes, 
including police diversion, drug diversion and indigenous-specific diversionary 
programs. Youth offenders may also benefit from FLRT — in a diversionary capacity, as 
well as in detention and post-release. The value of FLRT in adult custodial programs and 
post-release programs is also advanced. 
 
Chapter 6 considers the theoretical implications of the integration of FLRT as a 
neuroscientific insight. The integration of customized rehabilitation for impulse-control 
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management within traditional and modern conceptions of punishment and rehabilitation 
are assessed. Recidivism-reduction as a theoretical impetus to the scholarship is also 
considered. International human rights obligations and ethical considerations surrounding 
FLRT are also examined. Other theoretical concerns include the relevance of the rule of 
law, or more specifically the notion of equality before the law. 
 
Chapter 7 contains an assessment of some practical implications of FLRT-integration. 
Natural justice and therapeutic justice are considered, as well as the impact of therapeutic 
jurisprudence concepts upon judicial integrity. Matters surrounding paternalism and 
coercion are addressed. Limitations, such as the prohibitive costs of brain-scanning, and 
criticisms of the emergent science are also addressed. Deliberated further are matters 
relevant to the use of fMRI equipment, data interpretation and staff-training. This chapter 
also emphasizes that as FLRT is not a cure for impulsivity; treatment must be on-going in 
order to prevent relapse.  
 
Conclusions and recommendations are offered in Chapter 8. Particular weight is afforded 
to the utility of FLRT as a practical recidivism measurement. FLRT, as a derivative of 
NeuroDiversion, and essentially an extension of existing diversionary schemes, is 
advanced as a rehabilitative device for managing impulse-control in criminal offenders — 
an advancement that is ultimately reflective of societal maturation and legal prescience.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
CLARIFICATORY MATTERS: THESIS BASES 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, this thesis proffers FLRT as the mechanism through 
which NeuroDiversion operates. It is under the umbrella of therapeutic jurisprudence that 
the incorporation of this rehabilitative mechanism is advanced and recommended. The 
foundational bases of the thesis discussed in this chapter primarily include, and draw 
upon, the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence, whereby the goal of the law is to assist the 
offender, which in turn will assist society at large. 
 
This chapter begins with the history of the therapeutic jurisprudence movement, as well 
as its operational arm in terms of problem-solving courts, and MHDCts in particular. The 
concepts underpinning therapeutic jurisprudence are also explicated. The challenge posed 
by therapeutic jurisprudence to the regular criminal justice system, and the rule of law 
principles upon which it is based, are introduced, although they will be more fully 
elaborated in Chapter 6. Another foundational basis addressed includes the creation of 
neurolaw from neuroscience and law.  
 
In addition, the role of executive functioning in the frontal lobe is explained in this 
chapter, with specific emphasis on impulse-control. The neuroscientific grounds to the 
concept of FLRT are stated and an explanation of the treatment is provided. 
 
Finally, this chapter introduces the relationship between impulse-control and mental 
illness. The suggested categorization of impulse-control is informed by the DSM-5, and 
the discretionary ‘NeuroDiversion test’ is suggested as a means to determine the utility of 
FLRT for an offender suffering from poor impulse-control in the absence of a defined 
mental disorder. The link between mental illness and offending is also explored. 
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II THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
 
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Introduced 
 
 
[A]nimate new work on the boundaries of the social sciences and the law.
108
 
 
 
Coined as a concept in 1987
109
 and perpetuated by Professors Wexler and Winick, the 
interdisciplinary scholarship of therapeutic jurisprudence builds on the insight that 
‘therapeutic’ is defined as promoting the advancement and well-being of the offender, the 
community and society.
110
 The therapeutic jurisprudential ‘lens’111 focuses on therapeutic 
outcome-maximization, collaborative treatment and individual rehabilitation. 
 
Proponents of therapeutic regard it as a ‘mechanism, vector, prism, lens’112 with a 
perspective that ‘sets the stage for … articulation and debate’ with the ‘potential of 
reinvigorating the field’.113 This means that it ‘focuses on the law’s impact on emotional 
life and psychological well-being’.114 The goal of therapeutic jurisprudence is to 
overcome the limitations of the adversarial model traditionally adopted by the criminal 
justice system, particularly in relation to people with mental health impairments, by 
focusing on an individual’s needs, psychological functioning and emotional well-
being.
115
 Diversion is said to fall within the scope of therapeutic jurisprudence because 
diversionary programs attempt to help an accused person ‘develop skills that will enable 
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them to act differently in future situations where they may be at risk of committing a 
crime’.116 
 
Beginning as a scholarly approach to mental health law, therapeutic jurisprudence has 
emerged as a popular mental health approach to law generally,
117
 as a ‘broad and all-
encompassing concept’.118 This graduation from a school of thought to an ‘affirmative 
reform effort that advocates a particular means of delivering justice’119 cements its 
challenge to modern adversarialism — and to the rule of law itself. Considered one of the 
key dimensions that determines the quality and good governance of a country,
120
 the rule 
of law embodies, and represents, the optimal functioning of the (adversarial) legal 
system. Therapeutic jurisprudence claims that the ‘lofty rhetoric surrounding the 
provision of legal services and decision-making’121 has a detrimental impact on legal 
stakeholders, and instead proffers ‘reforms that enable the legal system to focus more on 
problem-solving’.122 
 
1 The History of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
 
The history of the therapeutic movement, it has been said, ‘i[s] not a terribly satisfying 
theoretical one’.123 Law once was regarded as a set of formal principles that ordered 
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human behaviour. Under the nineteenth-century conception, judges were conceived of as 
state agents who merely ‘discovered’ and ‘applied’ the law in a more or less mechanical 
way, as though operating within a system of deductive logic.
124
 Judges did not ‘make’ the 
law; they simply located it in the common law or in legislation, and applied it to resolve 
the issue at hand. Although potentially a ‘naive and artificial conception’,125 it was 
against this backdrop of ‘perceived failures of traditional western-style justice 
processes’126 that an alternative perspective developed. Or, as American judge and jurist 
Oliver Wendell Holmes mused, such ‘failures’ comprised the ‘felt necessities of the time, 
the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or 
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men’.127 
 
The specific basis of law as a ‘therapeutic agent’128 is not precisely known. However, the 
history of the therapeutic jurisprudence movement does reflect the works of scholars 
Roscoe Pound
129
 and Oliver Wendell Holmes.
130
 Pound, an early sociological jurist, 
advocated the law in action. Holmes, regarded as the founder of the realist school of 
jurisprudence, implored his students to view the law pragmatically. He suggested that 
‘[t]he life of the law has not been logic’;131 rather, ‘it has been experience’.132 He then 
went on: ‘The law … cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and 
corollaries of a book of mathematics.’133 By exposing the ‘fallacy of the logical form’,134 
where the law should not be viewed as a ‘series of logical deductions from pre-existing 
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rules’,135 Holmes advocated the branching away from the strictures of ‘axioms and 
corollaries’, enabling law to move with the times, reflecting societal needs and 
advancements. 
 
The eminent dichotomy between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ is a distinction 
elaborated upon by Pound.
136
 It further upholds the notion that the law should not be 
reduced to static, prescriptive rules, but rather should embody the sociology and 
psychology of the time. Conceiving of law as having therapeutic and anti-therapeutic 
consequences can be seen as a response to societal needs and trends. Pound 
acknowledged the prolificacy of ‘pluralistic and competing cultures’137 and promulgated 
a more interventionist role for creative lawmaking. This is comparable to the inception of 
therapeutic jurisprudence whereby erudite lawmaking pays homage to Pound’s 
preoccupation with ‘unmet social needs’.138 
 
As Pound recognized, the common law is both a ‘body of authoritative materials’ and a 
‘judicial process’. This process itself is defined by a particular cognitive disposition or 
‘frame of mind’. ‘The judicial “frame of mind” endemic to the common law tradition 
requires a high level of restraint, discipline, craftsmanship, and careful reasoning.’139 It is 
‘a legal orientation’140 that has always ‘imposed upon itself limitations’.141 In the light of 
this, Pound implored the law to reconsider such limitations and ‘look to the relationship 
between itself and the social effects it creates’.142  
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At the intersection of Holmes’ and Pound’s insights one might find the genesis of 
therapeutic jurisprudence. For here one is charged with the ‘duty of weighing 
considerations of social advantage’143 and warned against the ‘pitfall of 
antiquarianism’144 in order to effect meaningful change and effectively harness the 
pluralities of society. The insights of such movements as the sociological jurisprudence of 
Pound and the legal realism of jurisprudential scholar Karl Llewellyn
145
 have advocated 
‘law as part of a rich tapestry of human interactions’,146 whereby delving beyond law’s 
formalisms to the deeper structures within facilitates an understanding of how law 
functions. Familiarization with political science, economics, anthropology, sociology and 
psychology is also recommended. On this basis, modern approaches to law have been 
interdisciplinary and empirical in character. Therapeutic jurisprudence is thus in line with 
these interdisciplinary insights.  
 
Although law is designed to serve various normative ends, modern scholars consider the 
extent to which these ends are furthered in practice. Once it is understood that rules of 
substantive law, legal procedures, and the roles of various actors in the legal system have 
either positive or negative effects on the health and mental health of the people they 
affect, the need to assess these therapeutic consequences is enhanced.
147
 Unlike law and 
psychology and social science in law, which are empirical in their methodology and 
purport to have no normative agenda, therapeutic jurisprudence is normative in its 
orientation. It posits that the therapeutic domain is important and ought to be understood 
and factored into legal decision-making. Indeed, this perpetuates Pound’s theory of law 
as a ‘tool of social engineering’ to be executed ‘with the least waste and inefficiency’.148 
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2 Therapeutic Jurisprudence Operationalized 
 
‘Problem-solving court’ is a broad term used to describe a specialist court that seeks to 
address the underlying issues associated with a legal problem through the use of 
processes such as judicial supervision of participants, a multidisciplinary team, 
collaborative decision-making processes, and the support of community agencies. 
  
Problem-solving courts originated in the United States of America, as a response by 
individual judges.
149
 Presented with increasing court lists, the ‘revolving door’150 of 
offending and reoffending, and the escalating ventilation of social problems in the legal 
arena, judges sought a creative remedy. Wexler and Winick promoted problem-solving 
courts as ‘care-based judicial alternatives’ to counter ‘rising rates of incarceration and 
recidivism’.151 The call for legal reform was further strengthened by court officials’ 
feelings of frustration at the narrow range of sentencing options and the debilitating 
effects of the legal system on those involved. It was deemed that the negative effects of 
adversarial processes are exacerbated by ‘psychological and social dysfunction’ from the 
‘retributive cycle of imprisonment and offending’.152 Proponents thus began calling 
adversarial legal processes ‘jurigenic’.153 Likened to ‘iatrogenic’ processes in the health 
care system where some patients suffer harmful, adverse events or death, the adversarial 
system is deemed to have harmful psychological effects on offenders and court 
personnel.
154
 In Australia, dissatisfaction with government responses to crime and their 
impact on offending rates, along with the need for a more cost-effective service that is 
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more responsive to the needs of court clients, have influenced the shift towards 
therapeutic jurisprudence as an innovative,
155
 ‘new way of doing justice’.156 
 
In an effort to break the cycle of reoffending,
157
 the therapeutic jurisprudence paradigm 
has moved courts away from their traditionally adversarial role towards ‘reforms that 
enable the legal system to focus more on problem-solving’.158 This is evident in various 
initiatives, including the establishment of specialist, or problem-solving, courts.
159
 Many 
of these specialist courts aim to reduce reoffending and, consequently, imprisonment.  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence underpins the practice of problem-solving courts,
160
 focusing 
on the underlying medical and social issues of those who come into contact with the 
justice system. Such courts and programs apply practices and ‘evidence-based 
interventions from the behavioural sciences to effectuate change and seek innovative 
solutions to complex social issues’.161 
 
Problem-solving courts include, inter alia, various kinds of drug courts, alcohol courts, 
family violence courts, mental health courts and community groups. Following their 
conception in the United States of America, a growing number of jurisdictions around the 
world have established problem-solving courts, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
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England, Ireland, New Zealand and Scotland. Australian problem-solving court programs 
have largely been the product of the involvement of the executive — and in some cases 
the legislature as well — with some local judicial initiatives. There are drug courts in 
New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. Several 
jurisdictions have family violence courts.
162
 Some have special mental health lists in 
magistrates’ courts. Victoria has the only community court in Australia. Australian 
problem-solving courts have been established almost entirely in the criminal jurisdiction. 
 
3 Mental Health Diversion Courts (MHDCts) 
 
A ‘practical legal innovation’,163 MHDCts are said to ‘connect defendants to therapeutic 
interventions including rehabilitative … mental health treatment’.164 In some mental 
diversion health courts, for example, the prosecutor brings criminal charges and the 
defendant is required to choose between pursuing the traditional adversarial route or 
pleading guilty to the charges and accepting conditions monitored by the diversion court. 
If the defendant chooses to plead guilty, the conditions of court-ordered treatment can be 
enforced with periods of incarceration if the defendant fails to comply. An offender is 
subject to treatment that can promote his or her interest in ameliorating his or her 
disorder, as well as the societal interest in reducing the risk of recidivism. Thus, the 
magistrate monitors the conditions of the court order through a cooperative process 
between the court, the defendant and the treatment providers, which is designed to 
advance the convergent interests of the defendant and the public.
165
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4 Therapeutic Jurisprudence Concepts 
 
[N]ew responses to chronic social, human and legal problems . . . that have proven resistant to 
conventional solutions, to broaden the focus of legal proceedings, from simply adjudicating past 
facts and legal issues to changing the future behaviour of litigants and ensuring the future well-
being of communities.
166
 
 
 
As a ‘field of inquiry’ and not a theory, therapeutic jurisprudence possesses prominent 
features or concepts, rather than established principles. The idea of law as a therapeutic 
agent
167
 is the concept that is central to the movement. Further features are informed by 
the ‘hallmarks of problem-solving justice’,168 as asserted by Berman and Feinblatt, as 
well as the ‘tripartite framework’169  for therapeutic problem-solving, as established by 
Wexler.  
 
Berman and Feinblatt’s ‘hallmarks’ include the redefining of goals such that the court 
becomes more concerned with outcomes ‘directed at resolving issues underlying the legal 
problem’ rather than ‘the legal outcome and the proper process for reaching that 
outcome’.170 The notion that judicial authority promotes compliance with court orders is 
considered a promising feature. Yet another hallmark is the contextualizing of problems 
considered by judicial officers and lawyers, widening their ambit of considerations to 
include ‘health, social, economic and relational aspects of the problem’.171 Additionally, 
the collaborative and creative nature of the movement promotes participation of the court 
team and ‘a more extensive engagement by the judicial officer with the participant’.172  
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Originating from the case of United States v Riggs,
173
 the tripartite framework adopted by 
Wexler consists of the ‘pertinent legal landscape’, being the rules and procedures 
operative in a jurisdiction, the ‘available treatment and services and practices and 
techniques’ comprising the roles and behaviours exhibited by judges, lawyers and 
therapists,
174
 and the therapeutic and anti-therapeutic impact of these. Moreover, 
therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that the law should seek to further therapeutic ends, 
but it does not suggest that therapeutic ends are the only ones that law should seek to 
accomplish, or the most important ends. In this way, therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to 
operate in accordance with rule-of-law principles. In the words of Wexler, ‘therapeutic 
goals should be achieved only within the limits of considerations of justice’, 
acknowledging that ‘law should be applied fairly, even-handedly, and non-
discriminatorily’.175 
 
Simply put, the foundational concepts of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship are based 
on law as a therapeutic agent, with the overarching premise of therapeutic outcome-
maximization through collaborative treatment and individual rehabilitation. 
 
III NEUROLAW 
 
 
The law needs neuroscience to evolve.
176
 
 
 
As therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship promotes a rehabilitative rather than a punitive 
response to criminal behaviour,
177
 studies in neurolaw could bolster the rehabilitative 
efforts of court systems, providing people with ‘an opportunity to receive more informed 
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sentencing, counselling, and rehabilitation,
178
 and ultimately increasing the likelihood of 
them staying out of the prison system. Arguably, anything that reduces recidivism and 
triggers to criminal activity is of therapeutic value. It is the contention of this thesis that 
the utility of FLRT through the creation of NeuroDiversion could thus enhance the 
therapeutic outcomes of the law. 
 
‘Law’, it has been said, ‘is an inveterate intellectual scavenger from advances in other 
fields’,179 with an ‘omnivorous taste for interdisciplinary knowledge’,180 and has 
welcomed the influence over its field. A legitimate discipline
181
 and ‘a recognized field of 
study’182 with an interdisciplinary basis, neurolaw explores the effects of discoveries in 
neuroscience upon legal rules and standards. Drawing from neuroscience, philosophy, 
social psychology, cognitive neuroscience and criminology, neurolaw practitioners seek 
to address not only the descriptive and predictive issues of how neuroscience is and will 
be used in the legal system, but also the normative issues of how neuroscience should and 
should not be used. Neurolaw considers how neuroscience will shape future aspects of 
legal processes.
183
 
  
Science and law are hardly new bedfellows. Efforts to employ science to predict criminal 
behaviour, for example, have a somewhat disreputable history. In the nineteenth century, 
Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso championed a theory of ‘biological criminality’, 
which held that criminals could be identified by certain physical characteristics, such as 
cranial size, jaw size or the bushiness of eyebrows.
184
 Invasive measures included 
labotomies, eugenics, phrenology and experimental psychosurgery.185 
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Various other individual theories
186
 have been advanced regarding criminality preceding 
neurolaw; however, neuroscience provides the law with a utility grounded in empirical 
scientific evidence, which therefore distinguishes it from previous arguably dubious 
science-law intersections. The data clearly suggest that there is growing interest on the 
part of law professors, and growing demand on the part of law reviews, for scholarship on 
law and the brain.
187
 Indeed, there has been ‘broad and quickly developing interest across 
the academy’,188 with a number of symposia on law and neuroscience being held in the 
United States of America over the past few years. Despite the notable infancy of the field, 
courses in Law and Neuroscience have been taught at a number of American law 
schools.
189
 
 
Neurolaw sagely argues that ‘[t]he science is undeniably potent’,190 yet it is the case that 
‘law and science are linked but distinct’,191 and ‘the big question is how to best use 
emerging insights into the human brain to ultimately accomplish the goals of law’.192 The 
‘emergence and current topography of neurolegal discourse’193 further advocates that 
‘[a]lthough the law must be responsive to scientific advances, it rightfully must retain 
control and temper technology with the social values it incorporates’.194  
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A Neuroscience 
 
 
[A]t the seat of our rationality is a three-pound organ, the brain.
195
 
 
 
Neuroscience, the scientific study of the nervous system, seeks to explain how human 
behaviour arises from brain activity.
196
 It has shed light on how the brain and certain 
mental processes operate, and research is revealing the complex links between brain 
activity, mental processes and behaviour.
197
 Indeed, ‘the innumerable facets of our 
behavior, thoughts and experience are inseparably yoked to … the nervous system’.198 
 
The study of the nervous system can be traced to ancient Egypt. Evidence of trepanation 
— the surgical practice of drilling a hole into the skull to ‘cure’ headaches or mental 
disorders, or relieving cranial pressure — dates back to Neolithic times and has been 
found in various cultures throughout the world.
199
 Early views on the function of the 
brain regarded it to be a ‘cranial stuffing’. In Egypt, from the late Middle Kingdom 
onwards, the brain was regularly removed in preparation for mummification. The view 
that the heart was the source of consciousness was not challenged until the time of the 
Greek physician, Hippocrates. He believed that the brain was not only involved with 
sensation, but was also the seat of intelligence. Plato also speculated that the brain was 
the seat of the rational part of the soul.
200
 
Studies of the brain became more sophisticated after the invention of the microscope and 
the development of a staining procedure by Camillo Golgi during the 1890s. The 
procedure used a silver chromate salt to reveal the intricate structures of individual 
neurons. His technique was used by Santiago Ramón y Cajal and led to the formation of 
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the neuron doctrine, the hypothesis being that the functional unit of the brain is the 
neuron. Parallel to this research, work with brain-damaged patients by Paul Broca 
suggested that certain regions of the brain were responsible for certain functions. At the 
time, Broca’s findings were seen as a confirmation of Franz Joseph Gall’s theory that 
language was localized and that certain psychological functions were localized in specific 
areas of the cerebral cortex.
201
 
The scope of modern neuroscience has broadened to include different approaches used to 
study the molecular, cellular, developmental, structural, functional, evolutionary, 
computational and medical aspects of the nervous system. For example, cognitive 
neuroscience explores the areas and chemicals in the brain oriented to decision-
making.
202
 The techniques employed by neuroscientists have also expanded enormously, 
from molecular and cellular studies of individual nerve cells to imaging of sensory and 
motor tasks in the brain. It is possible to understand, in much detail, the complex 
processes occurring within a single neuron. Neurons are cells specialized for 
communication. They are able to communicate with neurons and other cell types through 
specialized junctions, or synapses, at which electrical or electrochemical signals can be 
transmitted from one cell to another. Many neurons extrude long thin filaments of 
protoplasm called axons, which may extend to distant parts of the body and are capable 
of rapidly carrying electrical signals, influencing the activity of other neurons, muscles or 
glands at their termination points. A nervous system emerges from the assemblage of 
neurons that are connected to one another. 
As an intricate organ system in the body, the complexity of the nervous system resides 
predominantly in the brain. The human brain alone contains around one hundred billion 
neurons and one hundred trillion synapses; it consists of thousands of distinguishable 
substructures, connected to one another in synaptic networks. Due to the plasticity of the 
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human brain, the structure of its synapses and their resulting functions change throughout 
life.
203
 
 
B Neuroplasticity 
 
 
[T]he prevailing view that we are born with a hardwired system had to be wrong. The brain had to 
be plastic.
204
 
 
 
Neuroplasticity, known also as brain plasticity, is a term that encompasses both synaptic 
plasticity and non-synaptic plasticity. It refers to changes in neural pathways and 
synapses that are due to changes in behaviour, environment and neural processes, as well 
as changes resulting from bodily injury.
205
 Neuroplasticity has replaced the formerly held 
position that the brain is a physiologically static organ, and explores how the brain 
changes throughout life.
206
 Neuroplasticity occurs on a variety of levels, ranging from 
cellular changes due to learning, to large-scale changes involved in cortical remapping in 
response to injury. The role of neuroplasticity is widely recognized in healthy 
development, learning, memory and recovery from brain damage.  
 
Throughout the majority of the twentieth century, the consensus among neuroscientists 
was that brain structure is relatively immutable after a critical period during early 
childhood. Until the 1970s, an accepted idea across neuroscience was that, in terms of 
brain function, the nervous system was essentially fixed throughout adulthood. It was 
also believed that it was impossible for new neurons to develop after birth.
207
 This belief 
has been challenged by findings revealing that many aspects of the brain remain plastic 
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even into adulthood
208
 — or, in the words of neuroscientist Michael Merzenich, 
‘plasticity exists from the cradle to the grave’.209 Neuroscientific research indicates that 
experience can actually change both the brain’s physical structure (anatomy) and its 
functional organization (physiology).
210
  
 
Neuroplasticity allows the neurons, or nerve cells, in the brain to compensate for injury 
and disease and to adjust their activities in response to new situations or to changes in 
their environment. Brain reorganization takes place by mechanisms such as ‘axonal 
sprouting’, whereby undamaged axons grow new nerve endings to reconnect neurons 
whose links were injured or severed. Undamaged axons can also sprout nerve endings 
and connect with other undamaged nerve cells, forming new neural pathways to 
accomplish a needed function. For example, if one hemisphere of the brain is damaged, 
the intact hemisphere may take over some of its functions. The brain compensates for 
damage by reorganizing and forming new connections between intact neurons. In order to 
reconnect, the neurons need to be stimulated through activity.  
 
People can re-sculpture how they think (and behave) through conscious effort, altering 
their own mental wiring. The brain deletes unused pathways, yet neurological pathways 
remain open for the development of another thought pattern, and thus a new pathway is 
constructed.
211
 This is an example of ‘“self-directed neuroplasticity” concluding that “the 
mind can change the brain”’.212 
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Similarly, with neuroplasticity, toxic or negative thought patterns can be changed. The 
method can be used to help someone find more productive thought patterns. With new 
reference points through questions, the person builds thought paths that bring him or her 
to another result. This method of thought change goes by the term ‘brain mapping’ and it 
offers counselors in prisons a way to help criminals develop new ways of thinking about 
their behaviour.
213
 
 
 
C Neuroimaging Technology 
 
 
MRI is revolutionizing our ability to see how humans think.
214
 
 
 
Neuroimaging includes the use of various techniques to either directly or indirectly image 
the structure and function of the brain. The most common technique for measuring 
human brain structure and activity is MRI. Also among the most prominent technologies 
and disciplines are positron emission tomography (PET scan) and epigenetics. 
 
While structural MRI produces images of brain anatomy, fMRI produces dynamic images 
that reflect patterns of brain activity. Both structural and functional MRI have good 
spatial resolution
215
 and allow detailed mapping of the human brain providing insight into 
brain psychology and cognition of the brain. Neuroimaging, or fMRI, allows the viewing 
of neural activity
216
 and measures the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal 
in areas of the brain that are most active while a person is engaged in a given mental task. 
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The technique known as real-time fMRI (rt-fMRI), or neurofeedback,
217
 ‘permits 
simultaneous measurement and observation of brain activity during an ongoing task’.218 
The approach is similar to the biofeedback strategies of previous decades, except that it 
allows a view inside the skull, giving a level of precision never before possible.
219
 Real-
time feedback involves cutting-edge technology, its development owing to the 
introduction of fast computation and efficient algorithms.
220
 Raw data from the imaging 
can be reconstructed in close to real time and visually displayed in a scanner, allowing 
the observer to measure brain activity while the person being tested is addressing 
different tasks. This subsequently allows the experimenter to non-invasively study the 
effects of brain activity on behavioural characteristics by choosing specific tasks for the 
person to be tested.
221
  
 
This technology has the potential to enable a dramatically new level of sophisticated 
exploration of brain function that goes beyond modest measurements of correlations 
between stimuli and their associated fMRI activations.
222
 In this way, neural activity can 
be shown directly to an individual and that person can attempt to modify it.
223
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IV FRONTAL LOBE FUNCTION 
 
The frontal lobe is one of the major lobes of the cerebral cortex on each side of the brain. 
It is located at the front of each cerebral hemisphere and positioned in front of the parietal 
lobe, and superior and anterior to the temporal lobes. The frontal lobe contains most of 
the dopamine-sensitive neurons in the cerebral cortex. The dopamine system is associated 
with reward, attention, short-term memory tasks, planning and motivation. The executive 
functions of the frontal lobes involve the ability to recognize future consequences 
resulting from current actions, to choose between good and bad actions (or better and 
best), override and suppress socially unacceptable responses (impulse-control), and to 
determine similarities and differences between things or events. The frontal lobe is the 
same part of the brain that is responsible for other executive functions such as judgement, 
decision-making skills, attention span and inhibition. 
 
 
A Impulse-Control 
 
 
[T]he persistent lack of restraint and consideration of consequences.
224
 
 
 
Poor impulse-control, or impulsivity, is a multifactorial construct
225
 that involves a 
tendency to act on a whim, exhibiting behaviour characterized by little or no forethought, 
reflection or consideration of the consequences.
226
 Impulsive actions are typically ‘poorly 
conceived, prematurely expressed, unduly risky, or inappropriate to the situation [and] 
often result in undesirable consequences’.227 Such actions imperil long-term goals and 
strategies for success,
228
 yet they often produce desirable short-term rewards. A 
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functional variety of impulsivity has also been suggested, which involves action with 
little forethought in appropriate situations resulting in desirable consequences. ‘When 
such actions have positive outcomes, they tend not to be seen as signs of impulsivity, but 
as indicators of boldness, quickness, spontaneity, courageousness, or 
unconventionality.’229 Thus, the construct of impulsivity includes at least the two 
independent components of acting without an appropriate amount of deliberation,
230
 
which may or may not be functional, and, choosing short-term gains over long-term 
ones.
231
 
 
1 Neurobiology 
 
Neurobiological findings suggest that there are specific brain regions involved in 
impulsive behaviour,
232
 although different brain networks may contribute to different 
manifestations of impulsivity.
233
 Although the precise neural mechanisms underlying 
disorders of impulse-control are not fully known, the brain regions associated with 
impulse-control have been well characterized.
234
 The prefrontal cortex (PFC) — the thick 
outer layer (cerebral cortex) of the prefrontal lobe (the front portion of the frontal lobe) — 
is the brain region most ubiquitously implicated in impulsivity.
235
 Although outside of the 
frontal lobes, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) — ‘a limbic region associated with 
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error processing, conflict monitoring, response selection, and avoidance learning’,236 and 
inhibiting undesirable behaviour
237
 — has also been associated with impulse-control.
238
 
Recent research has uncovered additional regions of interest, as well as highlighted 
particular sub-regions of the PFC, that can be tied to performance in specific behavioural 
tasks. 
 
Prevailing theory posits that two distinct and interconnected brain systems interact with 
each other and compete for behavioural outcomes.
239
 The impulsive system (involving 
the amygdala, located in the medial temporal lobe) provides an immediate signal of pain 
or pleasure; the reflective system involving the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) 
considers the long-term consequences of behavioural alternatives.
240
 Impulsivity has also 
been correlated with reduced volumes in the vmPFC.
241
 Simply put, impulsivity results 
from an imbalance between these systems: the latter is unable to check the push for 
immediate action signalled by the former.
242
 
 
                                                 
236
  Eyal Aharoni et al, ‘Neuroprediction of Future Rearrest’ (2013) 110 Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of The United States Of America 6223, 6223; C B Holroyd and M G H Coles, 
The Neural Basis of Human Error Processing: Reinforcement Learning, Dopamine, and the Error-
Related Negativity’ (2002) 109 Psychological Review 679; K A Kiehl, P F Liddle and J B 
Hopfinger, ‘Error Processing and the Rostral Anterior Cingulate: An Event-Related fMRI Study’ 
(2000) 37 Psychophysiology 216; D S Kosson et al, ‘The Role of the Amygdala and Rostral Anterior 
Cingulate in Encoding Expected Outcomes During Learning (2006) 29 Neuroimage 1161; D H 
Mathalon, S L Whitfield and J M Ford, ‘Anatomy of an Error: ERP and fMRI’ (2003) 64 Biological 
Psychology 119; V van Veen and C S Carter, ‘The Anterior Cingulate as a Conflict Monitor: fMRI 
and ERP Studies’ (2002) 77 Physiology and Behavior 477. 
237
  Eyal Aharoni et al, ‘Predictive Accuracy in the Neuroprediction of Rearrest’ (2014) 9 Social 
Neuroscience 332, 332. 
238
  Eyal Aharoni et al, ‘Neuroprediction of Future Rearrest’ (2013) 110 Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of The United States Of America 6223, 6223. 
239
  A Bechara, ‘Decision Making, Impulse Control and Loss of Willpower To Resist Drugs: A 
Neurocognitive Perspective’ (2005) 8 Nature Neuroscience 1458; A Bechara and M Van Der 
Linden, ‘Decision-Making and Impulse Control After Frontal Lobe Injuries’ (2005) 18 Current 
Opinion in Neurology 734. 
240
  A D Boes et al, ‘Right Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex: A Neuroanatomical Correlate of Impulse 
Control in Boys’ (2009) 4(1) Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 1; M A Cato et al, 
‘Assessing The Elusive Cognitive Deficits Associated with Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage: A 
Case of a Modern-Day Phineas Gage’ (2004) 10 Journal of International Neuropsychological 
Society 453. 
241
  A D Boes et al, ‘Right Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex: A Neuroanatomical Correlate of Impulse 
Control in Boys’ (2009) 4(1) Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 1. 
242
  J Blair, D Mitchell and K Blair, The Psychopath: Emotion and Brain (Blackwell Press, 2005); L J 
Siever, ‘Neurobiology of Aggression and Violence’ (2008) 165 American Journal of Psychiatry 
429. 
  43  
2 Neuroscientific Underpinning  
 
The neuroscientific underpinning of the frontal lobe rehabilitation treatment referenced in 
this thesis is based on the work of Assistant Professors Pearl Chiu and Stephen LaConte 
who found that ‘through neurofeedback, cognitive control may be enhanced and/or 
subjective craving may be diminished in chronic smokers’.243 The following studies and 
publications form the basis of this treatment:  
 
 P Chiu et al, ‘Modulating “Crave” and “Don’t Crave” Brain States Using Real-
time fMRI Neurofeedback’ (Abstract, 19th Annual Meeting of the Organization 
for Human Brain Mapping, Seattle, 20 June 2013); 
 P Chiu et al, ‘Real-time fMRI Modulation of Craving and Control Brain States in 
Chronic Smokers’ (Abstract, 39th Annual Meeting of Society of Neuroscience, 
Chicago, 21 October 2009); 
 S LaConte et al, ‘Modulating rt-fMRI Neurofeedback Interfaces via Craving and 
Control in Chronic Smokers’ (Abstract, 15th Annual Meeting of the Organization 
for Human Brain Mapping, San Francisco, 23 June 2009); 
 S M LaConte, ‘Decoding fMRI Brain States in Real-Time’ (2010) Neuroimage 
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.06.052; 
 Stephen M LaConte et al, ‘Real-Time fMRI Using Brain-State Classification’ 
(2007) 28 Human Brain Mapping 1033; 
 Andrea Caria, Sitaram Ranganatha and Niels Birbaumer, ‘Real-Time fMRI: A 
Tool for Local Brain Regulation’ (2012) 18 The Neuroscientist 487; and 
 S M LaConte, ‘Modulating rt-fMRI neurofeedback interfaces via craving and 
control in chronic smokers’ (2009) 47 Neuroimage S45. 
 
In collaboration with LaConte, Eagleman from the laboratory at Baylor College of 
Medicine in Houston, Texas, has launched experiments using real-time feedback 
techniques in neuroimaging. These experiments are honing techniques to allow users to 
strengthen the influence of their prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain that specializes in 
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long-term decision-making and impulse-control.  Such techniques can change the 
personality of an individual as little as possible, merely allowing the improvement of 
long-term consideration and control over impulsivity.  This technique may aid in — but is 
not limited to — the rehabilitation of offenders who cannot resist impulsive behaviour.244  
 
 
V FRONTAL LOBE REHABILITATION TREATMENT (FLRT) 
 
 
I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do, I do not do, but what I hate, I do.
245
 
 
 
The ‘Initiative on Neuroscience and the Law’246 is exploring techniques that will allow 
users to strengthen the influence of their prefrontal cortex, which, as earlier mentioned, is 
a part of the brain that specializes in long-term decision-making and impulse-
control. Raw data from neuroimaging can be reconstructed in ‘real-time’ and visually 
displayed in a scanner, and the neural activity can be shown directly to an individual, who 
can then attempt to modify it. Director of the Initiative, David Eagleman, reasons that this 
‘frontal lobe work-out’ designed to improve long-term consideration and control over 
impulsivity would enable offenders to receive ‘neurofeedback’247 treatments designed to 
retrain their brains towards pro-social behaviour. Placing ‘the individual in the driver’s 
seat of his own neural circuitry’,248 this technology has the capacity to customize the 
rehabilitation of offenders. 
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The ‘prefrontal work-out’,249 as coined by Eagleman, capitalises on the ‘inner 
parliament’250 of the brain whereby ‘the brain is a team of rivals, a competition among 
different neural populations’.251 The different factions in the brain each compete to 
control the single output channel of individual behaviour. This is based on the notion that 
the frontal lobe circuits, which represent the long-term considerations, cannot override 
individual elections when temptation (say, to commit crime) is present. In German, if 
someone is trying to delay instant gratification, it is said that he or she has to overcome 
their innerer Schweinehund, or ‘inner pig-dog’. The prefrontal work-out utilizes real-time 
brain imaging to monitor which parts of a person’s brain are active, and how active they 
are, when resisting a particular stimulus, be it tobacco, an illicit substance or, by 
extension, a criminal activity. A simplistic example is that of resisting a piece of 
chocolate cake. In this instance, an individual would look at pictures of chocolate cake 
during brain scanning. The experiments determine the regions of the brain involved in the 
craving. The activity in those networks is represented by a vertical bar on a computer 
screen. The individual tries to make the bar go down. The bar acts as a gauge for the 
individual’s craving: if his or her craving networks are increasing, the bar is high; if he or 
she is suppressing the craving, the bar is low. The individual tries different mental 
avenues until the bar begins to sink. These can include ‘anything from simple finger 
tapping to mental imagery or complex cognitive tasks’.252 When it goes down, it means 
the individual has successfully recruited frontal circuitry to supress the networks involved 
in impulsive craving — that is, the long term has won over the short term. Still looking at 
pictures of chocolate cake, the individual would practice making the bar go down over 
and over until he or she has strengthened those frontal circuits. By this method of 
visualization of task-related brain activity, the individual is able to visualize the activity 
in the parts of the brain that need modulation, and witness the effects of different mental 
approaches.
253
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After training at the prefrontal ‘gym’, an individual might still crave chocolate cake, but 
he or she will have experience in utilizing the associated brain pathways to control, rather 
than succumb to, the craving.
254
 Strengthening the ‘neural populations that care about 
long-term consequences’ inhibits impulsivity and encourages reflection.255 It represents 
‘new strategies for rehabilitation to allow an individual to have better control of his 
behavior, even in the absence of external authority’.256 Arguably the most striking 
application of neurofeedback is the possibility to take possession of ‘volitional control of 
localized brain activity using real-time fMRI … protocols’.257 Without the use of drugs or 
surgery, this approach ensures that the brain remains intact and ‘leverages the natural 
mechanisms of brain plasticity to help the brain help itself’.258 In other words, if a person 
considers committing a criminal act, that is permissible, as long as he or she does not 
choose to take action: 
 
We cannot restrict what people think; nor should a legal system hope to set that as its goal. Social 
policy can only hope to prevent impulsive thoughts from tipping into behavior.
259
 
  
 
Although there are no verifiable peer-reviewed results that validate this exact treatment of 
resisting the impulse to engage in criminal behaviour, a longitudinal, prospective study of 
the prediction of future antisocial behaviour (namely, re-arrest) in released criminal 
offenders
260
 revealed that functional changes in the ACC within a sample of 96 criminal 
offenders engaged in the Go/No-Go (GNG) impulse-control task significantly predicted 
their re-arrest following release from prison.
261
 (After being released they were tracked 
from 2007 to 2010
262
.) 
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Participants completed a number of psychological and behavioural assessment measures 
and an fMRI-based inhibition task using the Mind Research Network’s Mobile MRI 
system before release from one of two New Mexico state correctional facilities.
263
 
Behavioural impulsivity was measured during fMRI using the GNG task, a widely used 
procedure that requires participants to inhibit a prepotent
264
 motor response. The task, 
modeled after the work of Kiehl et al,
265
 presents participants with a frequently occurring 
target (the letter ‘X’) interleaved with a less-frequent distracter (the letter ‘K’) on a 
computer screen. Participants were instructed to depress a button with their right index 
finger as quickly and accurately as possible whenever they saw the target (‘go’ stimulus) 
and not when they saw the distractor (‘no-go’ stimulus). As targets are more frequent 
than distracters in this task, a prepotent response toward the targets is elicited. When a 
distractor is presented, participants are required to inhibit
266
 their button response.
267
 
Those with lower ACC activity during the tasks were more likely to be re-arrested.  
 
The conflation of these findings, and the impulse-control experiments of Assistant 
Professors Chiu and LeConte, could result in a treatment to assist offenders to strengthen 
pathways concerned with longer-term consequences, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
reoffending. 
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VI IMPULSE-CONTROL DEFINED 
 
A Diagnostic 
 
Poor impulse-control is not a mental disorder. Often the following terms are used 
interchangeably: impulse-control, impulsivity, impulsiveness. Impulse-control is the 
degree to which a person can control the desire for immediate gratification. Everyone has 
issues with impulse-control to varying degrees: it is simply part of human nature. 
 
Impulsivity is both a facet of personality as well as a major component of various 
disorders, including, inter alia, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder,
268
 Substance-
Related Disorders,
269
 Bipolar Disorder,
270
 Antisocial Personality Disorder,
271
 and 
Borderline Personality Disorder.
272
 Impulsiveness may also be a factor in 
procrastination.
273
 Abnormal patterns of impulsivity have also been noted in instances of 
Acquired Brain Injury
274
 and Neurodegenerative Diseases.
275
  
 
1 Key Terms Defined 
 
(a) Mental Health 
The World Health Organization defines mental health as: ‘a state of well-being in which 
the individual realises his or her own abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, 
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can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to his or her 
community’.276 
 
(b) Mental Illness 
 
Diagnoses of mental illnesses world-wide conform to classifications listed in two 
professional publications: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fifth Edition (DSM-5),
277
 and the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth 
Revision (ICD-10).
278
 The DSM-5 covers mental illnesses and the ICD-10, the official 
coding system in the United States of America
 279
 (and used in Australia) covers mental 
and physical illnesses. The DSM-5 is a ‘standard reference for clinical practice in the 
mental health field’280 and is the leading diagnostic manual in Australia.  
 
The terms ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental disorder’ are used interchangeably within legal 
literature. It is also ‘well established both in case law and the mental health literature that 
clinical and legal meanings of mental illness are not synonymous’.281 Unless otherwise 
stated, reference to ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental impairment’ includes mental disorders, 
and ‘mentally ill/impaired offenders’ include those suffering from a mental disorder as 
stipulated within the DSM-5. 
 
(c) Mental Disorder 
 
The definition of mental disorder in the DSM-5 ‘was developed to meet the needs of 
clinicians, public health professionals, and research investigators. … By providing a 
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compendium based on a review of the pertinent clinical and research literature, DSM-5 
may facilitate legal decision makers’ understanding of the relevant characteristics of 
mental disorders’.282 A mental disorder is defined as: 
 
a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, 
emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or 
developmental processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated 
with significant distress in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expectable or 
culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not 
a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that 
are primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or 
conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above.
283
 
 
An official nomenclature with applicability in ‘a wide diversity of contexts’,284 the DSM-
5 describes the following disorders: 
 
 Neurodevelopmental Disorders; 
 Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders; 
 Bipolar and Related Disorders; 
 Depressive Disorders; 
 Anxiety Disorders; 
 Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders; 
 Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders; 
 Dissociative Disorders; 
 Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders; 
 Feeding and Eating Disorders; 
 Elimination Disorders; 
 Sleep-Wake Disorders; 
 Sexual Dysfunctions; 
 Gender Dysphoria; 
 Disruptive, Impulse-Control, and Conduct Disorders; 
 Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders; 
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 Neurocognitive Disorders; 
 Personality Disorders; 
 Paraphilic Disorders; and 
 Other Mental Disorders. 
 
VII IMPULSE-CONTROL CATEGORIZED 
 
For ease in exposition, as a concept involved in mental health classifications, impulse-
control is divided into four separate categories: 
 
Category One (hereinafter ‘C1’) recognizes that impulse-control is a facet of personality. 
Impulsivity is part of executive functioning and everyone’s executive functioning 
operates on a continuum. 
 
Accordingly, ‘pure’ poor impulse-control does not amount to a mental disorder, and, as 
such, C1 offenders would not be eligible for participation in a MHDCt. FLRT could be 
administered to C1 offenders through the regular criminal justice system.  
 
In Category Two (hereinafter ‘C2’), an extreme lack of impulse-control is a mental 
disorder and is diagnosed as Impulse-Control Disorder. Consequently, FLRT could be 
administered to C2 offenders through MHDCts.  
 
Impulse-control, in Category Three (hereinafter ‘C3’), is part of the diagnostic criteria 
for various disorders. This category recognizes impulse-control as a diagnostic criterion 
for a mental disorder, thus, FLRT could be administered to C3 offenders through 
MHDCts. 
 
Category Four (hereinafter ‘C4’) considers that impulse-control may not be part of the 
defining criteria of the diagnosed disorder, but may be an additional significant problem 
for someone with a mental disorder. Impulse-control as an additional issue to a diagnosed 
mental disorder could enable FLRT to be administered to C4 offenders through MHDCts.  
  52  
 
It is important to bear in mind that all categories of offenders –– with a mental disorder 
(C2, C3, C4) or without a mental disorder (C1) –– are deemed criminally responsible, do 
not lack volitional capacity and appreciate the criminality of their conduct. Offenders 
may suffer from a degree of ‘impairment’ but not to the extent that they could be wholly 
exculpated. Consequently, matters surrounding volitional capacity in the domain of 
insanity and the criminal responsibility standard in the M’Naghten rules285 are not 
examined at this point. Expansion of the utility of FLRT to these possibilities is discussed 
in Chapter 5.  
 
 
 
A Facet of Personality (C1) 
 
 
Impulsivity is defined in the Glossary of Technical Terms of the DSM-5 as ‘[a]cting on 
the spur of the moment in response to immediate stimuli; acting on a momentary basis 
without a plan or consideration of outcomes; difficulty establishing and following plans; 
a sense of urgency and self-harming behavior under emotional distress. Impulsivity is a 
facet of the broad personality trait domain disinhibition.’286 
 
Disinhibition is defined by an ‘[o]rientation toward immediate gratification, leading to 
impulsive behavior driven by current thoughts, feelings, and external stimuli, without 
regard for past learning or consideration of future consequences’.287 
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Impulse is to be distinguished from ‘compulsion’. Compulsions ‘are repetitive behaviours 
or mental acts that an individual feels driven to perform in response to an obsession 
according to rules that must be applied rigidly’.288 
 
Impulsivity is something everyone suffers from. ‘Many of the symptoms that define the 
disruptive, impulse-control, and conduct disorders are behaviors that can occur to some 
degree in typically developing individuals. Thus, it is critical that the frequency, 
persistence, pervasiveness across situations, and impairment associated with the 
behaviors indicative of the diagnosis be considered relative to what is normative for a 
person’s age, gender, and culture when determining if they are symptomatic of a 
disorder’.289 
 
Offenders in this category have some problems with impulse-control, but do not have a 
mental illness. They would be ineligible for diversion in the sense that they could not be 
diverted fully into treatment. They would be eligible for FLRT as part of a good 
behaviour bond or some other such court-mandated treatment. Only having a mental 
illness would enable them to be fully diverted. (Arguably, everyone could benefit from 
FLRT then.)   
 
1 Discretionary NeuroDiversion Test 
 
Certainly, a neurological insult or cognitive damage not amounting to a mental disorder 
would be an example of a C1 offender. Where there is not a biological or organismic 
variable to a measureable extent, determining whether an offender is suffering from 
‘pure’ poor impulse-control –– that is, not a mental disorder, simply struggling with 
impulsivity –– the magistracy/judiciary could be assisted by clinicians when making this 
determination. 
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A subjective offender report, with the potential to be minimized or exaggerated to satisfy 
a legal threshold, is not a reliable or valid way to measure control problems.
290
 Factors 
arguably relevant to determining the appropriateness of FLRT for C1 offenders could be 
guided by those proffered by Rogers and Shuman.
291
 These factors include the 
defendant’s perceived options, decision-making abilities, the deliberateness of the 
actions, and the point at which criminal actions become ‘inevitable’.292 This approach 
could be adopted in conjunction with Webster and Jackson
293
 who provide a clinical 
perspective of ‘impulse-driven conduct’, with the following characteristics enveloped in 
ﬁve domains: (1) interpersonal dysfunction: manipulative, black/white thinking with 
regard to others, distrustful; (2) lack of plans: avoidance of change, volatile lifestyle; (3) 
distorted self-esteem: low self-awareness, hopelessness, acting rashly to avoid emotional 
discomfort; (4) anger and rage: aggression, low frustration tolerance, high explosivity; 
and (5) irresponsibility: entitlement, beliefs that most others act immorally and 
irresponsibly, poor ability to cope with emotional discomfort.  
 
In the application of this ‘test’ to determine the utility of FLRT for a non-mentally ill C1 
offender, ‘clinicians can offer descriptive and explanatory testimony relevant to an 
offender’s impairment, and the relationship between that impairment and the criminal 
conduct at issue’.294 There is ‘utility to clinical expertise when it provides thorough 
description of clinicians’ unique understanding of human behaviour,’295 which in turn 
assists the court in its normative judgement.  
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B Impulse-Control Disorder (C2) 
 
1 Disruptive, Impulse-Control and Conduct Disorders  
 
Disruptive, impulse-control, and conduct disorders include conditions involving problems 
in the self-control of emotions and behaviours. While other disorders in the DSM-5 may 
also involve problems in emotional and/or behavioural regulation, the disorders in this 
chapter are unique in that they are manifested in behaviours that violate the rights of 
others (for example, aggression, destruction of property) and/or bring the individual into 
significant conflict with societal norms or authority figures.
296
 
 
Offenders in this category may be diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder. 
Criterion A of the diagnostic criteria refers to ‘[a] pattern of angry/irritable mood, 
argumentative/defiant behavior, or vindictiveness’.297  
 
Similarly, criterion A of the diagnostic criteria for Intermittent Explosive Disorder, 
another plausible diagnosis for offenders in C2, records ‘[r]ecurrent behavioral outbursts 
representing a failure to control aggressive impulses’.298 Criterion C elaborates that ‘[t]he 
recurrent aggressive outbursts are not premeditated (i.e., they are impulsive and/or anger-
based) are not committed to achieve some tangible objective (e.g., money, power, 
intimidation)’.299 A further diagnostic feature is that ‘[t]he impulsive (or anger-based) 
aggressive outbursts in intermittent explosive disorder have a rapid onset and, typically, 
little or no prodromal period’.300 Functional consequences assert that ‘legal (e.g., civil 
suits as a result of aggressive behaviour against person or property; criminal charges for 
assault) problems often develop as a result of intermittent explosive disorder’.301 
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Another relevant diagnosis in this category would be Conduct Disorder. ‘Personality 
features of trait negative emotionality and poor self-control … frequently co-occur with 
conduct disorder.’302 In terms of functional consequences, ‘[i]t is not uncommon for 
individuals with conduct disorder to come into contact with the criminal justice system 
for engaging in illegal behavior’.303 
 
Other C2 diagnoses include Antisocial Personality Disorder and Pyromania, which 
encompasses ‘[i]ndividuals who impulsively set fires’.304 Criterion B of the diagnostic 
criteria for Pyromania refers to ‘[t]ension or affective arousal before the act’.305 
 
Kleptomania –– the ‘[r]ecurrent failure to resist impulses to steal objects that are not 
needed for personal use or for their monetary value’306 –– is another impulse-control 
disorder that may be typical of C2 offenders. ‘Individuals with kleptomania typically 
attempt to resist the impulse to steal, and they are aware that the act is wrong and 
senseless.’307 
 
Thus, for C2 offenders diagnosed with Disruptive, Impulse-Control and Conduct 
Disorders, such as Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, 
Conduct Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, Pyromania and Kleptomania, FLRT 
could be administered through MHDCts. 
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C Impulse-Control as Part of Diagnostic Criteria for a Disorder (C3) 
 
 
Impulse-control may be part of the diagnostic criteria for various disorders.  
 
1 Neurodevelopmental Disorders 
 
Criterion A of the diagnostic criteria for Intellectual Disability (Intellectual Development 
Disorder) refers to ‘[d]eficits in intellectual functions, such as reasoning, problem  
solving, planning, [and] judgment’.308 Impulse-control is implicated within these 
functions. 
 
Impulse-control is a diagnostic feature of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD), whereby ‘[i]mpulsivity refers to hasty actions that occur in the moment without 
forethought and that have high potential for harm to the individual ... . Impulsivity may 
reflect a desire for immediate rewards or an inability to delay gratification. Impulsive 
behaviours may manifest as social intrusiveness and/or as making important decisions 
without consideration of long-term consequences’.309 A functional consequence of this 
impulsivity is that ‘[c]hildren with ADHD are significantly more likely than their peers 
without ADHD to develop conduct disorder in adolescence and antisocial personality 
disorder in adulthood, consequently increasing the likelihood for substance use disorders 
and incarceration’.310 
 
2 Bipolar and Related Disorders 
 
(a) Bipolar I Disorder 
 
Criterion B7 of the diagnostic criteria for Manic Episode and Hypomanic Episode 
implicates poor impulse-control as ‘excessive involvement in activities that have a high 
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potential for painful consequences’.311 An associated feature includes ‘catastrophic 
consequences of a manic episode (e.g., … difficulties with the law …) often result from 
poor judgment, loss of insight, and hyperactivity’.312 
 
(b) Bipolar II Disorder 
 
‘A common feature of bipolar II disorder is impulsivity’313 and criterion B7 of the 
diagnostic criteria for Hypomanic Episode also highlights ‘[e]xcessive involvement in 
activities that have a high potential for painful consequences’.314 Relevantly, an 
associated feature cautions that ‘[i]mpulsivity may also stem from a concurrent 
personality disorder, substance use disorder, anxiety disorder, another mental disorder, or 
a medical condition’. 315 
 
3 Trauma- and Stessor-Related Disorders 
 
(a) Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
 
Poor impulse-control manifests itself in criterion E1 of the Diagnostic Criteria: ‘Irritable 
behavior and angry outbursts (with little or no provocation) typically expressed as verbal 
or physical aggression toward people or objects.’316 This is further complemented by 
criterion E2, which describes ‘[r]eckless or self-destructive behavior’.317 
 
(b) Acute Stress Disorder 
 
Criterion B11 –– ‘[i]rritable behavior and angry outbursts (with little or no provocation), 
typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression toward people or objects’318 –– is yet 
another expression of poor impulse-control. This is substantiated by the associated 
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feature that states that ‘individuals with acute stress disorder may display chaotic or 
impulsive behavior’.319 
 
 
4 Personality Disorders 
 
Poor impulse-control is ubiquitously implicated in the diagnostic criteria for personality 
disorders –– especially the majority listed in Cluster B.320 Personality disorders are 
grouped into three clusters based on descriptive similarities.
321
 Cluster A includes 
paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal personality disorders. Cluster B includes antisocial, 
borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic personality disorders. Cluster C includes avoidant, 
dependent, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorders. 
 
(a) General Personality Disorder 
 
Criterion A4 asserts that ‘[t]he essential feature of a personality disorder is an enduring 
pattern of inner experience and behaviour that deviates markedly from the expectations of 
the individual’s culture and is manifested in at least two of the following areas: cognition, 
affectivity, interpersonal functioning, or impulse-control’.322 
 
(b) Antisocial Personality Disorder 
 
Criterion A3 of the Diagnostic criteria explicitly states that this disorder is characterized 
by ‘[i]mpulsivity or failure to plan ahead’.323 A further diagnostic feature goes on to 
confirm that ‘[i]ndividuals with antisocial personality disorder fail to conform to social 
norms with respect to lawful behaviour … A pattern of impulsivity may be manifested by 
a failure to plan ahead.’324 
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(c) Borderline Personality Disorder 
 
‘[M]arked impulsivity’325 is plainly part of the Diagnostic Criteria for Borderline 
Personality Disorder, whereby criterion A4 elaborates upon ‘[i]mpulsivity in at least two 
areas that are potentially self-damaging’.326 
 
(d) Histrionic Personality Disorder 
 
‘Individuals with antisocial personality disorder and histrionic personality disorder share 
a tendency to be impulsive.’327 
 
(e) Personality Change Due to Another Medical Condition 
 
Relevantly, ‘[c]ommon manifestations of the personality change include … poor impulse-
control’.328 ‘The clinical presentation in a given individual may depend on the nature and 
localization of the pathological process. For example, injury to the frontal lobes may 
yield symptoms such as lack of judgment or foresight, facetiousness, disinhibition, and 
euphoria.’329 
 
In summary, for C3 offenders diagnosed with a disorder in which impulse-control is part 
of the diagnostic criteria, FLRT could be administered through MHDCts. In this category, 
such disorders may include Neurodevelopmental Disorders, such as Intellectual 
Disability (Intellectual Development Disorder). However, the degree of impairment may 
be relevant to the utility of the treatment. Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and 
Bipolar and Related Disorders such as Bipolar I Disorder and Bipolar II Disorder are also 
diagnoses relevant to this category. Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders, including 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Acute Stress Disorder also fit within C3. Personality 
Disorders –– General Personality Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, Borderline 
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Personality Disorder and Histrionic Personality Disorder –– are further examples of 
diagnoses within this category. 
 
 
D Impulse-Control as an Additional Significant Problem (C4) 
 
 
Impulse-control may not be part of the defining criteria of the presenting/diagnosed 
disorder, but may be an additional significant problem for someone with a mental illness. 
Indeed, ‘mental disorders do not always fit completely within the boundaries of a single 
disorder’.330 
 
1 Depressive Disorders 
 
(a) Unspecified Depressive Disorder 
 
Specifier A6 in the diagnosis of Unspecified Depressive Disorder refers to ‘[i]ncreased or 
excessive involvement in activities that have a high potential for painful 
consequences’.331 
 
2 Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders 
 
Poor impulse-control is significantly implicated in Substance-Related and Addictive 
Disorders as deficits in executive function
332
 are typical with these disorders. 
 
Although not explicitly contained within the diagnostic criteria for some mental 
disorders, impulse-control difficulties could be an additional problem to any number of 
mental disorders. Such disorders may include: Neurodevelopmental Disorders, Anxiety 
Disorders, Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders, Dissociative Disorders, 
Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders, Feeding and Eating Disorders, Elimination 
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Disorders, Sleep-Wake Disorders, Sexual Dysfunctions, Gender Dysphoria, Paraphilic 
Disorders and Other Mental Disorders. 
 
 
E Incommensurability of FLRT with Certain Mental Disorders 
 
 
1 Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders 
 
Schizophrenia and Delusional Disorder are disorders for which FLRT would have little to 
no utility. ‘The characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia involve a range of cognitive, 
behavioural, and emotional dysfunctions.’333 Similarly, although an individual diagnosed 
with Delusional Disorder may experience ‘legal difficulties’,334 the disorganized 
thinking
335
 associated with schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders does 
not lend itself to FLRT. Psychotic illnesses affect the brain and result in changes to one’s 
thinking, emotions and behaviour. Someone experiencing an acute stage of a psychotic 
illness may lose touch with reality as their ability to make sense of thoughts, feelings and 
external information is seriously affected.
336
 Thus, the ability to process FLRT may be 
lacking entirely. 
 
 
2 Neurocognitive Disorders 
 
For those suffering from Neurocognitive Disorders, deficits in executive function and 
ability
337
 ‘such as poor performance on tests of mental flexibility, abstract reasoning, and 
response inhibition, are present’.338 For example, ‘[p]rogressive cognitive impairment is a 
core feature of Huntington’s disease, with early changes in executive function (i.e., 
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processing speed, organization, and planning)’.339 Furthermore, Major or Mild 
Neurocognitive Disorder Due to Alzheimer’s Disease evidences a ‘gradual decline in 
cognition’340 and is ‘sometimes accompanied by deficits in executive function’.341 
Behavioural disinhibition is part of the diagnostic criteria for Major or Mild 
Frontotemporal Neurocognitive Disorder.
342
 One of the associated features supporting a 
diagnosis of Major or Mild Neurocognitive Disorder Due to Traumatic Brain Injury 
refers to personality changes, in particular, disinhibition –– of which impulsivity is a 
facet.
343
 FLRT would likely not be of therapeutic utility for an offender diagnosed with a 
Neurocognitive Disorder, as the requisite abstract reasoning skills may not be present. 
Furthermore, if the frontal lobes themselves are organically damaged, insufficient neural 
pathways may exist and thus the treatment would not be effective. Similarly, FLRT is not 
suitable for an offender with irremediable cognitive impairment or mental disability. 
 
3 Psychopathy 
 
The matter of psychopathy will relevantly be raised (if only to be excluded). Assessments 
of psychopathic characteristics are widely used in criminal justice settings,
 344
 and as 
such, attract public attention and speculation. Psychopathy –– also known as, though 
sometimes distinguished from, –– the non-clinical term, ‘sociopathy’, is traditionally 
characterized by diminished empathy and remorse, and disinhibited or bold behaviour 
with consequent antisocial behavioral traits.
345
 
 
Characteristically, psychopaths lack moral understanding: they are deficient in both their 
capacity to feel moral emotions, such as empathy and guilt, and the ability to distinguish 
moral right from wrong. Paradoxically, psychopaths who commit crimes are typically in 
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control of their actions and aware of their illegality and the relevant criminal sanctions.
346
 
While impulsive behaviour is a feature in the construct of psychopathy, it has been 
proven in GNG tasks
347
 that such individuals can exert control over their impulses –– it is 
more an issue of whether they choose to exercise that control or not, rather than a blanket 
inability.
348
 Psychopaths may react impulsively to certain situations, yet ‘they are in 
complete control while doing so’.349 Psychopaths know their actions are wrong, but may 
not care.
350
 
 
Given that psychopathy is not a mental disorder listed within the DSM-5 and no 
psychiatric or psychological organization has sanctioned a diagnosis titled 
‘psychopathy’,351 the utility of FLRT in the rehabilitation of a psychopathic offender is 
not examined in this thesis.  
 
 
VIII MENTAL ILLNESS AND OFFENDING 
 
There is evidence that a person with a mental health or cognitive impairment has an 
increased risk of coming into contact with the criminal justice system. This is the 
implication of the evidence of overrepresentation.
352
 
 
In Australia, and other countries, individuals with a mental illness comprise a 
disproportionate number of those who are arrested, appear before the courts, and are 
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imprisoned.
353
 Prison health surveys in the States of New South Wales, Victoria and 
Western Australia have suggested that inmates have a much higher level of mental health 
problems than for members of the general population.
354
 One study indicated that the 
overall incidence of any psychiatric illness was 80 per cent for prisoners as compared to 
31 per cent for the community.
355
 The high imprisonment rate of individuals with mental 
illnesses is a problem that does not seem to be abating,
356
 and various jurisdictions around 
the world have responded with measures aimed at diverting individuals with mental 
illnesses away from the criminal justice system. The United Kingdom has primarily used 
court-based mental health diversion services to divert offenders into mental health 
treatment.
357
 The Australian Senate Select Committee on Mental Health recommended 
that ‘there be a significant expansion of mental health courts and diversion programs, 
focused on keeping people with mental illness out of prison’.358 People with cognitive 
and mental health impairments may, for various reasons, offend repeatedly and become 
entrenched in the criminal justice system.
359
 
 
Depression and anxiety are the largest mental health issues in Australia, with an 
estimated one million Australians living with depression each year.
360
 Schizophrenia and 
bi-polar disorder affect approximately one percent and two per cent of the population, 
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respectively.
361
 Research shows that the rates of major mental illnesses, such as 
schizophrenia and depression, are between three and five times higher in the offender 
population in Australia than in the general community.
362
 This is evidence to suggest an 
association between major psychotic and affective disorders and increased rates of 
offending behaviours.
363
 
 
In the Tasmanian Mental Health List Report,
364
 44.6 per cent of offenders had a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia, 18.8 per cent bi-polar, and 8 per cent depression. Notably, of the top 
three most prevalent diagnoses, two are disorders for which FLRT may have utility. 
 
Of those referred to the Mental Health Court Liaison Service in Newcastle, New South 
Wales, the top diagnoses were 19 per cent psychoses, 10 per cent depression, 8 per cent 
personality disorder,  and 6 per cent bipolar disorder.
365
 
 
In the South Australian MHDCt, 40.6 per cent program participants suffered from either 
an alternative affective disorder or schizophrenia. A further 19.8 per cent were diagnosed 
with bipolar disorder or major depression, and 10.6 per cent of participants had an 
intellectual disability.
366
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IX CONCLUSION 
 
 
The footing upon which this thesis rests has been explicated, both in terms of its 
therapeutic jurisprudential and neuroscientific bases.  The historical and conceptual 
components of these bases further frame the necessary background material. Relevantly, 
the categorization of impulse-control sets the stage for detailed deliberations around the 
utility of FLRT within the existing legal framework in Chapter 4. This is preceded by 
Chapter 3, which situates FLRT in terms of existing models of offender-rehabilitation, 
and argues for its acceptance as a recognized rehabilitative treatment. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
 
FLRT AND THE GOOD LIVES MODEL OF OFFENDER-
REHABILITATION 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis asserts that impulse-control (as an isolated issue) is important in the aetiology 
of offending, but it is not recognized as such. It should be the case that both the 
provisions of the law and psychological treatment reflect this. Currently, only people who 
are mentally ill with impulse-control issues are able to be diverted from the regular 
criminal justice system. 
 
The previous chapter detailed the foundational bases of this thesis and, inter alia, detailed 
the functional operation of FLRT. In order for FLRT to become a recognized 
rehabilitative treatment, it must comply with current models of offender-rehabilitation. 
This chapter explores the theoretical compatibility of FLRT with the Good Lives Model 
and the Risk-Need-Responsivity Model. The chapter also addresses the 
practical/administrative mechanisms for treatment program acceptance in accordance 
with government policy. Legitimising FLRT (if only hypothetically) in a manner 
consistent with theories of criminal conduct and their correspondent models of offender-
rehabilitation practice gives credence to the analysis of FLRT-utilization in the current 
legal framework, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
II THEORIES OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
 
A theory of criminal conduct is weak indeed if not informed by general psychology of human 
behavior.
368
 
 
The currently popular, more empirically defensible, theories of crime and delinquency 
(and, in particular, those with aspects relevant to impulse-control) are based on key 
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historical contributions, including the psychodynamic perspective of Sigmund Freud,
369
 
the radical behavioural perspective of B F Skinner,
370
 and the cognitive behavioural 
perspectives of Albert Bandura,
371
 Walter Mischel
372
 and Donald Meichenbaum.
373
 
 
The psychodynamic theory of criminal behaviour, with roots in the psychoanalytic 
perspective of Sigmund Freud, remains a source for much of current theory. The major 
contribution resides in Freud’s description of the structure of human personality: ego and 
superego, ‘which interact with the immediate environment and the demands of id for 
immediate gratification’.374 
 
Put simply, the key theoretical idea is that criminal behaviour reflects psychological 
immaturity and particularly weak self-control in specific situations, with impulsivity 
being representative of a major risk factor: 
 
Psychological maturity involves a fully developed ego and superego and is characterized by the 
ability to delay gratification for longer-term gain … . A strong superego is the psychological 
representation of societal rules and a strong ego is a set of coping and defense skills by which 
demands for immediate gratification may be delayed for longer-term gain.
375
 
 
On a certain metaphorical level, the prefrontal cortex is the closest thing we possess to a 
superego.
376
 
 
Another early theory of crime is that of Gottfredson and Hirschi,
377
 who argue that lack 
of self-control is the broadest and most important cause of crime.
378
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Six dimensions of self-control are derived from the theory of Gottfredson and Hirschi: 
impulsivity, avoidance of difficult tasks, risk-taking, tendency to be physical rather than 
mentally contemplative, self-centeredness, and bad temper.
379
 Further research has 
revealed impulsivity to be the most important dimension of the global construct, inviting 
speculation that ‘low self-control, to a large extent, [may] simply [be] impulsivity’.380 
 
The central idea behind this general theory of crime as posited by Gottfredson and 
Hirschi is that a deficit in self-control increases the propensity of individuals to commit 
crime. The authors theorize that persons lacking in self-control ‘tend to be impulsive, 
insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-sighted, and nonverbal, 
and they will tend therefore to engage in criminal and analogous acts’.381 
 
Models of offender-rehabilitation address indicia expounded by theories of crime. Having 
cemented the role of impulse-control in a theoretical criminological context, the 
compatibility of FLRT to current models of offender-rehabilitation can be examined.  
 
In terms of psychological treatment, impulse-control is part of current offender-
rehabilitation treatment programs, but the mode of treatment delivery is cognitive rather 
than neuropsychological — that is to say, the therapy addresses how offenders think, not 
the mechanisms behind thought processes and consequent behaviour. FLRT, based on 
cognitive neuroscience, considers how psychological functions are produced by neural 
circuitry. The emergence of neuroimaging combined with sophisticated experimental 
techniques from cognitive psychology allows neuroscientists and psychologists to 
consider how human cognition and emotion are mapped to specific neural substrates. The 
two models are GLM and RNR and will be discussed in turn. 
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III GOOD LIVES MODEL OF OFFENDER-REHABILITATION (GLM) 
 
FLRT could be considered a treatment consistent with the GLM of offender-
rehabilitation. This is a strength-based approach
382
 to offender-rehabilitation that provides 
‘an integrative framework for assisting individuals to achieve their goals as well as 
managing their risk for reoffending’.383 This model asserts that 
 
focus on people’s cognitive, behavioral and character strengths can indeed lead to improved self-
regulation and positive outcomes across a range of life domains.
384
 
 
The GLM promotes ‘pro-social and personally more satisfying goals’,385 with ‘attention 
paid to re-entry and reintegration into the social environment’.386 In order to motivate 
offenders to pursue more socially acceptable goals, it is necessary that they view 
alternative ways of living as personally meaningful and valuable.
387
 
 
 
A Relevance of Positive Psychology 
 
 
Positive psychology is a branch of mainstream psychology that is concerned with 
understanding human strengths, well-being and optimal functioning. It has been defined 
as ‘the scientific study of positive experiences and positive individual traits, and the 
institutions that facilitate their development’.388 Psychological intervention, from the 
perspective of positive psychology, seeks to balance a problem-focused approach of 
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offender risk-management with the promotion of human strengths and the ‘pervasive 
human tendency to seek meaning and purpose in life’.389 
 
Relevant to positive psychology, the GLM perpetuates the assumption that ‘human 
beings actively seek activities or experiences that benefit them and that are associated 
with a sense of subjective well-being’.390 There are 10 fundamental (or ‘primary’) human 
‘goods’ sought by all people,391 irrespective of education, intelligence or class.392 These 
are: life (including healthy living and physical functioning), knowledge, excellence in 
work and play (including pleasure and mastery experiences), agency (namely, autonomy 
and self-directedness), inner-peace, friendship, community, spirituality, happiness and 
creativity.
393
 
 
Putting ‘flesh on the bones of the more abstract primary goods’,394 secondary goods ‘are 
available to individuals by way of the numerous models and opportunities for attaining 
goods in everyday life … and dictate the form these goods take in specific contexts’.395 
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The twin focus of the GLM regarding therapy with offenders is to promote individuals’ 
important personal goals while concurrently reducing and managing their risk for future 
offending.
396
 A major aim is to equip the offender with the skills, values, attitudes and 
resources to obtain primary goods in socially acceptable ways.
397
 In assisting offenders to 
create personally meaningful and satisfying lives, the scope and quality of primary goods 
available to them are increased. Through its emphasis on assisting offenders to create and 
implement their conception of a good life while reducing their risk, the GLM promotes 
positive or approach goals, thereby enhancing motivation to change. A GLM leads to the 
development of tailored case formulations and treatment plans that address the critical 
role of contextual factors in both the process of offending and in rehabilitation. The GLM 
promotes offender engagement and arguably offers a comprehensive understanding of 
offending. 
 
It follows that the role of FLRT — placing the offender in the driver’s seat of his own 
neural circuitry
398
 — is representative of the ‘holistic’399 perspective perpetuated by the 
GLM, whereby offenders are empowered to address their own rehabilitative needs. The 
simplicity of the goal of FLRT is to enhance a person’s capacity for long-term decision-
making, and the technology, together with other new developments, may reinvigorate the 
discussion of possibilities for customized rehabilitation.
400
 This further capitalizes on the 
contention of the GLM that ‘[g]oal-directedness is a human enterprise’.401 
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B Psychological Flexibility 
 
 
The construct of psychological flexibility is also relevant and is recognized by positive 
psychology researchers and practitioners. A component of the rational frame theory
402
 — 
which assumes that meanings derived from everyday use of language exert a powerful 
influence on psychological processes — psychological flexibility refers to one’s ability to 
‘adapt to fluctuating situational demands, reconfigure mental resources, shift perspective, 
and balance competing desires, needs, and life domains’.403 From the perspective of 
offender supervision, psychological flexibility refers to the extent to which an offender’s 
internal resources (strengths) can be utilized to facilitate pro-social pursuits. Hence, what 
might distinguish offenders who desist from crime from those who persist may be their 
ability to flexibly utilize their cognitive repertories to pursue goals in pro-social ways. 
This means that individuals who are psychologically flexible will be less likely to 
maladaptively respond to negative thoughts, feelings and behaviours:
404
 
 
We suggest that offenders will be ready to change their offending behaviour to the extent that they 
possess certain cognitive, emotional, volitional, and behavioural properties and live in an 
environment where such changes are possible and supported. More specifically, offenders need to 
possess the capacities and inclination to change their behaviour in general, solve a particular 
problem, accept a particular intervention, and to do all this at a particular time (now versus some 
future date).
405
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C Good Lives Model of Forensic Mental Health (GLM-FM) 
 
 
For C2, C3 and C4 offenders, the GLM can be extended to offenders with mental health 
concerns (GLM-FM) and posits that the presence of mental illness ‘acts as a major 
obstacle to the attainment of an individual’s pursuit of primary goods’.406 
 
The GLM-FM is underpinned by a comprehensive rehabilitation theory and it integrates 
both risk and rehabilitation perspectives. It provides clinicians with a broad and flexible 
framework for addressing offending, treating mental illness, and assisting with other 
clinical needs.
407
 It represents a departure from rehabilitative initiatives directed solely 
toward risk reduction, whereby ‘offenders with significant psychological problems who 
are not designated as high risk may not receive treatment’.408  
 
The GLM-FM is a strength-based, client-centered, and recovery-oriented approach that 
combines a humanistic approach to rehabilitation with the imperative of protecting 
society. Although further operationalization and testing will be required to enable GLM-
FM to develop into a robust, evidence-based, clinical framework that forensic mental 
health practitioners will use,
409
 its framework is such that it houses FLRT aptly. In 
keeping with the idea of viewing offenders as more than simply ‘bearers of risk’,410 the 
consistency of FLRT to the GLM of offender-rehabilitation is further evidenced. 
Augmenting risk or deficit-focused offender-rehabilitation practice with a strength-based 
approach, of which FLRT could be a part, could be most beneficial in recidivism 
reduction. Promoting psychological flexibility also assists offenders to move toward 
leading pro-social lives.  
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IV RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY (RNR) MODEL 
 
[A] psychological “understanding” of criminal conduct is crucial to effective correctional 
programming.
411
 
 
Many current forensic psychology practitioners integrate principles from the GLM with 
the more traditional therapeutic model of offender-rehabilitation: the RNR model. First 
developed by Andrews and Bonta,
412
 the RNR model is ‘a theoretical framework that 
outlines both the central causes of persistent criminal behaviour, and some broad 
principles for reducing engagement in crime’.413 Founded on three core principles of 
offender classiﬁcation — risk, need and responsivity — the RNR model is an empirically 
validated guide for criminal justice interventions that aim to help offenders to depart from 
that system.
414
 Its strengths as a theoretical framework for offender-rehabilitation are 
substantial: it distils a large volume of aetiological and intervention-related information 
into a series of transparently simple principles for application.
415
 
  
Key assumptions of the RNR model are that certain empirically based social and 
psychological risk factors are associated with offending, that an offender’s level of risk 
increases with the presence of each additional risk factor, and that targeting dynamic (that 
is, potentially changeable factors that give rise to offending) risk factors in treatment will 
reduce reoffending rates. The risk principle holds that the greatest level of resources 
should be directed to the highest-risk group of offenders. The need principle states that 
interventions should address empirically based dynamic risk factors or criminogenic 
needs such as distorted cognitions, substance abuse or antisocial peers. The responsivity 
principle stipulates that programs should be tailored to match the individual 
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characteristics and environment (for example, learning style, intellectual level and 
culture) of the offender in order to be optimally effective in reducing risk.
416
 
 
The general personality and social psychology underlying the RNR model of 
rehabilitation recognizes the importance of the personal, interpersonal and relatively 
automatic sources of control over human behaviour, as well as the power of cognitive-
social-learning approaches to interpersonal influence, in many social settings.
417
  
 
Within the RNR model, there are eight criminogenic needs, of which impulse-control is 
one. Arguably, impulse-control is embedded within all risk factors, thus heightening the 
utility and relevance of FLRT to both the GLM and the RNR model. 
  
As the GLM is a strength-based model, the RNR model is a risk-reduction model. It 
assumes that (a) intervening to help offenders reduce their involvement in crime beneﬁts 
them and the community around them, and (b) the only way to intervene effectively is 
through compassionate, collaborative and digniﬁed human service intervention that 
targets change on factors that predict criminal behaviour.
418
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A Risk 
 
 
Risk assessment is the process of determining an individual’s potential for harmful behavior. It 
entails consideration of a broad array of factors related to the person, the situation, and their 
interaction.
419
 
 
There are two aspects of the risk principle: prediction and matching. Prediction comprises 
assessment of risk factors. These refer to personal attributes and circumstances that are 
assessable prior to service and are predictive of future criminal behaviour. Matching 
refers to the notion that higher levels of service are reserved for higher-risk cases because 
they respond better to intensive service than to less intensive service. Lower-risk cases 
flourish with minimal, as opposed to, more intensive service. Therefore, offenders’ 
current risk level should be identiﬁed prior to making intervention decisions:420 
 
predictability of recidivism increases still further when actual changes in the person and 
circumstances of offenders are monitored.
421
 
 
 
 
B Need  
 
The need principle of the RNR model refers to the targets for change. Criminogenic 
needs are dynamic attributes of offenders and their circumstances that, when changed, are 
followed by changes in recidivism. Targets of service are matched with the criminogenic 
needs of offenders. Needs are case characteristics that are associated with changes in the 
chance of recidivism. If reduced recidivism is the ultimate goal, the more effective 
services are those that set reduced criminogenic need as the intermediate target of service. 
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Criminogenic needs are a subset of risk factors: ‘They are dynamic attributes of offenders 
and their circumstances that, when changed, are associated with changes in the chances of 
recidivism.’422 
 
 
C Responsivity 
 
 
The third core principle of the RNR model is responsivity, also described as the ‘how’ of 
intervention: designing and delivering services in ways that engage offenders, and help 
them to learn and change. General responsivity refers to general techniques and 
processes: behavioural and cognitive-behavioural techniques such as teaching skills and 
reinforcing pro-social behaviour.
423
 
 
Speciﬁc responsivity refers to variations among offenders in the styles and modes of 
service to which they respond. Behavioural and cognitive behavioural interventions are 
tailored to the cognitive ability of the offender. Styles and modes of service, or ‘treatment 
strategies’,424 are matched to the learning styles and abilities of offenders. Service is 
matched not only to criminogenic need, but also to those attributes and circumstances of 
cases that render individuals likely to profit from that particular type of service. 
 
It is widely accepted that ‘[r]isk, need and responsivity considerations provide reasonable 
guides to service and research in rehabilitation’.425 ‘Assignment of offenders to 
agencies/programs that do not adhere to RNR does not reduce crime.’426 
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The three core principles of the RNR model are accompanied by ‘overarching principles’, 
‘additional clinical principles’, and ‘organizational principles’.427 Overarching principles 
include (a) respect for the person and the normative context, (b) basing the programs on 
empirically validated psychological theory, and (c) the importance and legitimacy of 
services that prevent crime, even when those services are located outside the criminal 
justice system. Additional clinical principles state that programs should target multiple 
criminogenic needs (breadth), should assess strengths, both for risk prediction and 
responsivity, use structured assessments of risk, and use professional discretion 
occasionally on well-reasoned and well-documented grounds. Organizational principles 
recognize intervention contexts and needed resources. They state that community-based 
interventions are preferable, that staff practice both the relationship and structuring 
principles with offenders, and that management must provide, develop and support the 
staff and other resources needed.
428
 
 
The RNR model systematically targets risk factors associated with recidivism. Treatment 
programs are problem-focused and aim to eradicate or reduce the various psychological 
and behavioural difficulties associated with offending.
429
 The model has resulted in 
effective treatment and a reduction in recidivism rates.
430
 The focus is on the reduction of 
maladaptive behaviours, the elimination of distorted beliefs, the removal of problematic 
desires, and the modification of offence-supportive emotions and attitudes.
431
 In essence, 
the goals are avoidant in nature and emphasize ‘hypervigilance around potential threats of 
relapse and the reduction of criminogenic risk factors’.432  
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Recidivism is reduced when offenders are taught ‘how to manage aspects of their lives 
that elevate risk rather than simply presuming a deterrent value to punishment alone’.433 
Furthermore, the RNR model has been ‘imported from the correctional setting to the 
forensic context with mental illness being incorporated as an additional risk factor’.434  
 
 
 
D Crime Prevention Jurisprudence (CPJ) 
 
 
The RNR model, and the psychology that underlies it, may also assist justice agencies 
and the courts through crime prevention jurisprudence (CPJ).
435
 ‘Understanding and 
promotion of crime prevention will be enhanced when the justice system is informed by a 
strong psychology of human behaviour.’436 ‘Overall then, the introduction of a general 
human psychology into the crime-prevention aspects of the law and justice is not too 
great a stretch for jurisprudence or for psychology.’437 
 
According to CPJ, a purpose of the courts is to apply sanctions in a manner consistent 
with sentencing legislation and to do so with regard to offending-reduction through 
applications of the RNR model and an evidence-based, interdisciplinary understanding of 
the psychology of the criminal behaviour of individuals. Judges and the prosecuting and 
defence attorneys may reduce, increase or have no effect on criminal behaviour, 
depending upon their actions with respect to those offenders before the court. The actions 
of judges and lawyers, the court process, and the sanction itself may affect causally 
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significant factors and thereby increase or decrease reoffending.
438
 Relevantly, this may 
be touted as ‘an exercise in therapeutic jurisprudence’.439 
The relevance of FLRT to the RNR model is typified thus: 
 
Human beings are active, conscious, and wilful, and they are goal-oriented. They are also 
creatures with biological predispositions and with habits and conditioning histories whereby 
repeated associations among stimuli, responses, and behavioural outcomes can produce automatic, 
non-conscious cognitive regulation of motivation, perception, and behaviour. Their behaviour is 
under personal control, interpersonal control, and automatic control.
440
 
 
Returning to the significance of impulse-control in a theoretical criminological context, it 
is important to consider the following: 
 
To do anything, the self has to keep its own inner house in order, such as by organizing its actions 
toward goals, avoiding swamps of emotional distress, obeying laws, and internalizing society’s 
standard of good (both moral and competent) behavior.
441
 
 
The role of FLRT in the management of impulsivity, a dimension of self-control,
442
 is 
one that could be assimilated into existing models of offender-rehabilitation. For 
example, FLRT may form an adjunct to self-control assessments. Such assessments 
provide a direct indication of an individual’s ability to monitor, evaluate and deliver self-
instructions, cope with temptations, and self-deliver meaningful consequences. The 
exercise of self-control is assessed with reference to criminal activity, depending on the 
standards of the individual. These standards are assessed through an examination of 
personal attitudes, values, beliefs, rationalizations, cognitive-emotional states, and 
identities supportive or not supportive of criminal activity. The anti-criminal or pro-
criminal nature of standards is also influenced by the anti-criminal, pro-criminal, or 
neutral position of significant others in regard to antisocial behaviour.
443
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Furthermore, it is recommendable to actively engage an offender in his or her own 
rehabilitation process.
444
 With real-time fMRI, direct feedback is given to an offender and 
therefore success can be directly measured. In that sense the offender is part of a ‘game’ 
against his or her own brain and thus actively engaged in the process. By designing real-
time fMRI as a sort of ‘computer game’,445 and thus making it increasingly visual, the 
method is more accessible for the offender. On top of this, the method might arouse the 
patient’s ambition to achieve high scores in the ‘game’ and hence the willingness to 
participate in more sessions in order to continuously increase the scores. Engaging FLRT 
not only strengthens the neural pathways that care about long-term consequences, but 
also enables fMRI to reveal ‘how goals are represented at the neural level’ and the 
corresponding ‘brain activity associated with goal-directed behavior’,446 providing direct 
support for the following: 
 
In brief, human behaviour, criminal and non-criminal, is outcome-oriented and the chances of any 
act occurring increase with the density of the signalled rewards (that is, the number, variety, 
quality, frequency, immediacy, and regularity of rewards). The chances decrease with the 
signalled density of the costs.
447
 
 
 
V FLRT AS A RECOGNIZED TREATMENT PROGRAM 
 
 
Although ‘[t]here continues to be a paucity of legislative guidance for the delivery of 
offender-rehabilitation programs’,448 for the purposes of this thesis, FLRT is proffered as 
a treatment in keeping with current recognized offender-rehabilitation models: both the 
GLM and the RNR model. Because FLRT has utility for offenders in all categories (with 
the exception of those mental illnesses stipulated), managing the impulse-control part of 
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mentally ill/non-mentally ill offenders in both diversionary mechanisms and regular 
criminal justice system is possible. 
 
The Minister for Corrections would have authority to sanction the accreditation of FLRT 
and its inclusion in Correctional Offender-Rehabilitation Programs.
449
 As a legitimate, 
accredited treatment program, FLRT could then be utilized as a court-mandated 
opportunity for offender-rehabilitation through mental health diversionary mechanisms 
and the regular criminal justice system in each State and Territory in Australia. 
 
Correctional Services in each State and Territory in Australia have mechanisms through 
which offender-rehabilitation programs are endorsed. For example, Queensland 
Corrective Services approves applications for the provision of programs and services in a 
variety of areas, the most relevant being Offender Behaviour Programs.450 The application 
requires detailed information regarding the following: 
 
 the organization providing the proposed program;  
 the qualifications of staff delivering the program;  
 the program particulars; 
 the identification of appropriate program participants; 
 the funding source; 
 the theoretical model(s) upon which the program is based; 
 the method of program delivery; 
 the area of need targeted by the program and its relationship to offending 
behaviour; 
 the reporting of program participation (for example, participant outcome measures 
on clinical assessment tools and standard completion letters including the number 
of sessions attended, as well as brief comments on engagement and compliance 
with in-session and out-of-session activities and tasks); 
                                                 
449
  Ibid 35. 
450
  Queensland Corrective Services, Administrative Form – Application to Provide a Program or 
Service (2015) 
<http://www.correctiveservices.qld.gov.au/Resources/Procedures/Offender_Management/index.sht
ml>. 
  86 
 the program evaluation and monitoring mechanisms; 
 the dynamic risk factors addressed by the program; 
 the skills-oriented content of the program; 
 the program intensity and duration; 
 the monitoring of engagement and motivation of program participants; 
 the measures in place to maintain program integrity (to ensure that the program is 
delivered as intended through mandatory training, supervision and/or monitoring 
and auditing); and 
 the evaluation of the program on an on-going basis (for example, the utilization of 
an independent advisory board).451 
 
Programs offered to offenders are to be based on best practice and have solid evidence as 
to their efficacy.
452
 As a court-mandated treatment, FLRT would be an example of where 
courts partner with community-based programs licensed by the State to provide 
treatment, in conjunction with judicial monitoring. Treatment Reports, detailing an 
offender’s progress in the program, would then be available to the court for use in 
sentencing. This is elaborated upon in Chapter 7. 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
 
In order for the provisions of the law and psychological treatment to reflect the 
importance of impulse-control in the aetiology of offending, this chapter has detailed the 
alignment of FLRT to theories of criminal conduct and practical treatment models such as 
the GLM and the RNR model.  
 
An application to provide FLRT to offenders could be made to Correctional Services in 
accordance with the appropriate administrative mechanisms. If approved, FLRT would be 
                                                 
451
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452
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a recognized rehabilitative treatment program, thereby available to offenders. The 
following chapter reviews the existing court-mandated opportunities for FLRT-utilization 
for categorized impulse-control management as part of offender-rehabilitation through 
mental health diversionary mechanisms and/or the regular criminal justice system in each 
State and Territory in Australia. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
 
FLRT-UTILIZATION FOR IMPULSE-CONTROL 
MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter detailed the compatibility of FLRT with accepted theories of crime, 
and in particular, the theory of Gottfredson and Hirschi,
453
 who posit that a deficit in self-
control increases the propensity of individuals to commit crime. Chapter 3 also addressed 
the concordance of FLRT with the widely recognized models of offender-rehabilitation, 
the GLM and the RNR model. The formalities of FLRT becoming a legitimate treatment 
program were also addressed. 
 
This chapter considers how FLRT, if it were to be an accepted treatment, could be 
utilized within the existing Australian legal framework. This includes an examination of 
diversionary mechanisms and the regular criminal justice system in each State and 
Territory of Australia. FLRT-utilization for categorized impulse-control management, as 
established in Chapter 2, will also be addressed and summarized in a table at the end. The 
chapter commences with an overview of mental health and the criminal justice in 
Australia and proceeds to an examination of the various types of diversion available, and 
details diversion-appropriate offending. 
 
II MENTAL HEALTH AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA 
 
In Australia, a great deal of discrepancy exists in relation to options for offenders with a 
mental illness. Under the federal system, each of the six States and two Territories have 
separate mental health and criminal justice systems, which gives rise to significantly 
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different approaches in each jurisdiction.
 454
 The Commonwealth and each State and 
Territory have provisions in their criminal laws for the prosecution and disposition of 
persons with a mental illness or an intellectual disability.
455
 In most jurisdictions, 
criminal legislation and other relevant Acts, such as bail and sentencing Acts, interact 
with mental health services through the operation of mental health Acts.
456
 Most 
jurisdictions have provisions at the court level for diverting mentally or intellectually 
impaired defendants from the traditional court system where appropriate.
457
 
 
In many Australian States, specific legislation empowers magistrates and judges to defer 
taking a plea or sentencing to enable a person to undertake a diversion program before 
sentence. In general, all States and Territories have sentencing legislation that enables 
courts to dispense good behaviour bonds or adjourned undertakings or to defer 
sentencing.
458
 Under their mental health Acts, most jurisdictions have established special 
courts or services designed to assess the mental health of persons arrested or brought 
before the courts on criminal charges and to divert into treatment those found to have a 
mental illness.
459
 
 
The States and Territories have also established mental health liaison programs designed 
to assess the mental health of persons who come before the courts. In most Australian 
jurisdictions, mentally ill people may be diverted by the courts from the criminal justice 
system to the health system. Magistrates’ courts may make orders for treatment of 
offenders following advice received from the relevant court liaison service. 
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III TYPES OF DIVERSION  
 
Traditionally the term ‘diversion’ meant diversion out of the criminal justice system 
altogether. However, the term is now also commonly used to describe programs that 
initially increase contact with the criminal justice system through treatment and 
supervision, but which are aimed at reducing contact with the criminal justice system 
over time.  
 
A Mental Health Diversion Courts (MHDCts) 
 
 
Mental Health Diversion Courts originated in the United States of America, as a 
responsive initiative of individual judges.
460
 Mental health diversion courts are a type of 
problem-solving court, similar to drug courts, which function as a dedicated court for 
processing people with a mental illness.
461
 Described as a ‘practical legal innovation’,462 
mental health diversion courts are a broadly defined category: there are no accepted, 
specific criteria of what constitutes such a court. Each mental health diversion court is 
unique, and the way in which a mental health court operates in each jurisdiction is 
generally determined by the particular deficiencies in the mental health and criminal 
justice system perceived to exist in the individual jurisdiction.
463
 However, mental health 
courts all generally attempt ‘a rehabilitative response to what would otherwise have been 
criminally sanctioned behaviour’.464 
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In the United States of America, the Council of State Governments Justice Center
465
 has 
suggested that an appropriate working definition of a mental diversion health court is: 
 
a specialized court docket for certain defendants with mental illnesses that substitutes a problem-
solving model for traditional criminal court processing. Participants are identified through mental 
health screening and assessments and voluntarily participate in a judicially supervised treatment 
plan developed jointly by a team of court staff and mental health professionals. Incentives reward 
adherence to the treatment plan or other court conditions, nonadherence may be sanctioned, and 
success or graduation is defined according to predetermined criteria.  
 
Currently in Australia, two programs are in operation that have adopted the problem-
solving court model: the Magistrates Court Diversion Program in South Australia, and the 
Mental Health and Cognitive Diversion List in Tasmania. Both include judicial 
supervision and a collaborative team approach between mental health professionals, 
lawyers for the defence and the prosecution, and the court.
466
 
 
 
B Court Diversion and Liaison Services 
 
 
Another method of dealing with mentally ill offenders is through court diversion and 
liaison schemes. The objectives of court diversion and liaison programs are ‘to provide 
court-based mental health assessments, and where appropriate, to divert mentally ill 
offenders from the criminal justice system and to link them with appropriate psychiatric 
services in hospitals or in the community’.467 
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In contrast to mental health court models, these services do not engage in follow-up 
supervision of offenders once diverted from court.
468
 While some variation exists across 
schemes in relation to operational structure, many services are staffed by psychiatric 
teams who provide a link between the criminal justice system and the health system. 
Most mental health court liaison services provide an assessment, referral and advice 
service to the court. Importantly, ‘court diversion does not equate with discontinuation of 
criminal prosecution; it allows for the two systems of diversion and prosecution to work 
in a collaborative manner’.469 
 
Most jurisdictions in Australia have established court liaison/diversion services for 
mental health or specialized courts/lists, for the purpose of assessing and diverting 
mentally ill individuals from the criminal justice system into treatment.
470
 In New South 
Wales, for example, the Statewide Community and Court Liaison Service operates as a 
court-based diversion program, and Victoria has an Assessment and Referral Court List, 
as well as a Mental Health Court Liaison Service. Although in its infancy, with a 
consequent paucity of information, the Specialist Treatment and Assessment Referral 
Team Court commenced operation in March 2013 in Western Australia, operating out of 
Perth Magistrates Court. Neither the Northern Territory nor the Australian Capital 
Territory, however, have any mental health diversion mechanism. 
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IV DIVERSION-APPROPRIATE OFFENDING  
 
Diversion is appropriate for lower-level offending or that which typically comes before 
courts of summary jurisdiction, such as summary and minor indictable offences. 
 
A summary offence
471
 is an offence that can be heard by a magistrate sitting alone, rather 
than a judge and jury. Known also as ‘simple offences’472 in Queensland, Western 
Australia and Tasmania, summary offences can be heard in the absence of the defendant. 
Such offences are usually considered to be less serious and generally carry a maximum 
penalty of two years’ imprisonment.473 Examples include road traffic offences, petty 
crime, assaults, property damage and offensive behaviour.  
 
Indictable offences,
474
 in contrast, are more serious offences that cannot be heard in the 
absence of the defendant. Such offences are triable by either a judge and jury, or 
summarily. Some of these offences, although considered serious, may be heard in the 
Magistrates’ Court where the court considers it is appropriate for the offence to be dealt 
with by a magistrate. 
 
‘Minor indictable’475 offences are dealt with in the Magistrates’ Court unless the 
defendant chooses to have the charge dealt with in a superior court. An example of a 
minor indictable offence triable is an offence involving interference with, damage to, or 
destruction of, property where the loss resulting from commission of the offence does not 
exceed $30,000.
476
 
 
Thus, in its criminal jurisdiction, the Magistrates’ Court has the power to: hear and 
determine all summary offences; hear and determine all indictable offences triable 
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summarily; and conduct committal proceedings into indictable offences.
477
 Generally, 
offences of a violent or sexual nature are excluded from diversionary programs, as 
diversion is often regarded as an inappropriate response to serious offending,
478
 the 
inevitability of punitive recourse prevailing. 
 
Relevantly, according to data collected by MHDCts, the most prevalent offences 
committed by mentally impaired people, appear to be minor offences such as trespass, 
public transport offences, property damage, shoplifting, disorderly conduct and nuisance 
offences.
479
 Furthermore, data from a relevantly recent Tasmania Mental Health List 
Report
480
 show that 26.2 per cent of offences were committed against justice 
procedures,
481
 23.3 per cent were theft and related offences,
482
 and 16.5 per cent were 
traffic regulatory offences.
483
 And in the South Australian MHDCt, almost one-half of all 
offences laid against program participants were against property (47.0 per cent), just over 
one-quarter involved an offence against good order (27.9 per cent), and driving offences 
accounted for about 10 per cent of all offences laid.
484
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V FLRT-UTILIZATION WITHIN THE EXISTING AUSTRALIAN LEGAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
 
Impulse-control as such is not ‘treated’ in the current system. Consequently, rehabilitative 
treatment for impulse-control as an isolated phenomenon does not exist. Clearly, FLRT 
does not yet exist as a rehabilitative treatment, although it has been established to be 
concordant with currently accepted offender-rehabilitation models. This thesis 
accordingly poses the question: If FLRT were to be accredited as a legitimate 
rehabilitative treatment, through what existing mechanisms could it be administered to 
offenders? 
 
A review of existing court-mandated opportunities for offender-rehabilitation through 
mental health diversionary mechanisms and the regular criminal justice system — both in 
the pre- and post-sentencing stages — in each State and Territory in Australia proceeds 
on the following conjectural bases: 
 
All definitions of mental illness in each jurisdiction are compatible with the definition of 
mental disorder as specified in the DSM-5:
485
 
  
a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, 
emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or 
developmental processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated 
with significant distress in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expectable or 
culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not 
a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that 
are primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or 
conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above.
486
 
 
FLRT could be a treatment option under the definition of a ‘prescribed program’487 in the 
Northern Territory, ‘rehabilitation program’488 in Australian Capital Territory, ‘other 
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programs’489 in Queensland, ‘community treatment’490 and ‘intervention program’491 in 
New South Wales, a condition of an ‘individual support plan’,492 ‘treatment service’,493 
‘program’494 and ‘treatment’495 in Victoria, ‘treatment program’496 and ‘intervention 
program’497 in South Australia, ‘appropriate treatment’498 in Western Australia, and 
‘treatment’,499 ‘rehabilitation’500 and ‘program’501 in Tasmania.  
 
For C1 offenders suffering from difficulty with impulse-control in the absence of a 
mental illness, mechanisms for rehabilitation available through the regular criminal 
justice system may be appropriate. Mentally ill offenders in C2, C3 or C4, however, 
would ideally be treated through a mental health diversionary scheme. In some 
jurisdictions though, no such schemes exist, and so these offenders could only be treated 
through the regular criminal justice system. 
 
 
A Existing Offender-Rehabilitation Mechanisms 
 
 
A review of existing court-mandated opportunities for offender-rehabilitation through 
mental health diversionary mechanisms and the regular criminal justice system — both in 
the pre- and post-sentencing stages — in each State and Territory in Australia now 
follows. Again, this is with a view to locating the possibilities for Australian FLRT-
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integration within the existing court-mandated opportunities for offender-rehabilitation 
through mental health diversionary mechanisms as well as the regular criminal justice 
system. 
 
1 The Northern Territory 
 
 
In the Northern Territory, mental illness is defined legislatively as: 
 
an underlying pathological infirmity of the mind, whether of long or short duration and whether 
permanent or temporary, but does not include a condition that results from the reaction of a 
healthy mind to extraordinary stimuli (although such a condition may be evidence of a mental 
illness if it involves some abnormality and is prone to recur).
502
 
 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) 
 
No mental health diversion mechanism presently exists in the Northern Territory.
503
 
Thus, for someone suffering from a mental illness, as defined in C2, C3 and C4, there is 
no mental health diversionary mechanism through which FLRT could be administered. 
 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
Similarly, no deferred sentencing option exists in the Northern Territory.
504
 Deferred 
sentencing is a similar power to that of adjournment, whereby the sentencing of an 
offender is deferred for a period of time, ‘during which the offender may obtain treatment 
to participate in a range of programs’.505 In this period of time, the offender can address 
his or her offending behaviour, with ‘the likelihood that the court will make a better 
                                                 
502
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decision about the appropriate disposition which may be any of the sentencing options 
available to it, including a dismissal or a conditional discharge’.506 
 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
Section 9(a) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) provides ‘for the rehabilitation of an 
offender by allowing the sentence to be served in the community’. Division 4A outlines 
the imposition of a Community Based Order, whereby s 39F details the court-imposed 
conditions of such an order. Section 39F(1)(a) states that ‘the offender must undertake 
prescribed programs’ and ‘submit to medical, psychological or psychiatric assessment 
and treatment’.507 
 
Division 5, Subdivision 2A, of the Act addresses Community Custody Orders whereby, 
as a statutory condition, the offender must undertake a prescribed program or undergo 
counselling or treatment.
508
 This counselling or treatment must relate to ‘the offender’s 
psychological or psychiatric problem’.509 Section 48F details optional conditions 
available to the court: ‘the offender must undertake one, or more than one, specified 
prescribed programs’.510 
 
A ‘prescribed program’ is defined as ‘a course, training, education or similar activity 
prescribed by regulation for the order’.511 Further, ‘treatment or counselling addressing 
personal factors’ is a prescribed program.512 Section 100 also states: ‘Where a court may 
attach a condition to an order or require an offender to give an undertaking, the court 
may, as a condition of the order or as part of the undertaking, require an offender to 
undertake a prescribed treatment program.’513 
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In the Northern Territory, an offender in C1, or a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 or C4, 
receiving a non-custodial sentence could only have access to FLRT through the 
aforementioned post-sentencing mechanisms, as no pre-sentence mechanism currently 
exists. 
 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Options 
 
The Prisons (Correctional Services) Act 1980 (NT) provides guidelines and rules 
concerning medical treatment for offenders serving a term of imprisonment. Treatment 
programs are possible through these provisions to any prisoner on a consensual basis. The 
Act does not refer to rehabilitation explicitly. 
 
In the Northern Territory, an offender in C1, or a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 or C4, 
receiving a custodial sentence could have access to FLRT through the custodial treatment 
programs. 
 
 
2 The Australian Capital Territory 
 
 
In the Australian Capital Territory, mental illness is defined legislatively as: 
 
an underlying pathological infirmity of the mind, whether of long or short duration and whether 
permanent or temporary, but does not include a condition (a “reactive condition”) resulting from 
the reaction of a healthy mind to extraordinary external stimuli.
514
 
 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) 
 
No mental health diversionary mechanism presently exists in the Australian Capital 
Territory,
515
 and thus for someone suffering from a mental illness, as defined in C2, C3 
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and C4, there is no mental health diversionary mechanism through which FLRT could be 
administered. 
 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s)  
 
Section 27 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) empowers the court to make a 
Deferred Sentence Order, whereupon being convicted or found guilty an offender is 
‘given an opportunity to address his or her criminal behaviour, and anything that has 
contributed to the behaviour, before the court sentences the offender for the offence’.516 
The court is able to release the offender under s 25 of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT)
517
 with, 
for example, ‘a requirement that the accused person participate in a program of personal 
development, training or rehabilitation’.518 
 
Prior to sentencing, an offender in C1, or a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 or C4, may 
have access to FLRT through a Deferred Sentence Order. 
 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
One of the objects of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) is ‘to maximise the 
opportunity for imposing sentences that are constructively adapted to individual 
offenders’.519 
 
A Good Behaviour Order is imposed under s 13 of the Act and may include ‘a 
rehabilitation program condition’.520 Defined in s 93, a rehabilitation program refers to a 
program prescribed by regulation.
521
 Regulation 2(1)(c) of the Crimes (Sentencing) 
Regulations 2006 (ACT) stipulates that ‘programs that impart self-management and 
social skills to enable offenders to deal with difficult situations in ways that do not 
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involve the criminal behaviour’522 constitute rehabilitation programs for the purposes of 
the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). A Good Behaviour Order made without 
convicting the offender is known as a Non-Conviction Order.
523
 
 
In the Australian Capital Territory, an offender in C1, or a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 
or C4, receiving a non-custodial sentence could have access to FLRT through a Good 
Behaviour Order and/or a Non-Conviction Order. 
 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
One of the main objects of the Corrections Management Act 2007 (ACT) with respect to 
the treatment of sentenced offenders is articulated in s 7(1)(d): ‘to promote the offender’s 
rehabilitation and reintegration into society’. Similarly, the treatment of detainees 
generally is covered by s 9(f) of the Act: ‘to promote, as far as practicable, the detainee’s 
rehabilitation and reintegration into society’.524 
 
In the Australian Capital Territory, an offender in C1, or a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 
or C4, receiving a custodial sentence could have access to FLRT through the custodial 
treatment programs. 
 
 
3 Queensland 
 
The Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) does not contain a specific definition of mental illness. 
Deferring to the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld), a mental illness is defined as ‘a condition 
characterised by a clinically significant disturbance of thought, mood, perception or 
memory’.525 
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(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s)  
 
Queensland does not have a mental health diversion court. The Special Circumstances 
Court, which is no longer in operation, directed participants with ‘impaired decision-
making capacity’, including those with a disability attributable to a psychiatric 
impairment ‘to available treatment, rehabilitation and support services with the focus on 
reduction of their criminal offending behaviour’.526 This operated under the Bail 
(Prescribed Program) Regulations 2006. 
 
In Queensland, therefore, for someone suffering from a mental illness, as defined in C2, 
C3 and C4, there is no mental health diversionary mechanism through which FLRT could 
be administered. 
    
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
Following a finding of guilt, s 19 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) enables 
the court to release the offender on the condition that the offender must be of good 
behaviour and ‘the court may impose any additional conditions that it considers 
appropriate’.527 
 
Prior to sentencing, an offender in C1, or a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 or C4, may 
have access to FLRT in Qld through the imposition of an ‘additional condition’. 
 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
One of the sentencing guidelines articulated under Part 2 of the Governing Principles in 
the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) allows a court, in sentencing, to provide 
conditions in the court’s order that the court considers will help the offender to be 
rehabilitated.
528
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A Probation Order may be imposed under s 93 of the Act, whereby the offender ‘must 
take part in counselling and satisfactorily attend other programs as directed by the court 
or an authorised corrective services officer during the period of the order’.529 Additional 
requirements of a Probation Order may include conditions that the court considers 
necessary: (i) to cause the offender to behave in a way that is acceptable to the 
community; (ii) to stop the offender from again committing the offence for which the 
order was made; or (iii) to stop the offender from committing other offences.
530
  
 
An offender may be subject to an Intensive Corrective Order whereby the offender is to 
serve the sentence of imprisonment by way of intensive correction in the community and 
not in a prison.
531
 A general requirement of such an order is that the offender ‘must take 
part in counselling and satisfactorily attend other programs as directed by the court or an 
authorised corrective services officer’.532 
 
In Queensland, therefore, an offender in C1, or a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 or C4, 
receiving a non-custodial sentence could have access to FLRT through a Probation Order 
or an Intensive Corrective Order. 
 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
The Corrective Services Act 2000 (Qld), s 266(1)(d), specifically gives directions to the 
Chief Executive Officer to provide services or programs to help rehabilitate offenders. 
 
An offender in C1, or a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 or C4, receiving a custodial 
sentence, could thus have access to FLRT in Queensland through the stipulated offender 
programs. 
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4 New South Wales 
 
The Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), s 4, defines mental illness as 
 
a condition that seriously impairs, either temporarily or permanently, the mental functioning of a 
person and is characterised by the presence in the person of any one or more of the following 
symptoms: (a) delusions, (b) hallucinations, (c) serious disorder of thought form, (d) a severe 
disturbance of mood, (e) sustained or repeated irrational behaviour indicating the presence of any 
one or more of the symptoms referred to in paragraphs (a)–(d). 
 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) 
 
Two types of diversionary mechanisms exist in New South Wales.  Diversion is available 
through legislative powers and also through a Statewide Community and Court Liaison 
Service. 
(i) Diversionary Legislation in New South Wales 
 
In New South Wales, magistrates have been provided with unique legislative powers 
under ss 32 and 33 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) to divert 
offenders with mental illnesses, such as those defined in C2, C3 and C4, or intellectual 
disabilities charged with summary offences and minor indictable offences from the 
criminal justice system into community treatment (of which FLRT could be a part). 
Established in 2002, the service diverts offenders at any point of the court process into 
mental health treatment.
533
 
 
Diversion on adjournment of proceedings occurs where a defendant appears to the court 
to be developmentally disabled or suffering from mental illness or suffering from a 
mental condition for which treatment is available in a mental health facility. The 
defendant may be granted bail and the magistrate may make any order that he or she 
thinks appropriate.
534
 Section 32(3) of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 
(NSW) enables a magistrate to dismiss the charge and discharge the offender 
unconditionally or into the care of a responsible person or on the condition that the 
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offender attend on a person or at a place specified by the magistrate for assessment of the 
offender’s mental condition or for treatment. 
 
Importantly, in exercising discretion to grant orders under s 32 of the Act, the court must 
be confident that a treatment service is available.
535
 In achieving this, a treatment plan is 
provided to the court by a service provider before an order is granted. 
 
Magistrates also have power under s 33 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 
1990 (NSW) to order that individuals with a mental illness be taken to a mental health 
facility for assessment and detention, or to a mental health facility for assessment and 
detention, and if the offender is found on assessment not to be a person with a mental 
illness or disorder, the person may be brought back before a magistrate or an authorized 
officer, or be discharged, unconditionally or subject to conditions, into the care of a 
responsible person.  
 
Sections 32 and 33 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) provide 
an example of powers of diversion being incorporated into the mainstream system 
without the need to refer a person to a specific list.  
 
(ii) NSW Statewide Community and Court Liaison Service (SCCLS) 
 
Established in 1999, the SCCLS assists magistrates in utilizing the diversionary 
legislation under the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW). 
 
The SCCLS is part of the Statewide Forensic Mental Health Directorate and is entirely 
under the jurisdiction of Justice Health. The management structure of the service 
comprises a clinical director, an operations manager, a consulting forensic psychiatrist, an 
administrative officer, and includes reporting relationships to the Director of Statewide 
Forensic Mental Health Services. At each court where SCCLS services are available, a 
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court liaison officer (mental health nurse/clinical nurse consultant) provides service to the 
court under the supervision of consulting psychiatric personnel.
536
 
 
The SCCLS is a court-based diversion program targeting individuals in the criminal 
justice system who are ‘mentally ill and mentally disordered’.537 The service is available 
after the process of prosecution has begun for individuals charged with non-indictable 
offences. Broadly, the service provides mental health assessments and reports to the court 
to assist magistrates in making informed decisions about cases involving those with 
mental health problems.
538
 
 
The SCCLS diversion process comprises three phases: the screening and identification of 
individuals suspected of having a mental illness or mental disorder; psychiatric 
assessment and triage by a mental health professional of persons identified in the 
screening phase; and diversion, if appropriate, in negotiation and consultation with court 
staff and relevant health services.
539
 
 
In identifying possible cases for mental health assessment, the court liaison officers 
screen all detainees at court through daily review of police facts sheets, DCS documents 
and any other available relevant information.
540
 In the assessment phase, psychiatric 
interviews are conducted with the informed written consent of all individuals.  
 
Following assessments, a court report providing impartial views on mental health matters 
and making recommendations is presented to the court. If the court deems diversion to 
mental health facilities in the community appropriate, the court liaison officers 
communicate with the appropriate services and provide relevant information to assist 
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with the integration of individuals into treatment. When the court does not consider 
community diversion appropriate, the court liaison officers can facilitate access to 
appropriate care in custodial settings.
541
 The SCCLS has no ongoing clinical management 
or supervision role for individuals once diverted from court into the mental health 
system.
542
 
 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
One of the purposes of sentencing explicated in s 3A(d) of the Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) is ‘to promote the rehabilitation of the offender’. 
 
The Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) provides for the recognition and operation of 
certain programs for dealing with accused persons and offenders, known as ‘intervention 
programs’. The provisions are found in Chapter 7, Part 4 of the Act. An accused person 
or offender, such as one in C1, may have access to FLRT through referral for 
participation in an intervention program at several points during criminal proceedings.  
 
Prior to a conviction or a finding of guilt, s 350 of the Criminal Procedure Act empowers 
the court to adjourn proceedings to allow an accused person to be assessed or to 
participate in an intervention program. 
 
In accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, an intervention program may 
include a program ‘promoting the treatment or rehabilitation of offenders or accused 
persons’.543 An intervention plan is ‘a plan, agreement or arrangement arising out of the 
participation of an offender or an accused person in an intervention program’.544 
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In addition, without proceeding to conviction, a court that finds a person guilty of an 
offence may make an order requiring the person to participate in an intervention program 
(and to comply with any plan arising out of the program) under s 10(1)(c) of the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). This is an Intervention Program Order, the 
procedures for which are set out in Part 8C of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. 
Intervention Program Orders are made ‘to reduce the likelihood of the person committing 
further offences by inviting or requiring him or her to participate in a rehabilitation 
treatment or restorative justice program’.545 
 
Section 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Procedure Act enables deferral of sentencing for 
rehabilitation, participation in an intervention program, or other purposes. A court that 
finds a person guilty of an offence (whether or not it proceeds to conviction) may make 
an order adjourning proceedings for the purpose of assessing the offender’s capacity and 
prospects for rehabilitation,
546
 or for the purpose of allowing the offender to demonstrate 
that rehabilitation has taken place,
547
 or for the purpose of assessing the offender’s 
capacity and prospects for participation in an intervention program,
548
 or for the purpose 
of allowing the offender to participate in an intervention program.
549
 
 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
Under s 9 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), instead of imposing a 
sentence of imprisonment on a C1 offender, a court may make an order directing the 
offender to enter into a good behaviour bond for a specified term. 
 
A court can make participation in an intervention program (and compliance with any plan 
arising out of the program) a condition of a good behaviour bond under s 9 of the Act 
                                                 
545
  A Freiberg and N Morgan, ‘Between Bail and Sentence: The Conflation of Dispositional Options’ 
(2004) 15 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 220. 
546
  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 11(a). 
547
  Ibid s 11(b). 
548
  Ibid s 11(b1). 
549
  Ibid s 11 (b2); See also R v Trindall (2002) 133 A Crim R 119. 
  110 
(explicated under s 95A), or of a suspended sentence under s 12 of the Act, FLRT could 
be one of the treatments. 
 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
An object of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW) is to provide for 
the rehabilitation of offenders with a view to their reintegration into the general 
community.
550
 An offender in C1 receiving a custodial sentence could have access to 
FLRT through the stipulated offender programs. Despite the mental health diversionary 
mechanisms available in New South Wales, should a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 and 
C4 be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, FLRT could similarly be available. 
 
 
5 Victoria 
 
The Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) defers to the definition of mental illness in the 
Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) as ‘a medical condition that is characterised by a 
significant disturbance of thought, mood, perception or memory’.551 
 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s)  
 
Victoria has two types of diversionary mechanisms. One is a separate court list called the 
Assessment and Referral Court List, and the other is the Mental Health Court Liaison 
Service. 
(i) Assessment and Referral Court (ARC) List  
 
This is a specialist court list developed by the Department of Justice and is established 
under s 4S of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) to meet the needs of accused persons 
who have a mental illness and/or a cognitive impairment. Pursuant to s 4T of the Act, an 
accused, such as those defined in C2, C3 and C4, is eligible to participate in the ARC List 
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if he or she is suffering from mental illness, intellectual disability, acquired brain injury, 
autism spectrum disorder, or a neurological impairment, including, but not limited to, 
dementia. Offences of a violent, serious violent or serious sexual nature are precluded 
from the list.
552
 Less serious offences that may typically be listed include recklessly 
causing serious injury, making threats to kill, and indecent assault.  
 
The ARC List is located at Melbourne Magistrates’ Court and works collaboratively with 
the Court Integrated Services Program (CISP), which provides participants with case 
management. This may include referral for psychological assessment (which may include 
referral to FLRT), welfare, health, mental health, disability, housing services and drug 
and alcohol treatment.
553
 The accused must consent to participate in the ARC List, 
although a plea of guilty is not required. 
 
Once a referral is made and an initial assessment is administered, the ARC List 
Magistrate will decide whether to accept the participant in the ARC List. If the referral is 
accepted, the ARC List clinical advisor will develop an individual support plan (ISP) in 
collaboration with the participant and the CISP staff for approval by the Magistrate. If the 
referral is not accepted, the accused’s charges will be referred back to mainstream court 
lists. If the participant pleads not guilty, his or her case will be returned to mainstream 
court for a contested hearing. 
 
Upon completion of an ISP to the satisfaction of the court, the court must hear and 
determine the criminal proceeding to which the ISP related.
554
 If an accused completes, or 
participates in, an ISP to the satisfaction of the court, the court may discharge the accused 
without any finding of guilt.
555
 If an accused participates in an ISP to the satisfaction of 
the court and the accused is subsequently found guilty of the charge, the court must take 
into account the extent to which the accused participated in the ISP when sentencing the 
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accused.
556
 However, if an accused fails to participate in an ISP to the satisfaction of the 
court and the accused is subsequently found guilty of the charge, the court must not take 
into account the accused’s failure to participate in the ISP when sentencing the 
accused.
557
  
 
(ii) Mental Health Court Liaison Service (MHCLS) 
 
A court-based assessment and advice service, the MHLS was implemented in 1994 as a 
pilot program and has since been expanded across the State. The program aims to reduce 
recidivism in mentally ill offenders, such as those defined in C2, C3 or C4, by diverting 
them into mental health treatment services. The service identifies and assesses people 
before the Magistrates’ Court who may suffer from mental illness, and facilitates access 
to appropriate treatment services (which may include referral to FLRT if it were a 
possibility). The service also operates in five rural Magistrates’ Courts.558 
 
Once the MHCLS receives a referral it will ensure that the offender receives appropriate 
medication and that other custodial management issues are addressed.
559
 Mental health 
clinicians undertake clinical assessments in order to determine the presence or absence of 
serious mental illness, and provide feedback based on these assessments to the court.
560
 
 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
Pursuant to s 83A of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), if a person is found guilty of an 
offence and the court is of the opinion that sentencing should, in the interests of the 
offender, be deferred, and the offender agrees, the court may defer sentencing to allow 
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the offender’s capacity for and prospects of rehabilitation to be assessed, to demonstrate 
that rehabilitation has taken place, or to participate in a program or programs aimed at 
addressing the underlying causes of the offending. This would be appropriate for an 
offender in C1, with such a program including FLRT. 
 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
One of the enumerated purposes of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) is ‘to prevent crime 
and promote respect for the law by providing for sentences that facilitate the 
rehabilitation of offenders’.561 
 
A Community Correction Order provides ‘a community based sentence that may be used 
for a wide range of offending behaviours while having regard to and addressing the 
circumstances of the offender’.562A court that is making a Community Correction Order 
may attach a condition to the order that requires the offender to undergo ‘treatment and 
rehabilitation’.563 The treatment and rehabilitation specified may be ‘any mental health 
assessment and treatment that may include psychological, neuropsychological, 
psychiatric or treatment in a hospital or residential facility’,564 and more broadly ‘any 
program that addresses factors related to his or her offending behaviour’.565 
 
An order made under Division 1 of the Sentencing Act (Dismissals, discharges and 
adjournments) may serve the purpose ‘to provide for the rehabilitation of an offender by 
allowing the sentence to be served in the community unsupervised’.566 Options exist for 
release on adjournment following conviction,
567
 or without conviction,
568
 with a 
treatment and rehabilitation condition. This would be appropriate for an offender in C1, 
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with such a program including FLRT if it were to be an available option in the 
jurisdiction. 
 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
Section 5(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) states that one of the purposes for which 
sentences may be imposed is to ‘establish conditions within which it is considered by the 
court that the rehabilitation of the offender may be facilitated’. The Corrections Act and 
Regulations make few references to rehabilitative programs and purposes. Section 57B of 
the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) refers to the rehabilitation and transition permit system. 
An offender in C1 receiving a custodial sentence would have access to FLRT through the 
stipulated offender programs. Despite the mental health diversionary mechanisms 
available in Victoria, should a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 or C4 be sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment, FLRT would similarly be available.  
 
 
6 South Australia 
 
In South Australia, mental illness is legislatively defined as ‘a pathological infirmity of 
the mind (including a temporary one of short duration)’.569 Mental impairment includes a 
mental illness, an intellectual disability and a disability or impairment of the mind 
resulting from senility.
570
 
 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) 
 
In South Australia, the Magistrates’ Court Diversion Program (MCDP) has been in 
operation since 1999 and was Australia’s first specialized court for people with mental 
impairments.
571
 The program was established following a review of amendments to the 
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State’s mental health legislation, which had resulted in growing numbers of people 
relying on the costly and resource-intensive defence of mental illness for minor charges.  
 
The program, which usually runs for six months,
572
  is open to people with a mental 
illness — such as those defined in C2, C3 and C4 — an intellectual disability, a brain 
injury, dementia or a personality disorder who commit summary and certain minor 
indictable offences.
573
 The program has taken a flexible approach to eligibility regarding 
the types of offences involved and considers referrals on a case-by-case approach, with 
an emphasis on minor offences.
574
 There must be a connection between the mental 
impairment and the offending behavior, such that a link can be reasonably drawn. 
Otherwise, it is opined, if there is no connection the intervention will have no impact on 
future offending. Participation in the program is voluntary and, although defendants are 
not required to enter a guilty plea, they must indicate that they will not contest the 
charges against them.
575
 The MCDP has a dedicated court team, comprising a designated 
magistrate and a number of court officers — a program manager, four clinical advisors 
and five clinical liaison officers who develop a personalised treatment plan for each 
defendant.
576
 Regular status meetings are held where the defendant’s compliance with 
their individual intervention plan is assessed. Failure to comply might result in extension, 
alteration or termination of the program.
577
 
 
A Clinical Advisor (registered psychologist) must be satisfied at the preliminary 
assessment that the person understands the program and consents to being involved. A 
written report is provided to the Magistrate who decides whether to accept the person into 
the program. Program participants can generally expect a reduction in the sentence they 
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would have received in the general court list.
578
 The ongoing monitoring of the offender 
enables the treatment plan to be reviewed and updated where necessary. If it appears that 
the Diversion Program is not suitable, then participation may be terminated and the 
person returned to the normal court list or sentenced by the Diversion Program 
Magistrate. Poor performance and lack of satisfactory progress on the program is not 
relevant to sentencing. 
 
The team of Clinical Liaison Officers is responsible for the implementation of the 
treatment plans. This includes linking Diversion Program participants with relevant 
services and maintaining ties with service providers to promote the aims of the program 
and assist access to the services they provide. The Diversion Program facilitates the 
involvement of service providers based in the community, who are responsible for the 
case management of the offender on the particular treatment program.
579
 One such 
treatment program could be FLRT. Progress in the Diversion Program is assessed in 
relation to the individual’s overall mental well-being.580 
 
(i) Sentencing in MCDP 
 
An intervention program is defined in s 3 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 
(SA) as a program that provides: (a) supervised treatment; (b) supervised rehabilitation; 
(c) supervised behaviour management; (d) supervised access to support services; or (e) a 
combination of any one or more of the above. The specific sentencing considerations 
afforded to mentally impaired offenders involved in an intervention program are 
addressed in turn. 
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(ii) Without Conviction or Penalty 
 
The Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), s 19C(1), empowers a court to release a 
defendant who has been found guilty of a summary or minor indictable offence without 
conviction and without penalty where the court is satisfied that: the defendant suffers 
from a mental impairment that explains and extenuates, at least to some extent, the 
conduct that constitutes the elements of the offence;
581
 the defendant has completed or is 
participating in a satisfactory manner in an intervention program;
582
 the defendant 
recognizes that he or she suffers from the mental impairment and is making a 
conscientious attempt to overcome the associated behavioural problems;
583
 and release of 
the defendant does not pose an unacceptable risk to the safety of a particular person or the 
community.
584
  
 
(iii) Dismissal of the Charge 
 
Section 19C(2) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) empowers a court to 
dismiss a charge of a summary or minor indictable offence without any plea being 
entered (such as where the matter has not been ‘finally determined’), where the court is 
satisfied that the same conditions are met as in s 19C(1)(a)–(b). The dismissal of a charge 
is a favourable option to those who have completed, or participated to a satisfactory 
extent, in an intervention program585 through the MCDP: they have received rehabilitative 
treatment, yet are absolved of the criminality of their actions.  
 
(iv) Release on Undertaking to Complete the Program 
 
In accordance with s 19C(3) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), where a 
defendant is participating in an intervention program but has not yet completed the 
program, a court may, instead of releasing the defendant under s 19C(2), release the 
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defendant on an undertaking that they will complete the program and then appear before 
the court for determination, or appear before the court for determination if they fail to 
complete the program. 
 
 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
Section 10 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) outlines the sentencing 
considerations, one of which is ‘the rehabilitation of the defendant’.586 Section 19B of the 
Act empowers the court, on finding a person guilty of an offence (whether it proceeds to 
conviction), to make an order adjourning proceedings to a specified date and granting bail 
to the defendant in accordance with the Bail Act 1985 (SA) ‘for the purpose of allowing 
the defendant to participate in an intervention program’.587 This would be appropriate for 
an offender in C1, with such a program including FLRT if it were to be an available 
option for the court. 
 
 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
Section 38 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) provides for suspension of 
imprisonment on entering a bond. A Good Behaviour Bond with a condition to undertake 
an intervention program
588
 is an example. Similarly, s 39 of the Act enables an offender 
to be discharged without sentence on entering into a Good Behaviour Bond with a 
condition to undertake an intervention program.
589
 Such options would be appropriate for 
an offender in C1, with such a program including FLRT. 
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(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
The Department for Correctional Services offender-rehabilitation program operates in 
accordance with the Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA), s 23, which relates to prisoner 
assessment. In s 23(3)(i) it is stated that in carrying out an assessment under the section, 
the Chief Executive Officer must have regard to any proposed plans in respect of the 
release of the prisoner and his or her social rehabilitation. 
 
The Department for Correctional Services ensures that offenders and prisoners with an 
assessed need will be provided with a range of targeted programs and services that will 
assist them in developing appropriate social and vocational skills to prevent reoffending. 
An offender in C1 receiving a custodial sentence would have access to FLRT through the 
stipulated offender programs. Despite the mental health diversionary mechanisms 
available in South Australia, should a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 or C4 be sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment, FLRT would be similarly be available. 
  
 
 
7 Western Australia 
 
In Western Australia, a person has a ‘mental illness’ if he or she suffers from a 
disturbance of thought, mood, volition, perception, orientation or memory that impairs 
judgement or behaviour to a significant extent.
590
 The term mental illness means an 
underlying pathological infirmity of the mind, whether of short or long duration and 
whether permanent or temporary, but it does not include a condition that results from the 
reaction of a healthy mind to extraordinary stimuli. The term ‘mental impairment’ means 
intellectual disability, mental illness, brain damage or senility.
591
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(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s) 
 
The Specialist Treatment and Assessment Referral Team (START) Court commenced 
operation in March 2013. This pilot program is the first mental health court diversion 
program in Western Australia to ensure that those with mental health issues who need 
help receive it.
592
 Conceivably, offenders such as those defined in C2, C3 or C4 may be 
able to receive FLRT if available under the auspices of START. 
 
The initiative operates out of the Perth Magistrates’ Court and convenes five days per 
week. It focuses on providing greater options for people in court with mental illness, and 
increasing the capacity of the court to respond in ways that support people while 
addressing their offending behaviour.
593
 
 
The START Court operates without specific legislative backing, with the primary 
legislative vehicle for the operation of the court being the granting of conditional bail 
under the provisions of the Bail Act 1982 (WA). 
 
Those charged with serious offending, or who are considered to pose a high risk to the 
community, are not ordinarily admitted into the program. Entry to the program is not 
conditional upon a plea of guilty, because in many instances the program will be applied 
prior to entry of the plea.  Those with a primary diagnosis of intellectual disability, drug 
misuse, or personality disorder are not admitted into the program. 
 
Western Australia has a pre-existing diversion program for offenders with intellectual 
disabilities. The Intellectual Disability Diversion Program is open to adults with a 
diagnosed intellectual disability, who have been charged with minor non-violent 
offences. Those adults who do not agree with the referral, or for whom a disability is not 
detected continue with the traditional court process. For those deemed eligible, the 
Magistrate adjourns the matter for a plan to be developed. Progress reports are provided 
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to the court. If a person does not comply with the plan, he or she continue through the 
traditional court process. Where an intervention plan is successfully completed, the 
matter is finalized, with participants receiving a reduced sentence and a certificate of 
participation.
594
 
 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
Sections 33A–K of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) deal with Pre-Sentence Orders (PSO). 
If a court is sentencing an offender for one or more imprisonable offences, the court may 
make a PSO in respect of the offender if it considers ‘that a PSO would allow the 
offender to address his or her criminal behaviour and any factors which contributed to the 
behaviour’,595 and ‘that if the offender were to comply with a PSO the court might not 
impose a term of imprisonment’.596 
 
The program requirement of the PSO is addressed under section 33G and may include 
‘undergoing assessment by a medical practitioner, a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a 
social worker, or more than one of them and, if necessary, appropriate treatment’.597 This 
would be appropriate for an offender in C1, with such a program including FLRT. 
 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
Neither the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) nor the Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA) 
explicitly mentions rehabilitation as an objective of sentencing. 
 
A Conditional Release Order (CRO) enables the court to ‘impose any requirements on the 
offender it decides are necessary to secure the good behaviour of the offender’.598 The 
program requirement of the imposition of a Community Based Order (CBO) is addressed 
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under s 66 of the Act. This may include ‘undergoing assessment by a medical 
practitioner, a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a social worker, or more than one of them 
and, if necessary, appropriate treatment’.599 
 
The program requirement of the imposition of an Intensive Corrections Order (ICO) is 
addressed under s 73 of the Act and may include ‘undergoing assessment by a medical 
practitioner, a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a social worker, or more than one of them 
and, if necessary, appropriate treatment’.600 
 
Section 84A of the Act stipulates the program requirement of the imposition of a 
Conditional Suspended Sentence (CSI). This may include ‘undergoing assessment by a 
medical practitioner, a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a social worker, or more than one of 
them and, if necessary, appropriate treatment’.601 Under the program requirements of any 
of these abovementioned orders, FLRT could be administered to an offender in C1. 
 
 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
The ‘Preparation and Implementation of Activity Programs’ under s 95 of the Prisons Act 
1981 (WA) enables ‘the provision of services and programs for the well-being and 
rehabilitation of prisoners’.602 
 
An offender in C1 receiving a custodial sentence would have access to FLRT through the 
stipulated offender programs. Despite the mental health diversionary mechanisms 
available in Western Australia, should a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 or C4 be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, FLRT would be similarly available.  
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8 Tasmania 
 
In Tasmania, mental illness is defined as ‘a disturbance of thought, mood, volition, 
perception, orientation or memory that impairs judgment or behaviour to a significant 
extent’. 603 
 
(a) Diversionary Mechanism(s)  
 
Tasmania’s Mental Health Diversion List (MHDL) was established in 2007 and operates 
within the Hobart and Launceston registries of the Magistrates Court. The MHDL is not a 
separate or distinct court and is not subject to any unique legislation; it utilizes existing 
provisions in the Bail Act 1994 (Tas) and the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) to divert 
offenders into treatment.
604
 The List is open to defendants who have impaired intellectual 
or mental functioning as a result of a mental illness, such as those defined in C2, C3 and 
C4. People with intellectual disabilities will only be accepted if they also have a mental 
illness. 
 
The list is open to people charged with summary offences, or indictable offences triable 
summarily, with the exception of sexual offences and some offences involving bodily 
harm.
605
 Participation is voluntary and the person must consent to be referred from the 
general court list. The person is not required to give a formal plea of guilty before 
participating. 
 
Once consent is given to participation in the program, an assessment is conducted by the 
Forensic Mental Health Court Liaison Officer to determine whether the person has 
impaired intellectual or mental functioning as a result of a mental illness. An eligible 
person will then appear before the Diversion List Magistrate who decides whether to 
accept the person into the program. An offender accepted onto the Hobart Diversion List 
then undergoes a full assessment and is assisted to access treatment (of which FLRT may 
be an example) and services in the community by the Forensic Mental Health Court 
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Liaison Officer via a detailed treatment plan.
606
 Those offenders who are found not 
eligible to participate are referred back to the general list. 
 
The offender must comply with a personalised treatment plan and attend court on a 
regular (usually monthly) basis to discuss their progress. Compliance may be met with 
verbal encouragement, adjustments to the treatment/supervision plan, conferral of other 
rewards, or graduation. Non-compliance may be met with verbal sanctions, adjustments 
to the treatment/supervision plan, or expulsion from the program.
607
 If the person is 
excluded from the Hobart Diversion List, the matter reverts back to the general court list. 
 
The Forensic Mental Health Court Liaison Officer provides a verbal report to the 
Diversion List Magistrate at the final review, detailing the offender’s involvement and 
progress on the program. The Magistrate takes this report into account when finalizing 
the matter, which may result in the criminal charges being withdrawn if the offender has 
successfully completed the program. 
 
(b) Regular Criminal Justice System Pre-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
One of the stated purposes of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) is to ‘help prevent crime and 
promote respect for the law by allowing courts to … impose sentences aimed at the 
rehabilitation of offenders’.608 
 
Section 7(f) of the Act empowers the court, on finding a person guilty of an offence, 
‘with or without recording a conviction, adjourn the proceedings … on the offender 
giving an undertaking with conditions attached, order the release of the offender’.609 An 
undertaking under s 7(f) is subject to the condition that the offender must be of good 
behaviour,
610
 and the offender must also observe any additional conditions imposed by 
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the court.
611
 One such condition might be participation in a rehabilitation program, which 
would be appropriate for an offender in C1, with such a program including FLRT if 
possible. 
 
(c) Regular Criminal Justice System Post-Sentence Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
A suspended sentence under s 24 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) suspending the whole 
or a part of a sentence of imprisonment may be subject to a condition that the offender is 
required to undertake a rehabilitation program.
612
 (Under s 4 of the Act, ‘rehabilitation 
program’ means a structured treatment program designed to reduce the likelihood of a 
person who has committed a family violence offence reoffending.) 
 
An offender who is subject to a Community Service Order may be directed to attend ‘an 
educational or other program in accordance with the directions of a probation officer’.613 
Subject to s 37(2) of the Act, a probation order may include a special condition that ‘the 
offender must attend educational and other programs as directed by the court or a 
probation officer’,614 and that ‘the offender must submit to medical, psychological or 
psychiatric assessment or treatment as directed by a probation officer’.615 
 
These post-sentence rehabilitation options would be appropriate for an offender in C1, 
with FLRT as an available treatment. 
 
(d) Regular Criminal Justice System Custodial Rehabilitation Option(s) 
 
The Corrections Act 1997 (Tas) contains no direction regarding rehabilitation or 
programs. An offender in C1 receiving a custodial sentence would have access to FLRT 
through the stipulated offender programs. Despite the mental health diversionary 
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mechanisms available in Tasmania, should a mentally ill offender in C2, C3 or C4 be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, FLRT would similarly be available. 
 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
 
As evidenced by the preceding overview, there appears to be little consistency in the 
legislative fiats that drive the delivery of rehabilitative services. It is difficult to identify a 
cohesive legislative commitment to rehabilitative ideals in Australia and, instead, where it 
exists, legislation appears to be fragmented. For the most part, the imprimatur for 
programs is located in legislation, but there is no consistency in rubrics. Sometimes the 
legislation is focused on corrections, sometimes on sentencing, and sometimes on parole 
or programs or courts administration. Moreover, the mandate for delivery derives 
principally from departmental administrative initiatives, which vary according to 
location. 
 
Parliamentary authority for the delivery of correctional services across the nation differs 
markedly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Sometimes it appears in the relevant criminal 
statutes, sometimes in correctional legislation, and sometimes in the various Acts related 
to sentencing that apply in some, but not all, jurisdictions. Not only are there different 
legislative approaches to correctional authority and direction, there are a variety of 
models for delivery of programs as well. These models range from the passive legislative 
model, to the specific legislative mandate model. Some jurisdictions provide a very 
general administrative fiat, with policy specifics left principally to departmental 
development and implementation. Others operate within a more directive regime.
616
  
 
Despite the varied options for offender-rehabilitation within the States and Territories in 
Australia, this chapter has established the plausibility of FLRT-utilization within the 
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existing rehabilitative mechanisms. The following chapter examines the diversification of 
the therapeutic practice of FLRT by widening the ambit of existing mechanisms. The 
utility of FLRT as part of court-mandated rehabilitative treatment, rather than full 
diversion, for major indictable offences in superior courts is advocated. The use of FLRT 
in tribunals and the extension of FLRT to other diversionary schemes, as well as in the 
rehabilitation of youth offenders and FLRT-incorporation in adult custodial programs and 
post-release programs are also advanced. 
 
Before progressing to Chapter 5, the existing court-mandated opportunities for offender-
rehabilitation through Australian mental health diversionary mechanisms and the regular 
criminal justice system, as detailed above, are summarized in the following table. 
Offenders classified according to the categories of impulse-control (C1, C2, C3 and C4) 
are depicted in shaded text within the table, according to appropriate dispositional 
mechanisms. 
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Table: FLRT-Utilization within Existing Mechanisms for Offender-Rehabilitation 
 
State 
 
Diversionary 
Mechanism 
Regular Criminal Justice System 
Non-Custodial Custodial 
Pre-Sentence Post-Sentence 
Northern 
Territory 
— — Sentencing Act 1995 
(NT) 
 
s 9(a) Rehabilitation of 
offender by sentence 
served in community 
 
s 39A Community 
Based Order 
 
s 48A Community 
Custody Order 
 
s 100 Condition of 
order to undertake 
treatment program 
 
 
 
C1, C2, C3, C4 
Prisons (Correctional 
Services) Act 1980 
(NT)  
 
Treatment programs 
are possible through 
these provisions to any 
prisoner on a 
consensual basis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1, C2, C3, C4 
Australian 
Capital 
Territory 
— Crimes (Sentencing) 
Act 2005 (ACT) 
 
s 27 Deferred 
Sentence Order (Post-
conviction/finding of 
guilt)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1, C2, C3, C4 
Crimes (Sentencing) 
Act 2005 (ACT) 
 
s 13 Good Behaviour 
Order 
 
s 17 Non Conviction 
Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1, C2, C3, C4 
Corrections 
Management Act 2007 
(ACT)  
 
s 7(1)(d) refers to the 
treatment of sentenced 
offenders, in particular 
‘to promote the 
offender’s 
rehabilitation and 
reintegration into 
society’ 
 
s 9(f): ‘to promote, as 
far as practicable, the 
detainee’s 
rehabilitation and 
reintegration into 
society’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1, C2, C3, C4 
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Table: FLRT-Utilization within Existing Mechanisms for Offender-Rehabilitation 
Continued 
 
State 
 
Diversionary 
Mechanism 
Regular Criminal Justice System 
Non-Custodial Custodial 
Pre-Sentence Post-Sentence 
Queensland — Penalties and Sentences 
Act 1992 (Qld) 
 
s 19 Order of Court 
(Release with conditions) 
(Post-conviction/finding of 
guilt) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1, C2, C3, C4 
Penalties and 
Sentences Act 1992 
(Qld) 
 
s 9(1)(b) allows a 
court, in sentencing, to 
provide conditions in 
the court’s order that 
the court considers will 
help the offender to be 
rehabilitated 
 
s 93 Probation Order 
 
s 113 Intensive 
Corrective Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1, C2, C3, C4 
Corrective 
Services Act 2000 
(Qld) 
 
s 266(1)(d) 
specifically gives 
directions to the 
Chief Executive 
Officer to provide 
services or 
programs to help 
rehabilitate 
offenders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1, C2, C3, C4 
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Table: FLRT-Utilization within Existing Mechanisms for Offender-Rehabilitation 
Continued 
 
State 
 
Diversionary 
Mechanism 
Regular Criminal Justice System 
Non-Custodial Custodial 
Pre-Sentence Post-Sentence 
New South 
Wales 
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 
(NSW) 
s 32 Persons suffering from mental illness or 
condition (Diversion on adjournment) 
C2, C3, C4 
Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 
1999 
(NSW) 
 
s 9 Good Behaviour 
Bond 
 
s 12 Suspended 
Sentence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Crimes 
(Administration of 
Sentences) Act 
1999 (NSW)  
 
s 2A(1)(d) to 
provide for the 
rehabilitation of 
offenders with a 
view to their 
reintegration into 
the general 
community 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Statewide 
Community and 
Court Liaison 
Service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C2, C3, C4 
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 
(NSW) 
s 350 Court may adjourn 
proceedings to allow accused 
person to be assessed or to 
participate in intervention 
program (Pre-
conviction/finding of guilt) 
 
Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) 
s 10(1)(c) 
Dismissal of charges and 
conditional discharge of 
offender on condition that the 
person enter into an agreement 
to participate in an 
intervention program and 
comply with intervention plan 
(Post finding of guilt) 
This is an Intervention 
Program Order 
 
s 100M Intervention Program 
Order 
s 11 Deferral of Sentence For 
the purpose of assessment for 
suitability for an intervention 
program, or for participation 
in an intervention program 
(and to comply with any plan 
arising out of the program) 
(Post finding of guilt — 
whether or not it proceeds to 
conviction) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
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Table: FLRT-Utilization within Existing Mechanisms for Offender-Rehabilitation 
Continued 
 
State 
 
Diversionary 
Mechanism 
Regular Criminal Justice System 
Non-Custodial Custodial 
Pre-Sentence Post-Sentence 
Victoria Assessment and 
Referral Court 
List 
 
s 4S 
Magistrates’ 
Court Act 1989 
(Vic) 
 
s 4Y 
Magistrates’ 
Court Act 1989 
(Vic) 
 
 
C2, C3, C4 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) 
 
s 83A Deferral of 
Sentencing (Post finding 
of guilt) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Sentencing Act 1991 
(Vic) 
 
s 36 Community 
Correction Order 
 
s 48D Treatment and 
Rehabilitation 
Condition 
 
s 72 Release on 
adjournment following 
conviction 
 
s 75 Release on 
adjournment without 
conviction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Sentencing Act 
1991 (Vic)  
 
s 5(1)(c) one of the 
purposes for which 
sentences may be 
imposed is to 
‘establish 
conditions within 
which it is 
considered by the 
court that the 
rehabilitation of 
the offender may 
be 
facilitated’ 
 
Corrections Act 
1986 (Vic) and 
Regulations 
make few 
references to 
rehabilitative 
programs 
and purposes. 
 
Section 57B 
concerns the 
rehabilitation and 
transition permit 
system for the 
rehabilitation of 
the prisoner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Mental Health 
Court Liaison 
Service  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C2, C3, C4 
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Table: FLRT-Utilization within Existing Mechanisms for Offender-Rehabilitation 
Continued 
 
State 
 
Diversionary 
Mechanism 
Regular Criminal Justice System 
Non-Custodial Custodial 
Pre-
Sentence 
Post-Sentence 
South 
Australia 
Magistrates’ Court 
Diversion Program 
 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) 
Act 1988 (SA) 
 
s 19C(1) Release without 
conviction or penalty 
Conditional upon: 
mental impairment explains 
conduct constituting offence 
defendant completed/is 
participating in intervention 
program 
Defendant recognizes mental 
impairment and is making a 
conscientious attempt to 
overcome the associated 
behavioural problems  
Release of defendant does 
not pose an unacceptable 
risk  
 
s 19C(2) Dismissal before 
charge finally determined 
Conditional upon 
mental impairment explains 
conduct constituting offence 
defendant completed/is 
participating in intervention 
program 
Defendant recognizes mental 
impairment and is making a 
conscientious attempt to 
overcome the associated 
behavioural problems  
Release of defendant does 
not pose an unacceptable 
risk  
 
s 19C(3) Release on 
Undertaking 
to complete intervention 
program 
 
 
 
 
C2, C3, C4 
Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) 
Act 1988 (SA) 
 
s 19B Deferral 
of Sentence 
for 
rehabilitation 
(Post finding 
of guilt —
whether or not 
it proceeds to 
conviction) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 
(SA) 
 
s 38 Good Behaviour 
Bond  
(Suspension of 
imprisonment on 
entering bond) 
 
s 39 Good Behaviour 
Bond  
(Discharge without 
sentence on entering 
bond) 
 
s 42(1)(da) and (d) 
Undertake Intervention 
Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) 
Act 1988  
 
The Department 
for Correctional 
Services offender-
rehabilitation 
operates in 
accordance with 
the Correctional 
Services Act 1982 
(SA) s 23, which 
relates to prisoner 
assessment 
 
s (3)(i) In carrying 
out an assessment 
under this 
section, the Chief 
Executive Officer 
must have 
regard to where 
relevant, any 
proposed plans in 
respect of the 
release of the 
prisoner and his or 
her social 
rehabilitation 
 
DCS Policy 
statement: 
Offenders and 
prisoners with an 
assessed need 
will be provided 
with a range of 
targeted programs 
and services that 
will assist them in 
developing 
appropriate social 
and vocational 
skills to prevent 
their reoffending 
 
 
C1 
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Table: FLRT-Utilization within Existing Mechanisms for Offender-Rehabilitation 
Continued 
 
State 
 
Diversionary 
Mechanism 
Regular Criminal Justice System 
Non-Custodial Custodial 
Pre-Sentence Post-Sentence 
Western 
Australia 
Specialist 
Treatment and 
Assessment 
Referral Team 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C2, C3, C4 
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA)  
 
s 33A–K Pre-Sentence 
Order (Post finding of 
guilt) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Sentencing Act 1995 
(WA)  
 
s 47–52 Conditional 
Release Order 
 
s 61–67 Community 
Based Order 
 
s 68–76 Intensive 
Supervision Order 
 
s 84A Conditional 
Suspended Sentence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Prisons Act 1981 
(WA) 
s 95 (Preparation 
and 
Implementation of 
Activity Programs)  
 
(1) Without 
limiting the 
responsibility of 
the chief executive 
officer for the 
welfare of 
prisoners 
conferred by 
section 7(1), the 
chief executive 
officer may 
arrange for the 
provision of 
services and 
programs for the 
well-being and 
rehabilitation of 
prisoners. 
C1 
Tasmania 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mental Health 
and Cognitive 
Diversion List 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C2, C3, C4 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) 
 
s 7(f) 
Adjournment on 
undertaking with 
conditions (Post finding of 
guilt — with or without 
recording a conviction) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Sentencing Act 1997 
(Tas) 
 
s 32 Community 
Service Order 
 
s 37(2) Probation Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
Corrections Act 
1997 (Tas)  
 
No direction 
regarding 
rehabilitation or 
programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C1 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
 
APPRAISAL AND OPTIMAL FLRT-UTILIZATION IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 4 critiqued the plausibility of FLRT-utilization within the existing Australian 
legal framework in Australia. This included an examination of the extant diversionary 
mechanisms and the regular criminal justice system in each State and Territory. FLRT-
utilization for categorized impulse-control management, as established in Chapter 2, was 
addressed and summarized in a table at the end. 
 
This chapter elucidates the argument for diversifying this therapeutic practice by 
widening its jurisdictional ambit. The utility of FLRT as part of court-mandated 
rehabilitative treatment, rather than full diversion, for major indictable offences in 
superior courts is advocated. The use of FLRT in tribunals that assess the continued 
detention of both civilly committed and forensic patients, as well as those that determine 
issues of mental responsibility, are also considered. Optimal FLRT-utilization may 
extend to other diversionary schemes, including police diversion, drug diversion and 
indigenous-specific diversionary programs. Youth offenders may also benefit from FLRT 
— in a diversionary capacity, as well as in detention and post-release. The value of FLRT 
in adult custodial programs and post-release programs is also advanced. 
 
II DISCRETIONARY NEURODIVERSION TEST APPLIED 
 
This chapter proceeds on one of the bases established in Chapter 2, namely, that judicial 
determination of the appropriateness of FLRT in the absence of a mental illness (that is, 
C1 offenders) could be guided by factors proffered by Rogers and Shuman.
617
 Those 
factors include the defendant’s perceived options, decision-making abilities, the 
                                                 
617
  R Rogers and D W Shuman, Conducting Insanity Evaluations (Guilford Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2000) 80. 
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deliberateness of the actions, and the point at which criminal actions become 
‘inevitable’.618 This approach could be adopted in conjunction with Webster and 
Jackson,
619
 who provide a clinical perspective of ‘impulse-driven conduct’, with the 
following characteristics enveloped in ﬁve domains: (1) interpersonal dysfunction: 
manipulative, black/white thinking with regard to others, distrustful; (2) lack of plans: 
avoidance of change, volatile lifestyle; (3) distorted self-esteem: low self-awareness, 
hopelessness, acting rashly to avoid emotional discomfort; (4) anger and rage: aggression, 
low frustration tolerance, high explosivity; and (5) irresponsibility: entitlement, beliefs 
that most others act immorally and irresponsibly, poor ability to cope with emotional 
discomfort.  
 
In the application of this test to determine the utility of FLRT for a non-mentally ill C1 
offender, ‘clinicians can offer descriptive and explanatory testimony relevant to an 
offender’s impairment, and the relationship between that impairment and the criminal 
conduct at issue’.620 There is ‘utility to clinical expertise when it provides thorough 
description of clinicians’ unique understanding of human behavior’,621 which in turn 
assists the court in its normative judgement, and early detection of a potential impulse-
control problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
618
  Ibid. 
619
  C D Webster and M A Jackson, ‘A Clinical Perspective on Impulsivity’ in C D Webster and M A 
Jackson (eds), Impulsivity: Theory, Assessment, and Treatment (Guilford Press, 1997) 16. 
620
  R F Schopp and B J Sturgis, ‘Sexual Predators and Legal Mental Illness for Civil Commitment’ 
(1995) 13 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 437. 
621
  Cynthia Calkins Mercado, Robert F Schopp and Brian H Bornstein, ‘Evaluating Sex Offenders 
Under Sexually Violent Predator Laws: How Might Mental Health Professionals Conceptualize the 
Notion of Volitional Impairment?’ (2005) 10 Aggression and Violent Behavior 289, 296. 
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III APPRAISAL: FLRT-UTILIZATION IN THE EXISTING AUSTRALIAN LEGAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
At its most basic level, effective treatment options would help those who want to help themselves. 
Whether for those already in prison or for preventative treatment with individuals who are aware 
that they are at risk of anti-social behaviours, effective treatment methods offer people an 
opportunity to stay out of the system ...
622
 
 
A All Together Now: The Diagnosis, The Offence and The Existing Criminal 
Justice System 
 
 
By pairing each category of impulse-control with a specific offence — for example, theft, 
which is an offence commonly documented among mentally ill offenders
623
 — insight 
into offender trajectory through the existing framework can be gleaned. 
 
For a C1 offender charged with theft, he or she would not be eligible for participation in a 
diversionary scheme, as ‘pure’ poor impulse-control does not amount to a mental 
disorder. As this category of offending has the broadest scope for judicial discretion, it 
may be that such an offender could be directed into FLRT through the regular criminal 
justice system, as assisted by clinicians when making this determination. (This has been 
elaborated upon in Chapter 2.) 
 
For a C2 offender diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder (categorized under 
Disruptive, Impulse-Control and Conduct Disorders in the DSM-5)
624
 and charged with 
theft, FLRT could be administered through MHDCts. 
                                                 
622
  David M Eagleman and Sarah Isgur Flores, ‘Defining a Neurocompatibility Index for Criminal 
Justice Systems: A Framework to Align Social Policy with Modern Brain Science’ (2012) Law of 
the Future Series No 1 161, 166. 
623
  Magistrates Court Tasmania, Mental Health Diversion List Procedural Manual (April 2007) 3; 
Grace Skrzypiec, Joy Wundersitz and Helen McRostie, ‘Magistrates Court Diversion Program, An 
Analysis of Post-Program Offending’ (2004) Office of Crime Statistics and Research 1; New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission, ‘People with an Intellectual Disability and the Criminal Justice 
System’ (Report 80, New South Wales Law Reform Commission Report, December 1996) 32–3; 
Esther Newitt and Victor Stojcevski, ‘Mental Health Diversion List’ (Evaluation Report, 
Magistrates Court Tasmania, May 2009) 49;  Nichole Hunter and Helen McRostie, Helen, 
‘Magistrates Court Diversion Program, Overview of Key Data Findings’ (2001) 20 Office of Crime 
Statistics and Research 1. 
624
  American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) 
(American Psychiatric Publishing, 5
th
 ed, 2013) 461. 
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A C3 offender diagnosed with Bipolar I Disorder — a disorder commonly reported 
within Australian MHDCts,
625
 and for which impulse-control is a diagnostic criterion — 
and charged with theft, FLRT could be administered through MHDCts. 
 
A C4 offender diagnosed with a Depressive Disorder — a disorder also commonly 
reported within Australian MHDCts
626
 and for which impulse-control is not part of the 
defining criteria, but may be an additional significant problem — and charged with theft, 
FLRT could be administered through MHDCts.  
 
Those jurisdictions for which a broader range of mental disorders are considered 
diversion-appropriate are preferable to those with stringent exclusionary criteria. For 
example, in South Australia, the MCDP is open to those with a personality disorder, 
whereas in Western Australia, those with a primary diagnosis of personality disorder are 
not admitted into the program.  
 
Jurisdictions offering pre-sentence diversionary options adjourning proceedings to allow 
an offender to participate in a diversionary program further underpin the notion of 
rehabilitation and thus enable the availability of FLRT at the earliest possible stage. 
 
 
B Offenders Eligible for Diversion but Overlooked  
 
 
Although not depicted diagrammatically in the table in Chapter 4, in those jurisdictions 
with diversionary mechanisms, FLRT options available in mainstream courts could be 
available to mentally ill C2, C3 and C4 offenders if they are not captured through the 
available diversionary scheme and thus proceed through the mainstream court, or if they 
                                                 
625
  Esther Newitt and Victor Stojcevski, ‘Mental Health Diversion List’ (Evaluation Report, 
Magistrates Court Tasmania, May 2009) 52; J Sharples et al, ‘Offending Behaviour and Mental 
Illness:  Characteristics of a Mental Health Court Liaison Service’ (2003) 10 Psychiatry, Psychology 
and Law 300, 306; Nichole Hunter and Helen McRostie, Helen, ‘Magistrates Court Diversion 
Program, Overview of Key Data Findings’ (2001) 20 Office of Crime Statistics and Research 1. 
626
  Ibid. 
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do fall within in a diversionary scheme and receive a sentence similar to what would be 
imposed in the regular system. 
 
Some jurisdictions offer a safeguard against offenders ‘slipping through the cracks’, so to 
speak. For example, in Tasmania, an application for referral to the Mental Health and 
Cognitive Diversion List can be made at any time prior to the finalization of a matter.
627
 
Thus, if for some reason an offender is not recognized as eligible for participation in a 
diversionary scheme, and instead proceeds through the mainstream court, he or she 
retains the ability for referral to a diversionary scheme at any time. 
 
In New South Wales, an offender may be referred for participation in an intervention 
program at several points during criminal proceedings. For example, a court that grants 
bail to a person may, under s 36A(1) of the Bail Act 1978 (NSW), impose a condition of 
bail that the person enter into an agreement to subject himself or herself to an assessment 
of his or her capacity and prospects for participation in an intervention program or other 
program for treatment or rehabilitation. Prior to a conviction or a finding of guilt, s 350 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) empowers the court to adjourn proceedings to 
allow the accused person to be assessed for or to participate in an intervention program. 
 
 
 
C Offenders Return to General List  
 
 
In Tasmania, if a defendant is returned to the general list, he or she still retains the option 
of making an application of being unfit to stand trial or pleading not guilty by reason of 
insanity, pursuant to the Criminal Justice (Mental Impairment) Act 1999 (Tas). In South 
Australia, defendants who are not accepted into the diversionary program will have their 
matters sent back to the general court list for finalization at a later date and retain their 
rights to conduct a defence in accordance with s 269 of the Criminal Law Consolidation 
Act 1935 (SA). Regarded as the ‘mental incompetence’ or ‘section 269’ defence,628 this 
                                                 
627
  Magistrates Court Tasmania, Mental Health Diversion List Procedural Manual (April 2007). 
628
  Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 269. 
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defence originated from the ‘insanity defence’. The Mental Impairment Provisions (Part 
8A) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) deal with offenders found to be 
‘unfit to stand trial’ or not guilty on the basis of being ‘mentally incompetent to have 
committed an offence’. 
 
1 Insanity  
 
Matters surrounding the common law defence of insanity are not germane to this thesis. 
However, in an attempt to situate the matter of an offender leaving a diversionary list and 
returning to the regular criminal list, an overview of selected jurisdictions is nevertheless 
provided. A purely legal construct, and not a psychological illness or mental disorder 
classified in the DSM-5, insanity refers to ‘being of unsound mind’.629 The presumption 
of sanity –– that every person is of sound mind and was of sound mind at any time –– is 
called into question when the contrary is proved.
630
 
 
(a) Unsound Mind 
 
Unsound mind is a state of mind caused by disease, disorder or disturbance (temporary or 
long-standing) that prevents a person from knowing the physical nature of an act that the 
person is committing, or from appreciating that the act was wrong. It is a condition in 
which the functions of the understanding are through some cause, whether 
understandable or not, thrown into derangement or disorder and, therefore, the person is 
relieved of criminal responsibility for the act.
631
 An accused generally bears the onus of 
proving insanity on the balance of probabilities.
632
 An accused found not guilty on the 
grounds of mental illness or impairment is not discharged but rather is subject to orders 
made under the relevant operative statutory regime.
633
 
 
                                                 
629
  M’Naghten’s case (1843) 10 Cl & F 200, 8 ER 718, 722; Peter E Nygh, and Peter Butt (eds), 
Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2
nd
 ed, 2002) 231. 
630
  M’Naghten’s case (1843) 10 Cl & F 200, 8 ER 718. 
631
  See R v Porter (1936) 55 CLR 182; R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1. 
632
  R v Foy [1960] Qd R 225. 
633
  See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 20BJ(1); Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW) s 
39; Criminal Code (Qld) s 647; Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 
(Vic) s 23.  
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(b) M’Naghten’s Case 
 
In the context of insanity, defining volitional impairment has long proved problematic for 
courts. The earliest codification of a criminal responsibility standard dates back to 
M’Naghten’s Case in 1843.634 The M’Naghten test for insanity was purely cognitive, 
focusing solely on whether the defendant had knowledge of the nature and quality of the 
criminal act, and whether he or she knew that the act was wrong.
635
 The landmark test 
entrenched the viewpoint that mental disorder could absolve an individual from criminal 
responsibility.
636
 
 
An ‘irresistible impulse’ rule arose in response to the criticism of the narrowness of the 
M’Naghten test. The standard was then broadened to include severe volitional 
impairment in individuals who were otherwise aware of the wrongfulness of their 
actions.
637
 This test was also met with resistance, as it required total cognitive or 
volitional incapacity –– an absolutist standpoint that was ‘considered increasingly 
outdated and irrelevant’.638  
 
In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) published its Model Penal Code, in which a 
new insanity defence standard was to include both volitional and cognitive components: 
‘A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result 
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.’639 The 
term ‘substantial capacity’ thus required capacity less than total cognitive or volitional 
impairment.  
 
                                                 
634
  M’Naghten’s case (1843) 10 Cl & F 200, 8 ER 718. 
635
  G B Melton et al, Psychological Evaluations for the Courts: A Handbook for Mental Health 
Professionals and Lawyers (Guilford Press, 2
nd
 ed, 1997). 
636
  J E P Wallis, Reports of State Trials: New Series, 1839 to 1843 (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
1892). 
637
  Parsons v State, 81 Ala 577, 2 So 854 (1886). 
638
  J R P Ogloff, C F Roberts and R Roesch, ‘The Insanity Defense: Legal Standards and Clinical 
Assessment’ (1993) 2 Applied & Preventive Psychology 163. 
639
  G B Melton et al, Psychological Evaluations for the  Courts: A Handbook for Mental Health 
Professionals and Lawyers (Guilford Press, 2
nd
 ed, 1997). 
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The volitional prong of the test fell once more into public disfavour when it was feared 
that less-consistent application of the insanity defence would result from utilizing such an 
imprecise standard.
640
 Punctuated by the American Psychiatric Association, it was aptly 
concluded that ‘[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is 
probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk’.641 
 
The ALI formulation fell out of use and there was a return to the application of the 
strictly cognitive M’Naughten test.642 Central to the rules was the notion that a defence on 
the grounds of insanity could be established if it was proved that at the time of 
committing a crime the accused was suffering from a disease of the mind so as not to 
know the nature and quality of the act or that the act was wrong.
643
 
 
The M’Naghten rules provide the requirement for the common law defence of insanity 
that at the time of committing the act the accused was labouring under such a defect of 
reason, owing to disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality his or her act, 
or, if the accused did know it, he or she did not know that what he or she was doing was 
wrong.
644
 
Australian cases have qualified the M’Naghten rules. The High Court in R v Porter stated 
that the condition of the accused’s mind is relevant only at the time of the actus reus.645 
In Woodbridge v The Queen the Court stated that a symptom indicating a disease of the 
mind must be prone to recur and be the result of an underlying pathological infirmity.
646
 
                                                 
640
  Ibid. 
641
  American Psychiatric Association, ‘American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity 
Defense’ (1983) 140 American Journal of Psychiatry 681, 685. 
642
  G B Melton et al, Psychological Evaluations for the Courts: A Handbook for Mental Health 
Professionals and Lawyers (Guilford Press, 2
nd
 ed, 1997). However, there are still jurisdictions 
today that adhere to the ALI formulation as detailed in Michael L Perlin, The Jurisprudence of the 
Insanity Defence (Carolina Academic Press, 1995). 
643
  J E P Wallis, Reports of State Trials: New Series, 1839 to 1843 (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
1892. 
644
  Peter E Nygh and Peter Butt (eds), Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2
nd
 ed, 2002) 293. 
645
  R v Porter [1933] HCA 1; actus reus constitues the physical element of an offence. 
646
  Woodbridge v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 503, 531 (Davies J). 
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A ‘defect of reason’ is the inability to think rationally and pertains to an incapacity to 
reason, rather than one’s having unsound ideas.647 
In Australia, the defence of mental disorder — sometimes also referred to as the defence 
of mental illness — is a legal defence by way of excuse, whereby a defendant may argue 
that he or she should not be held criminally liable for his or her actions because he or she 
was mentally ill at the time of the alleged offence. These criminal laws of Australia are a 
statutory version of the M’Naghten rules, renamed to quell the stigma often associated 
with the label of ‘insanity’. 
 
An accused raising the insanity defence is different from a situation where an accused is 
deemed unfit to plead because of insanity. The latter refers to the principle that an 
accused can only be put on trial if he is actually mentally fit to participate in it.
648
 The 
question of fitness is a matter for a judge alone.
649
 
 
In Victoria the current defence of mental impairment was introduced in the Crimes 
(Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic), which replaced the 
common law defence of insanity.
650
 Where the defence is established the person must be 
found not guilty because of mental impairment. 
 
In New South Wales, the defence has been renamed the ‘Defence of Mental Illness’ in 
Part 4 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW). However, definitions 
of the defence are derived from M’Naghten’s Case and have not been codified. Whether a 
particular condition amounts to a disease of the mind is not a medical but rather a legal 
question to be decided in accordance with the ordinary rules of interpretation. If the 
insanity defence is successfully proven, the court issues a special verdict of ‘not guilty by 
reason of mental illness’ in accordance with s 38 of Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) 
Act 1990 (NSW). 
 
                                                 
647
  R v Porter [1933] HCA 1. 
648
  R v Presser (1994) 181 CLR 230; R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7. 
649
  Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) s 11. 
650
  Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) ss 20, 25. 
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For offenders who may return to the general list and are better suited to an application of 
being unfit to stand trial or pleading guilty by reason of insanity, FLRT may not be an 
efficacious rehabilitative option. Conceivably, it may serve an adjunctive role in an 
offender’s mental health treatment regime, but it would not be utilized in a diversionary 
capacity.  
 
The following examination details suggestions for optimal FLRT-utilization within the 
Australian legal framework. 
 
IV OPTIMAL FLRT-UTILIZATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
This thesis does not advocate a complete revolution of the current system. Rather, the 
system could be amended to effectively incorporate FLRT for therapeutic outcome-
maximization. The utility of FLRT reaches beyond the existing parameters elaborated 
upon in Chapter 4. 
 
 
A Nation-wide MHDCts 
 
 
The Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory and Queensland do not have 
MHDCts. Thus, for offenders suffering from a mental illness, as defined in C2, C3 and 
C4, no mental health diversionary mechanism exists through which FLRT could be 
administered. Instead, such offenders in those jurisdictions could only receive FLRT 
through the regular criminal justice system; consequently, they are not presently afforded 
the opportunity to address their illness and offending in a diversionary setting. 
 
This thesis contends that diversionary mechanisms would benefit these jurisdictions. 
Although it may be possible to obtain FLRT through the regular criminal justice system, 
of greater benefit would be to introduce a diversionary mechanism in those jurisdictions. 
MHDCts provide a nuanced approach to mental illness and offending that serve to 
enhance the rehabilitation of such offenders. 
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B Broadening of Jurisdictional Utility 
 
 
Diversifying this therapeutic treatment by widening the jurisdictional ambit is one 
suggested amendment to the current criminal justice system. FLRT could have utility in 
higher courts — District Courts and Supreme Courts — for major indictable offences, as 
part of court-mandated rehabilitative treatment, not as full diversion into a diversionary 
court. 
 
Indeed, this suggestion addresses the criticism that the arm of therapeutic jurisprudence 
— an ‘oddly truncated reach of a movement with such seemingly unbounded and hopeful 
activism’651 — extends only to summary or minor offences whereby ‘there are no 
aggravated robbery courts where we try to solve the social problems of armed robbers or 
community rape courts where we encourage rapists to apologize to victims’.652 
 
At present, legislative powers of diversion under the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) 
Act 1990 (NSW) and the South Australian MHDP enable diversion for summary and 
minor indictable offences.
653
 Diversion under the New South Wales Statewide 
Community and Court Liaison Service provides a court-based diversion program for 
individuals charged with non-indictable offences only.
654
 
 
The Victorian Assessment and Referral Court List precludes offences of a violent, serious 
violent or serious sexual nature,
655
 yet less serious offences that may typically be listed 
include recklessly causing serious injury, making threats to kill, and indecent assault. 
Similarly, the Western Australian START Court does not admit those charged with 
serious offending or who are considered a high risk to the community. 
 
                                                 
651
  Ibid. 
652
  Ibid. 
653
  Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) ss 32, 33; Nichole Hunter and Helen 
McRostie, ‘Magistrates Court Diversion Program, Overview of Key Data Findings’ (2001) 20 Office 
of Crime Statistics and Research 1, 4. 
654
  D Greenberg and B Nielsen, ‘Court Diversion in NSW for People with Mental Health Problems and 
Disorders’ (2002) 13 NSW Public Health Bulletin 158. 
655
  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6B(1) sch 1 ss 1, 2, 3. 
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Major indictable
656
 or serious indictable
657
 offences are serious crimes that are usually 
triable by judge and jury only, and will therefore be heard in the superior courts (either 
the District Court or the Supreme Court). Types of indictable offences include aggravated 
burglary, indecent assault, rape, and drug trafficking offences. The most serious offences 
— murder, attempted murder, and treason — are dealt with in the Supreme Court. 
 
For major indictable offences or offences unable to be diverted and committed by an 
offender in any category, FLRT may be available at the discretion of the judge through 
the regular criminal justice system. This would be as a condition of sentencing, not full 
diversion. 
 
 
C FLRT-Utility in the Commonwealth  
 
 
 
The most commonly encountered Commonwealth offences are found in the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) and the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth). Commonwealth law 
is different from State law in that there are only two categories of offences: summary 
offences and indictable offences. If the matter is to be dealt with summarily, then the 
same procedure as for any State matter applies.
658
 Summary offences are those involving 
a maximum penalty of 12 months or less, or no penalty of imprisonment.
659
  
 
Indictable offences involve a penalty of more than 12 months’ imprisonment.660  
Indictable offences with penalties of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years may be dealt 
with summarily or either party can elect to have the matter indicted, and the committal 
process commences.
661
 When matters are indicted to a higher court for trial, the trial must 
be by jury.
662
  Importantly, all Commonwealth offenders are sentenced pursuant to Part 
                                                 
656
  See, eg, Criminal Code (Qld) s 3; Criminal Code (NT) s 3; Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) s 190. 
657
  See, eg, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 4; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 325(6). 
658
  Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 68. 
659
  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4H. 
660
  Ibid s 4G. 
661
  Ibid s 4J. 
662
  Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Cth) s 80. 
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1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), which sets out general sentencing principles and makes 
extensive provisions in relation to the sentencing process and sentences that may be 
imposed. A federal offender is defined by the Act as a person convicted of an offence 
against Commonwealth law.
663
 State sentencing options apply only to the extent that they 
are expressed to be applicable by virtue of a specific provision of the Act or its 
Regulations.  
 
A court must impose a sentence or make an order that is of a severity appropriate in all 
the circumstances of the offence.
664
 Pursuant to s 19B(1)(d) of the Act, an offender can be 
discharged completely or on a recognizance. The conditions of the recognizance may 
include good behaviour for a period of up to three years, inclusive of any condition that 
the court sees fit to impose. Similarly, under s 20 of the Act, an offender can be subject to 
a good behaviour bond for a period of up to five years, probation for up to two years, or 
any other condition that the court sees fit to impose. Participation in FLRT could be a 
program into which an offender is directed to participate in accordance with ss 19B(1)(d) 
and 20 of the Act. 
 
A person who is charged before a court of summary jurisdiction with Commonwealth 
offences and who is suffering from a mental illness at the time the matter comes before 
the court for determination may be dealt with under s 20QB of the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth). For example, the court has power to dismiss the charge and discharge the person if 
it considers this would be more appropriate than dealing with a defendant otherwise 
according to law.
665
 In more serious summary court matters where the Court is not 
persuaded that it is appropriate for the defendant to be dealt with under s 20BQ of the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), questions of mental competence to commit the offence and 
mental fitness to stand trial are first determined under the relevant provisions of State 
legislation and, where the defendant is found to be mentally incompetent or mentally 
unfit, subsequent orders for disposition come under the relevant Commonwealth 
                                                 
663
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provisions.
666
 Section 7.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) also sets out the 
Commonwealth provisions regarding the defence of mental impairment. Under that Act, 
‘mental impairment’ is defined to include ‘senility, intellectual disability, mental illness, 
brain damage and severe personality disorder’. Depending on the degree of impairment, 
participation in FLRT could be a program into which an offender is directed to 
participate. A clinician may assist in the determination of mental competency and 
speculate on the neuroplasticity capabilities, consequently portending the utility and 
appropriateness of FLRT administration on an individual basis. 
 
 
 
D FLRT-Utility in Tribunals 
 
 
All States and Territories of Australia have established mental health tribunals to assess 
the continued detention of both civilly committed and forensic patients in the mental 
health systems.
667
 There are provisions in the laws of each State and Territory for the 
prosecution and disposition of persons with a mental illness or an intellectual 
disability.
668
 These laws provide that unsoundness of mind is a defence to a criminal 
charge. Application of these laws means that some persons charged with criminal 
offences are judged not fit to enter a plea, or are found not guilty because of mental 
disorder, and become ‘forensic patients’.669 People who have been charged with 
indictable offences, especially those involving serious violence, and who have been found 
not fit for trial or acquitted on grounds of mental impairment, are likely to be ordered to 
be treated in a secure facility. 
 
Queensland has a Mental Health Court, which determines mental responsibility issues — 
the insanity defence or the defence of diminished responsibility.  The Court is constituted 
by a Supreme Court Judge who receives expert advice and assistance on clinical matters 
from two ‘assisting psychiatrists’. References may be made to the Court by the accused 
                                                 
666
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or the accused’s legal representative, the Attorney-General, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions or the Director of Mental Health. The Court is not bound by the rules of 
evidence and may inform itself in any way it considers appropriate. It may order 
examinations by psychiatrists and other health professionals and may make forensic 
orders to provide for treatment in the mental health system.
670
 
 
The tribunals are constituted differently in different jurisdictions, but typically include 
people with legal and medical qualifications and a member (or members) of the 
community. They also have different powers; some may make determinations while 
others make recommendations to the courts or the executive government. In jurisdictions 
where the tribunals have an advisory role, the decision to release a person from a 
custodial order will be made by a court or, in some jurisdictions, by the Governor in 
Council.
671
 
 
In New South Wales, if a person is found to be unfit, he or she is referred to the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal.
672
 The tribunal decides whether he or she will be fit to stand 
trial within the next 12 months.
673
 If so, the Court may either grant bail, detain the person 
in a hospital facility, or detain the person in another facility.
674
 If not, the Court notifies 
the Director of Public Prosecutions,
675
 who decides whether to pursue the case or not. If 
the Director of Public Prosecutions decides that the case should proceed, a ‘special 
hearing’ is held.676  A verdict from the special hearing cannot be appealed.  
 
The procedure for the issue of ‘fitness to plead’ is executed differently. The defendant 
must be established as developmentally disabled, which means suffering from a mental 
condition or being mentally ill within the meaning of the Mental Health (Forensic 
Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW). Such people are governed by s 32 (people suffering from a 
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mental condition/developmentally disabled) and s 33 (people suffering from a mental 
illness), which allow the judge to make a wide variety of orders, including dismissing 
charges or placing the person under another’s care. The provisions invest in the 
magistrate a wide discretion, which is exercised while keeping in mind the interests of the 
person and the community.
677
 These provisions allow people suffering from such 
disorders to be diverted away from the criminal justice system. 
 
Forensic patients are held within health institutions until they are approved for release by 
the Mental Health Review Tribunal. The term ‘forensic patients’ refers to persons found 
not guilty by reason of mental illness, and persons found unfit to plead. There used to be 
a third category of ‘transferees’ — people who became mentally ill while in prison and 
were transferred to a health institution. There is now a formal distinction between those 
people (now termed ‘correctional patients’) and forensic patients. The Mental Health 
Tribunal initially reviews those patients who were found not guilty by reason of the 
mental illness defence. Thereafter, they are reviewed every six months by the tribunal.
678
 
 
It may be an option for FLRT to be administered to those who come before such 
tribunals, yet whether the requisite neuroplasticity is present would be a large 
determining factor. This discretion to invoke the rehabilitative properties of the treatment 
would rest with an experienced clinician. 
 
 
E FLRT-Utility in Other Diversionary Schemes 
 
 
1 Police Diversion  
 
The police may exercise diversion as a form of early intervention — mostly in the form 
of cautioning, both informal and formal.
679
 An informal cautioning is usually from the 
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officer attending the scene of the offence. If the matter is not of sufficient gravity, or is 
unclear, then the officer may give a verbal warning that is not formally recorded.  
 
The formal cautioning involves recording the details of the offence. In most cases, the 
offender is asked to attend the police station for a formal warning. In the case of young 
offenders, parents or other responsible adults may be asked to join the cautioning process. 
No further action is usually required and the offender is diverted out of the justice system. 
More recently, however, formal police diversion includes other add-ons such as fines, 
community service and participation in treatment programs.
680
 FLRT could be one such 
program. 
 
Diversion programs overseen by police include: the Cannabis Cautioning Scheme in New 
South Wales; the Cannabis Cautioning Program and Drug Diversion Program
681
 in 
Victoria; the Queensland Police Diversion Program in Queensland;
682
 the  Cannabis 
Intervention Requirement and All Drug Diversion in Western Australia; the Police Drug 
Diversion Initiative
683
 in South Australia; the Illicit Drug Diversion Initiative in 
Tasmania; the Early Intervention and Diversion Program
684
 and Simple Cannabis Offence 
Notice
685
 in the Australian Capital Territory; and the Cannabis Expiation Notice 
Scheme,
686
 Illicit Drug Pre-court Diversion Program, and the Youth Diversion Program 
in the Northern Territory. 
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2 Drug Diversion  
 
The need to divert illicit drug users into treatment programs for their addiction is an 
example of therapeutic jurisprudence in operation in Australia.
687
 A variety of programs 
have been established that seek to cease or reduce criminal activity related to drug abuse 
in Australia. The drug diversion programs often include close supervision, regular drug 
testing, sanctions, therapy and support services.
688
 It may be appropriate for an offender 
to be referred to FLRT as an adjunct therapy to drug and alcohol counselling. Special 
drug courts have been established in New South Wales,
689
 Queensland,
690
 South 
Australia,
691
 Victoria
692
 and Western Australia
693
 to establish and manage drug 
diversionary programs.
694
 
 
FLRT could be utilized as an adjunctive treatment to existing drug court-mandated 
programs within Australia. For example, FLRT may be assimilated within the New South 
Wales court-based drug diversion program and Magistrates Early Referral into Treatment 
(MERIT) initiative,
695
 the Victorian Court Referral and Evaluation for Drug Intervention 
and Treatment (CREDIT)
696
 and Rural Outreach Diversion Worker Service,
697
 the 
Queensland court-based Drug Diversion Program, the Queensland Magistrates Early 
                                                 
687
  Melissa Bull, ‘Just Treatment: A Review of International Programs for the Diversion of Drug 
Related Offenders from the Criminal Justice System’ (Report for the Department of the Premier and 
Cabinet, June 2003). 
688
  E Ziersch and J Marshall, ‘The South Australian Drug Court: A Recidivism Study’ (Report, South 
Australian Attorney-General’s Department, May 2012); C Spooner, W Hall and R P Mattick, ‘An 
Overview of Diversion Strategies for Australian Drug-Related Offenders’ (2001) 20 Drug and 
Alcohol Review 281. 
689
  Pursuant to the Drug Court Act 1998 (NSW). 
690
  Pursuant to the Queensland Drug Rehabilitation (Court Diversion) Act 2000. 
691
  Pursuant to the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA); Bail 
Act 1985 (SA). 
692
  Pursuant to the Sentencing (Amendment) Act 2002 (Vic). 
693
  Pursuant to the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) and Bail Act 1982 (WA). 
694
  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, ‘Diverting Indigenous Offenders from the Criminal 
Justice System’ (Resource Sheet No 24, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, December 2013) 
7. 
695
  Pursuant to the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Criminal Justice Interventions) Act 2002 (NSW). 
696
  Pursuant to the Sentencing (Amendment) Act 2002 (Vic). 
697
  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, ‘Diverting Indigenous Offenders from the Criminal 
Justice System’ (Resource Sheet No 24, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, December 
2013). 
  153 
Referral into Treatment (QMERIT),
698
 and the Illicit Drug Court Diversion Program.
699
 
The Western Australian Perth court-based Drug Diversion Program, the Young Person’s 
Opportunity Program,
700
 the Youth Supervised Treatment Intervention Regime, the Pre-
sentence Opportunity Program,
701
 and the Supervised Treatment Intervention Regime
702
 
may also be appropriate for FLRT-inclusion. Similarly, FLRT may have utility if 
incorporated as a treatment in the South Australian court-based Drug Diversion Program, 
Adult Court Assessment and Referral Drug Scheme (CARDS),
703
  and Youth Court 
Assessment and Referral Drug Scheme (CARDS).
704
 
 
FLRT could also be employed as a treatment option in the Tasmanian Court Mandated 
Diversion Program,
705
 the Australian Capital Territory Court Alcohol and Drug 
Assessment Service (CADAS),
706
 and the Northern Territory Substance Misuse 
Assessment and Referral for Treatment (SMART). 
 
3 Indigenous Diversionary Programs  
 
Given the poor access to, and participation in, mainstream programs by Indigenous 
clients, as well as the over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
in Australian prisons, a number of Indigenous-specific diversionary programs have been 
established in all Australian jurisdictions except Tasmania.
707
 These programs, which 
include Aboriginal courts and conferences, as well as alcohol and substance abuse 
reduction programs, foster an environment that is less intimidating and culturally more 
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acceptable to Indigenous people.
708
 In addition, a variety of programs have been 
established to support reintegration of Indigenous offenders into the community — to 
divert them from entering into the justice system initially and to improve community 
safety. Aboriginal courts and conferences seek to create an environment that is more 
socially and culturally appropriate than the mainstream courts for Indigenous people.
709
 
These courts involve Aboriginal Elders and other respected community members.  
 
New South Wales has Circle Sentencing
710
 and an Intensive Court Supervision Program. 
Victoria has Koori courts for Adults and for Children.
711
 Queensland has the Murri courts 
for Adults and for Children,
712
 a Diversion from Custody Program, and the Cairns 
Alcohol Remand and Rehabilitation Program.
713
 Western Australia has the Regional 
community conferencing (police diversion), Indigenous Diversion Program (IDP),
714
 
Regional Supervised Bail Program,
715
 and Community Courts,
716
 such as the Aboriginal 
Sentencing Court of Kalgoorlie.
717
 South Australia has the Nunga Courts.
718
Australian 
Capital Territory has Ngambra Circle Sentencing.
719
 Northern Territory has Community 
Courts
720
 and a Volatile Substance Abuse Program that operates in accordance with the 
Volatile Substance Abuse Prevention Act 2006 (NT). 
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Depending on the particular matter before the court, FLRT may play an adjunctive role to 
the existing rehabilitative programs. Existing rehabilitative programs do not contain 
inhibitory or conflicting bases or practices that would preclude the utilization of FLRT. In 
fact, FLRT may serve to enhance the existing programs and complement rehabilitative 
models across a range of specialities. 
 
4 Young Offender Diversion  
 
A major focus of diversionary programs is on young offenders, many of whom are first-
timer offenders and could be at risk of becoming chronic offenders.
721
 In all Australian 
jurisdictions, children and young people may be charged with a criminal offence if they 
are aged 10 years or over.  
 
Young people first enter the justice system when they are investigated by police for 
allegedly committing a crime. Following the investigation, a decision is made as to 
whether police will initiate legal action against the young person.
722
 Such a person could 
face court action (the laying of charges to be answered in court) or non-court actions 
(such as verbal warning, cautioning, conferencing, counselling or infringement notices — 
commonly referred to as police diversion).  
 
In New South Wales, youth cautioning and conferencing is available under the provisions 
of the Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW). Conferencing for young adult offenders is 
under the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). In Victoria, Juvenile cautioning is 
mandated by the Children and Young Persons Act 1989 (Vic), and juvenile justice group 
conferencing falls under the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic). 
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In Queensland, youth cautioning and conferencing is covered by the Juvenile Justice Act 
1992 (Qld). In Western Australia, juvenile cautioning and conferencing is under the 
Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA). In South Australia, cautioning and family conferences 
occurs pursuant to the Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA). In Western Australia, the Juvenile 
Pre-diversion Scheme operates under the Youth Justice Act 2005 (WA) and the Police 
Administration Act 1978 (WA). Tasmania’s Youth Diversion Program operates in 
accordance with the Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas).  
 
The South Australian Youth Court Diversion Program is based on the Magistrates Court 
Diversion Program and aims to assist youth suffering from mental impairment through 
brain injury, intellectual disability, mental illness, or personality or neurological disorder. 
This intervention provides an opportunity for youths to address mental health or disability 
needs and provides an alternative pathway for those young defendants who would 
otherwise qualify for a mental impairment defence in accordance with s 269 of the 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).   
FLRT could be assimilated into these existing programs with little disruption to the 
juvenile-offender rehabilitative efforts. Farrington and Welsh
723
 have found that there is 
growing proof that early programs for interventions are effective and successful. These 
findings in turn might imply the possibility of a coherent framework of neuroscientific 
intervention initiatives and options. Promotion of FLRT would also align with prevailing 
societal trends that favour rehabilitation for juvenile offenders over punishment and 
incarceration. 
724
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5 Other Forms of Diversion 
 
Many specific programs have been established by magistrates’ courts, other government 
agencies, and private organizations. Most of these programs have an in-built 
drug/substance abuse treatment component.
725
  
 
Miscellaneous mainstream court diversion programs include the following: the New 
South Wales Forum Sentencing and Court Referral of Eligible Defendants into Treatment 
(CREDIT); the Victorian Criminal Justice Diversion Program,
726
 Early School Leavers 
Pilot Program, Youth Justice Court Advice Service, and Court Referral and Evaluation 
for Drug Intervention and Treatment (CREDIT); the Western Australian Intensive 
Supervision Program;
727
 and the Tasmanian Family Violence Offender Intervention 
Program (FVOIP). Again, these are all initiatives within which FLRT could be 
incorporated, or serve as an additive in the overall promotion of diversion for offender-
rehabilitation. 
 
 
F FLRT-Utility for Young Offenders 
 
 
Adolescence is the distinct but transient period of development between childhood and 
adulthood that is characterized by increased experimentation and risk-taking, a tendency 
to discount long-term consequences, and heightened sensitivity to peers and other social 
influences.
728
 Neuroscientific evidence of significant changes in brain structure and 
function during adolescence strongly suggests that these cognitive tendencies of 
adolescents are associated with biological immaturity of the brain, and of the interactions 
of its constituent subsystems.
729
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While juvenile offenders could exhibit interest in participating in fMRI neurofeedback 
due to its resemblance to a computer game,
730
 its efficacy may be compromised by the 
fact that the ‘prefrontal cortex does not fully develop until the early twenties, and this 
underlies the impulse behavior of teenagers’.731 Furthermore, frontal lobes are also 
affected by synaptic pruning whereby ‘excess cortical synapses are gradually eliminated 
through childhood and adolescence in order to increase the efficiency of neuronal 
transmission’.732 The frontal lobes are subject to synaptic pruning for longer periods than 
other parts of the brain. ‘Adolescents command different skills in decision making and 
impulse-control than do adults; a child’s brain is simply not like an adult’s brain.’733 
 
In all States and Territories of Australia, there are specialized children’s courts that have 
jurisdiction over offences committed by young people. Except in Queensland, where the 
age limit is less than 17 years, the person must be less than 18 years old at the time of 
offence for trial by the children’s court. The courts may be constituted by a specialized 
children’s court magistrate or judge, or by a magistrate constituting a children’s court and 
exercising the powers under the relevant legislation. In most jurisdictions they are 
modified courts of summary jurisdiction with enlarged powers to deal with matters 
summarily.
734
 The children’s court may decide to dismiss the charge, divert the young 
person from further involvement in the system, or transfer them to other specialist courts 
such as drug or Aboriginal courts. 
 
The function of ‘juvenile justice’ — a term referring to a State’s criminal justice 
responses to children who have allegedly committed an offence — in some jurisdictions 
resides within human services agencies, and is not viewed purely within a criminal justice 
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context. In New South Wales, the Department of Juvenile Justice is considered both a 
justice and a human services agency.
735
 
 
1 The Northern Territory 
 
Juvenile justice is the responsibility of the Northern Territory Police through the Pre-
court Diversion Scheme and the Department of Justice, Correctional Services. If the 
Court finds a charge proven against a youth it may, whether or not it proceeds to 
conviction, do one or more of the following: dismiss the charge for the offence; discharge 
the youth without penalty; adjourn the matter for a period not exceeding six months and, 
if during that period the youth does not commit a further offence, discharge the youth 
without penalty; adjourn the matter to a specified date not more than 12 months from the 
date of the finding of guilt, and grant bail to the youth in accordance with the Bail Act 
(NT). For the purpose of assessing the youth’s capacity and prospects for rehabilitation or 
allowing the youth to demonstrate that rehabilitation has taken place, the Court may order 
the youth to participate in a program approved by the Minister, as specified in the order, 
and adjourn the matter for that purpose.736 The Court may order that the youth be released 
on his or her giving security that he or she will appear before the Court if called on, and 
be of good behaviour for the period of the order, and observe any conditions imposed by 
the Court.737 The Court may alternatively fine the youth not more than the maximum 
penalty that may be imposed under the relevant law in relation to the offence;738 make a 
community work order that the youth participate in an approved project for the number of 
hours specified in the order.739 
 
If the young person is bailed the Court can place him or her under the supervision of 
Correctional Services with conditions such as residence, curfew and attendance at 
                                                 
735
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specific appointments. All young people placed on orders undergo case management 
whether on a community-based order or serving a term of detention. 
 
2 The Australian Capital Territory 
 
Responsibility for youth justice services in the Australian Capital Territory rests with the 
Office for Children Youth and Family Support within the Department of Disability, 
Housing and Community Services. The youth justice system is primarily administered 
under the Children and Young People Act 1999 (ACT), which outlines the specific 
requirements for dealing with children and young people who offend. However, some 
provision is made for the sentencing of young people under the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 
2005 (ACT), which is primarily designed for the sentencing of adult offenders. Bail 
decisions for young people are made under the Bail Act 1992 (ACT). Dispositions 
available to the court include dismissal of charge, reprimand, conditional discharge, fine, 
reparation or compensation order, probation order, community service order, attendance 
centre order, residential order, committal order (within the ACT or to another state 
institution), and good behaviour orders.  
 
 
3 Queensland 
 
The Department of Communities has responsibility for the provision of youth justice 
conferencing, youth justice services and programs within Queensland. Youth justice 
statutory responsibilities are prescribed under the Juvenile Justice Act 1992 (Qld). The 
youth justice service centres provide supervisory, rehabilitative and re-integrative 
services to young people on community-based orders. 
 
 
4 New South Wales 
 
In New South Wales, the commencement, conduct and outcome of court proceedings 
against children alleged to have committed an offence and who are not diverted under the 
Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW) are governed principally by the Children (Criminal 
  161 
Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW). Section 33 of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 
(NSW) permits the courts to make any of the following orders: a dismissal and/or 
caution, a good behaviour bond with or without supervision, a fine, referral to a youth 
justice conference, conditional or unconditional probation, a community service order, or 
an order that confines a young person to a period to detention. The main responsibilities 
of the Department of Juvenile Justice are the administration of youth justice conferences 
and the supervision of young offenders on community-based or custodial orders made by 
the courts. The Youth Drug and Alcohol Court operates in accordance with the 
Children’s Court Act 1987 (NSW), the Children’s (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 
(NSW) and the Bail Act 1978 (NSW). It can be seen that optimal FLRT-utilization 
extends not only to young offenders in an established diversionary setting, but also in 
regular youth court proceedings around Australia. 
 
 
5 Victoria 
 
The Victorian Juvenile Justice Program sits within the Department of Human Services 
and takes a strong diversionary approach to managing children and young people who 
enter the criminal justice system. This is reflected in the Children and Young Persons Act 
1989 (Vic) and in the manner in which children and young people are dealt with from the 
initial point of contact with the police through to completion of any order740 imposed by 
the court. 
 
 
6 South Australia 
 
The South Australian Youth Court has the same powers to sentence a youth for a 
summary offence as the Magistrates’ Court, and the same powers in respect of an 
indictable offence as the District Court.741 Generally, young offenders are treated more 
leniently than adults. The Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) is generally 
applicable, except to the extent that the provisions of that Act conflict with specific 
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provisions of the Young Offenders Act 1993.  Families SA is housed within the 
Department for Families and Communities and carries the statutory responsibility of 
managing orders made by the Youth Court. 
 
 
7 Western Australia 
 
Juvenile justice operations in Western Australia are primarily governed by the Young 
Offenders Act 1994 (WA), the Young Offenders Amendment Act 2004 (WA), the Young 
Offenders Amendment Regulations 1995 (WA) and the Children’s Court of Western 
Australia Act 1988 (WA). Juvenile justice services fall under the Community and 
Juvenile Justice Division of the Department of Corrective Services. This Division covers 
adult community corrections and juvenile justice within the Community Justice Services 
Directorate and juvenile remand and detention services in the Juvenile Custodial Services 
Directorate. Should a juvenile offender be convicted and formally sentenced by the 
Children’s Court, a number of sentencing options are available: no punishment, no 
punishment with conditions, no punishment with recognizance, fine, youth community-
based order (with possible conditions of community work and therapeutic programs), 
intensive youth supervision order without detention (with possible conditions as above), 
intensive youth supervision order with detention/conditional release order (with possible 
conditions as above, and breach or reoffending while on the order can result in a custodial 
term being imposed at the magistrate’s discretion), or custodial sentence usually followed 
by supervised release (juvenile parole). 
 
 
8 Tasmania 
 
Youth Justice in Tasmania is administered through the Department of Health and Human 
Services by the Youth Justice Services, Business Unit, which is part of the Human 
Services Group. The Youth Justice Act 1997 (Tas) underpins the provision of services. A 
major emphasis of the Act is pre-court diversion and restoration or reparation of harm 
done in the community. Involvement of victims, parents, guardians and the community is 
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encouraged in order to improve individual resilience and community capacity to take 
responsibility and work in partnership to assist young people to rehabilitate in the 
community. The Magistrates’ Court (Youth Justice Division) has a range of sentencing 
options, including fines, community conference, probation, community service orders, 
suspended detention, and detention. The Community Youth Justice Service has a 
supervision and management role for young offenders who either have a statutory order 
resulting from a court appearance or an obligation to perform that which was agreed to 
during a community conference. 
 
 
 
G FLRT-Utility in Youth Detention Centres 
 
 
Detention centres have three fundamental roles: to enhance community safety, to provide 
a safe and secure environment for detainees, staff and visitors, and to provide a structured 
environment that supports the rehabilitation of detainees through a strength-based 
approach to prepare them for reintegration into society and to reduce the risk of 
reoffending.
742
 Access to FLRT could assist in the rehabilitation of incarcerated youths. 
 
1 The Northern Territory 
 
In the Northern Territory, youth justice case management is ‘a collaborative process of 
assessment, intervention, planning, linking, facilitation, review and advocacy to provide 
clients and their families with the tools to improve their lives’.743 The youth justice case 
management process incorporates a plan of action to deliver programs that are likely to 
promote crime prevention, build safer communities and address the individual 
psychological, social and emotional well-being of the detainee. Detainees are assessed to 
gain an understanding of their skills, abilities and risk of reoffending.
744
 
                                                 
742
  Department of Correctional Services, Programs and Services (28 January 2015) 
<http://www.correctionalservices.nt.gov.au/YouthJustice/programsandservices/Pages/default.aspx>. 
743
  Department of Correctional Services, Case Management (29 January 2015) 
 <http://www.correctionalservices.nt.gov.au/YouthJustice/AliceSpringsYouthDetentionCentre/Pages/
Case-management.aspx>. 
744
  Ibid. 
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2 The Australian Capital Territory 
 
A range of programs and interventions are delivered within the community and custodial 
environments to address the needs of young people. These include programs that focus on 
alcohol and other drug issues, relationship issues and educational needs. The Changing 
Habits and Reaching Targets (CHART) program, a cognitively based intervention 
designed to help young people to change their thinking and decision-making processes, is 
delivered in both the community and the Bimberi Youth Justice Centre. A range of 
partnerships also exist to assist young offenders that focus on the delivery of education, 
employment skills programs, post-release support, disability support, and health and 
mental health support.
745
 
 
 
3 Queensland 
 
The Aggression Replacement Training (ART) program targets medium-to-high-risk 
young people who exhibit aggressive and violent behaviour, and aims to reduce their risk 
of committing violent offences by teaching them social skills, anger-management 
techniques and moral reasoning. The CHART program is a structured individual 
intervention program for young people at a moderate-to-high risk of reoffending. The 
CHART program is also delivered to meet the cultural needs of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander young people. The Mater Family and Youth Counselling Service provides 
preparatory support and therapeutic interventions for young people, families and victims 
who are referred to a youth justice conference in relation to offences of a sexual nature.
746
 
The Griffith Youth Forensic Service is a funded service that works with departmental 
caseworkers to provide specialized assessment and treatment programs for young sexual 
offenders, pre-sentence reports to facilitate court decisions, and treatment planning, 
consultancy and training services. 
                                                 
745
  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Youth Justice Supervision in the Australian Capital 
Territory (2015) <http://www.aihw.gov.au/youth-justice/states-territories/act/>. 
746
  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Youth Justice Supervision in Queensland (2015) 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/youth-justice/states-territories/qld/>. 
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4 New South Wales 
 
‘Juvenile Justice NSW’ provides a range of programs and interventions within the 
community and custodial environments that are designed to address the needs of young 
people. These include counselling and group-work programs that focus on alcohol and 
other drug issues, and programs for sex offenders and violent offenders. Some examples 
of programs offered include: the Community/Custodial Services Intervention Framework 
and Framework for Programming, which helps staff to develop and deliver programs to 
tackle offending behaviour such as violent and aggressive behaviour, alcohol and drug 
misuse, the CHART program, a cognitive-based intervention designed specifically for 
caseworkers to engage and work with young people who require moderate-to-high 
intervention to reduce their risk of reoffending. ‘Juvenile Justice NSW’ has also 
developed a range of partnerships to assist young offenders. These include the delivery of 
education and health services within Juvenile Justice Centres, post-release support and 
employment skills programs, disability support, health and mental health support, and 
legal services.
747
 
 
 
5 Victoria 
 
A range of offence-specific programs are offered in Victoria. In addition to CHART, the 
Male Adolescent Program for Positive Sexuality (MAPPS) provides an intensive 
individual, group and family work-treatment program for adolescent males who have 
been found guilty of a sexual offence. MAPPS incorporates attitudinal and cognitive 
restructuring techniques, social skills training, relapse prevention, victim awareness, and 
education on sex and sexuality. The Adolescent Violence Intervention Program (AVIP) is 
targeted towards young people at moderate risk of violent behaviour and offending to 
develop skills to assist them to refrain from using violence. The Motor Vehicle Offending 
(MVO) Program is delivered to young people found guilty of motor vehicle offences. 
 
 
                                                 
747
  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Youth Justice Supervision in New South Wales (2015) 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/youth-justice/states-territories/nsw/>. 
  166 
6 South Australia 
 
A range of rehabilitation and support programs are offered to young people who are 
under the supervision of either the Community or Custodial Youth Justice. Examples of 
rehabilitation programs currently offered include Plus+, CHART, and the Drug and 
Alcohol Services South Australia (DASSA) program. 
The PLUS+ program is an intensive, group-based, criminogenic treatment program based 
upon cognitive behavioural principles. The program is implemented by staff of Youth 
Justice Psychology Services who are the principal facilitators of the program. The 
primary objective of the program is to help young people acquire, develop and apply a 
series of social problem-solving, interpersonal, and self-control skills that will enable 
them to better manage potential difficulties in their lives, and to avoid future reoffending. 
Currently, the program is available to young people serving detention orders assessed as 
moderate-to-high risk of reoffending. 
The DASSA Program is a psycho-educational, cognitive behavioural therapy, and 
motivational enhancement-based program for young people with alcohol and other drug 
misuse issues, and is suitable for males and females. 
A range of developmental, health and social integration programs are also available 
across Youth Justice in South Australia, including ‘Ignition’, ‘Beyond Art’, ‘Step Out’, 
and ‘Journey to Respect’. 
The Ignition program is facilitated by Helping Young People Achieve (HYPA) and is 
designed to improve the social and independent living skills of young people. This 
program can also be a pathway to the Integrated Housing Exits Program, which provides 
young people with independent accommodation for 12 months with support from workers 
from HYPA. The Beyond Art program is also facilitated by HYPA, with an Art 
Therapist, and utilizes the medium of art to explore the topic of victim awareness.  
The Journey to Respect program is facilitated by Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Services (CAMHS) and targets young Aboriginal males aged 14–18 years old who have 
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committed, or are at risk of committing, violent offences towards older family members. 
The core aims of the program are to assist participants to identify and manage feelings of 
anger, sadness and shame, to deconstruct and explore the ideas of masculinity and how 
these can drive or shape violent and aggressive behaviour. The program also explores the 
concept of victim empathy and perspective-taking with the aim of reducing the incidence 
of family violence and, in particular, violence towards older family members. 
In 2012, significant development occurred within Youth Justice Psychology Services 
(YJPS), with particular emphasis on providing treatment and rehabilitation for young 
offenders, integrated with case management services and supporting training centre 
operations. This also included clear promotion of a model of service delivery, articulating 
three key roles for psychologists in Youth Justice: the provision of clinical/forensic 
psychological assessments to assist case planning and case management, the delivery of 
individual therapeutic intervention and group-based rehabilitation programs, and 
consultation regarding behaviour support for residents of the Adelaide Youth Training 
Centre. 
YJPS prioritizes young people who are at high risk of reoffending, and who have been 
convicted of serious offences. Individual offence-focused intervention may be provided 
for referred Youth Justice clients who have been convicted of violent, sexual or high-
frequency repeat offending. YJPS intervention is specifically focused on addressing the 
underlying causes of a young person’s offending behaviour, with the aim of reducing the 
likelihood of further offending.
748
 
 
7 Western Australia 
All educational and vocational programs that a young person engages in while in custody 
are aimed to be compatible with the young person’s abilities and areas of interest. A 
young person can be referred to a variety of personal development and treatment 
programs, such as: Substance Misuse Education Program/Counselling (individual or 
                                                 
748
  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Youth Justice Supervision in South Australia (2015) 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/youth-justice/states-territories/sa/>. 
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group); PASH (Promoting Adolescent Sexual Health); Parenting Skills Program (for 
detainees who are parents or parents to be); Sex Offender Treatment (individual 
counselling with centre psychologist); Protective Behaviours/Domestic Violence 
Prevention Group; SAM-Save-A-Mate (preventative group programs); individual 
psychological counselling; and Personal Development Programs. 
All programs are aimed at the rehabilitation and/or personal development of young 
people by providing them with the opportunity to engage in practical education, work, 
health, general life coping skills, and addressing the known issues related to the young 
person’s offending behaviour. Psychologist-run therapeutic programs directly target the 
criminogenic factors related to a young person’s offending behaviour and group programs 
facilitate change in attitudes and beliefs associated with offending behaviour.
749
 
 
8 Tasmania 
 
All young people at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre participate in a range of 
rehabilitative programs. The programs offered and techniques applied take place within a 
case-management context, are evidence-based and focus on offender-rehabilitation. The 
program framework is designed to provide cognitive-based therapeutic programs for 
persistent and serious offenders and address specific criminogenic and social needs. Basic 
interventions that address issues that may affect community integration, such as 
employment, education, accommodation and leisure, are also included.
750
 
 
It is argued that the utility of FLRT is far-reaching, extending beyond MHDCts and the 
regular criminal justice system as detailed in Chapter 4. Broadening the jurisdictional 
utility of FLRT to encompass the Commonwealth, tribunals, and other diversionary 
schemes such as police, drug, indigenous-specific and young offender diversion and 
detention is a possibility that existing law and rehabilitative mechanisms could 
                                                 
749
  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Youth Justice Supervision in Western Australia (2015) 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/youth-justice/states-territories/wa/>. 
750
  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Youth Justice Supervision in Tasmania (2015) 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/youth-justice/states-territories/tas/>. 
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reasonably accommodate. Incorporating FLRT into post-release programs for young 
offenders and adult offenders is addressed in the following section, as well as the utility 
of FLRT in adult custodial programs. 
 
 
H FLRT-Utility for Young Offenders Post-Release 
 
 
1 The Northern Territory 
 
The aim of youth justice case management in the Northern Territory is to develop a 
structured plan that adheres to departmental objectives and best-practice principles, and 
identifies the detainee’s goals while in detention and beyond. It should also address 
criminogenic risks and needs, as well as non-criminogenic needs, that impact on the 
detainee’s well-being.751 
 
2 The Australian Capital Territory 
 
The Bimberi Youth Justice Centre offers a number of initiatives in the Australian Capital 
Territory that aim to provide young people with the skills to assist in a successful 
transition back into the community. In addition, the Canberra Police Community Youth 
Club provides post-release support in a range of areas, including employment, training 
and education, recreation, and issues around family, relationships and peer association 
through their ReSET Program. The Government provides transition support through the 
Youth Support and Transition Team for young people leaving Bimberi who have been on 
long-term care orders and an education program focused on reintegration outcomes 
delivered by the Murrumbidgee Education and Training Centre at Bimberi.
752
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Territory (2015) <http://www.aihw.gov.au/youth-justice/states-territories/act/>. 
  170 
3 Queensland 
 
 
In accordance with their assessed needs, young people in detention in Queensland are 
involved in a variety of programs, including therapeutic, educational, vocational, 
behavioural, life skills, cultural and recreational programs. These programs are regularly 
reviewed to ensure that they continue to meet the needs of the cohort in custody at that 
time. Transition officers, in partnership with Queensland Health and the Department of 
Education, Training and Employment, support young people exiting detention. As part of 
the transition-planning process, young people are referred to local community services to 
continue any programs they may have been receiving in detention.
753
 
 
 
4 New South Wales 
 
Juvenile Justice NSW provides pre- and post-release casework in collaboration with other 
agencies. The Joint Support Program supports young people released from custody in 
New South Wales by facilitating successful reintegration into their communities. Juvenile 
Justice NSW funds non-government organizations to provide post-release support in a 
range of areas, including accommodation, employment, training and education, income, 
recreation, and issues around family or relationships and peer association.
754
 
 
 
5 Victoria 
 
The Temporary Leave Program in Victoria supports the effective transition of young 
people from custody back into the community by promoting personal growth, skills 
development, behavioural and attitudinal change, and the adoption of appropriate, non-
offending behaviours. ‘Temporary leave’ refers to a time-limited leave of absence from a 
Youth Justice centre for a young person who is serving a sentence. The Youth Residential 
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Board and Youth Parole Board have responsibility for all young people sentenced to 
detention in a Youth Justice custodial centre and those transferred by the Adult Parole 
Board to such a centre, and aim to balance the needs of the young person with community 
safety considerations.
755
 
 
 
6 South Australia 
 
Pre- and post-release programs for young people detained in the Training Centres in 
South Australia focus on providing a range of education, training and vocational 
opportunities, with a strong through-care approach with community linkages. Education 
programs, both in the Training Centre and in the community, particularly emphasize 
literacy and numeracy as base skills, but also include a balanced curriculum offering art, 
life skills, health, physical education, woodwork and metalwork. Vocational courses 
accredited by the South Australian Certificate of Education are also offered and include 
hospitality, dry wall construction, and music. 
A large number of case-managed Innovative Community Action Networks courses and 
programs are also offered to young people released from training centres, all of which 
foster engagement, capacity and pathways to employment.
756
 ‘Step Out’ is a mentoring 
program funded by Australian Red Cross. It aims to support young people who are 
currently, or who have previously been, in custody to articulate their goals, reconnect 
with their community, and pursue positive lifestyles that minimize future risk of 
reoffending. Young people involved in the program commence working with mentors 
while in custody and continue into the community for up to 12 months. 
 
7 Western Australia 
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Upon release from detention in Western Australia, a young person can be referred to a 
number of programs in order to assist with their rehabilitation in the community, and also 
to prevent reoffending.
757
 Youth Justice Officers provide support to young people exiting 
detention on Supervised Release Orders.  As part of a release plan, referrals to programs 
similar to those available in custody are implemented. These include Substance Misuse 
Education Program/Counselling (individual or group); PASH (Promoting Adolescent 
Sexual Health); Parenting Skills Program (for detainees who are parents or parents to be); 
Sex Offender Treatment (individual counselling with centre psychologist); Protective 
Behaviours/Domestic Violence Prevention Group; SAM-Save-A-Mate (preventative 
group programs); individual psychological counselling; and Personal Development 
Programs. 
 
 
8 Tasmania 
 
In Tasmania, youth workers support young people in their transition from the Ashley 
Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) into the community. Save the Children work in 
partnership with the AYDC, Ashley School, Youth Justice, PCYC, EdZone, and the 
Department of Education to support young people to identify and meet their recreational, 
educational and vocational and/or employment goals and aspirations.
758
 
 
 
I FLRT-Utility in Custodial Programs 
 
 
There exists a need for correctional agencies to deliver services and programs that can 
assist prisoners to lead productive and law-abiding lives upon their release into the 
community.
759
 Whereas international research has shown that offender-rehabilitation 
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programs are likely to be most effective when offered in community settings, a robust 
body of evidence now exists testifying to the rehabilitative success of many custody-
based programs.
760
 
 
All jurisdictions deliver cognitive skills programs in custodial environments,
761
 and many 
different types of offender-rehabilitation programs are offered in Australian public prison 
settings. These include cognitive skills, drug and alcohol, anger-management, violent 
offender, domestic violence, and sex offender programs, as well as those programs that 
are delivered to other groups, including Indigenous and female offenders.
762
 
 
The Standard Guidelines for Corrections in Australia
763
 set out minimum requirements 
for prisons in relation to prisoner case management. For example:  
 
Each administering department should administer a system of individual case management of 
prisoners that enables the assessment, planning, development, co-ordination, monitoring and 
evaluation of options and services to meet the individual needs and risks of persons as they move 
between community corrections and prisons.
764
 
 
These guiding principles are intended to show the spirit in which correctional programs 
should be administered, and the goals toward which administrators should aim. However, 
no systematic approach exists to service delivery in Australian correctional services for 
other groups with special needs (for example, those with acquired brain injury, mentally 
disordered offenders, other minority culture groups).
765
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Prison-based offender-rehabilitation programs for adult offenders have a therapeutic 
(cognitive-behavioural) model of intervention that are underpinned by the RNR 
principles derived from the work of Andrews and Bonta,
766
 as elaborated in Chapter 3. 
 
Ross and Fabino
767
 first argued that offending behaviour may be linked to inadequate 
thinking skills (interpersonal problem-solving, moral reasoning, cognitive style, self-
control and perspective-taking), and that some of the most effective offender treatment 
programs involve an element of training in these areas. The past two decades has seen 
cognitive skills training become a core feature of offender-rehabilitation in the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada and, more recently, Australia. These 
programs employ cognitive behavioural treatment methods to improve decision-making 
and problem-solving, self-regulation and moral-reasoning skills.
768
 
 
Generally it would appear that program completion is associated with reductions in 
recidivism one year post release, but may not be maintained over longer timeframes. 
Cognitive skills programs have also been reported to have a short-term positive impact on 
institutional behaviour.
769
 Ward and Nee
770
 argue that there is a need to further develop 
the theoretical rationale for cognitive skills programs and, in turn, include the concepts of 
rationality, emotion, distributed cognitive and embodiment to conceptualize further the 
relationship between cognitive skills and action. FLRT may be valid treatment additive to 
existing custodial rehabilitation programs as detailed below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
766
  D A Andrews and J Bonta, ‘Rehabilitating Criminal Justice Policy and Practice’ (2010) 16 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 39. 
767
  R R Ross and E A Fabiano, Time to Think: A Cognitive Model of Delinquency Prevention and 
Offender Rehabilitation (Air Training and Publications, 1985). 
768
  Karen Heseltine, Andrew Day and Rick Sarre, ‘Prison-Based Correctional Offender Rehabilitation 
Programs: The 2009 National Picture in Australia’ (Report No 112, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2011) 23. 
769
  A Clarke, R Simmonds and S Wydall, ‘Delivering Cognitive Skills Programs in Prison: A 
Qualitative Study’ (Home Office Research Finding No 242, London Home Office, 2004). 
770
  T Ward and C Nee, ‘Surfaces and Depths: Evaluating the Theoretical Assumptions of Cognitive 
Skills Programs (2009) 15 Psychology, Crime and Law 165. 
  175 
1 The Northern Territory 
 
The Northern Territory Department of Correctional Services is implementing and 
delivering new initiatives and rehabilitation programs aimed at reducing the Northern 
Territory’s imprisonment rate by 15–20 per cent and the reoffending rate by 10 per 
cent.
771
 A program called ‘Cognitive Skills’ is offered.772 
 
 
2 The Australian Capital Territory 
 
In the Australian Capital Territory, Offender Intervention Program Unit Specific 
treatment components include individual and group counselling, alcohol and other drug 
education, relapse prevention and cognitive skill-building activities designed to address 
risk factors. Areas of treatment include socialisation in terms of developing attitudes and 
values of a mainstream, pro-social lifestyle, and the development of drug-free 
networks.
773
 ‘Cognitive Self Change’ is the name of one relevant program.774 
 
The pre-release Transitional Release Centre (TRC) is another service that is designed to 
assist prisoners in their rehabilitation. It has a valuable place in the rehabilitation, 
reintegration and resettlement of prisoners. It provides opportunities for prisoners to 
establish or re-establish support systems in the community, such as group-living, 
budgeting and cooking. This expands the opportunities available to prisoners to exercise 
appropriate discretion and decision-making. The TRC concentrates on life skills and 
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programs that enhance prisoners’ prospects of restoring and maintaining the family unit, 
finding employment, and generally re-adjusting to life in the community.
775
 
 
 
3 Queensland 
 
In Queensland, the Agency also offers offenders access to several cognitive-behavioural-
based intervention programs that target offending behaviours and anti-social thinking. 
These cognitive-behavioural based programs, such as ‘Making Choices’,776 are designed 
to assist offenders to confront and understand their past criminal behaviour, and to 
develop pro-social skills and techniques to control their behaviour and avoid situations 
that may lead to further offending when released from supervision or custody.
777
 There 
are also several programs for those convicted of sexual offences, including a specialized 
program for intellectually disabled offenders.
778
 
 
 
4 New South Wales 
 
In New South Wales, Corrective Services delivers professional correctional services and 
programs to reduce the risk of reoffending and enhance public safety.
779
 One function of 
Offender Services and Programs is to provide rehabilitation programs and psychological 
services for offenders in custody and in the community.
780
 Offenders are assessed in 
order to develop a case plan, which is ‘a goal-oriented pathway [with] activities and 
interventions that aim to increase the likelihood that a person will lead a life without 
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harming others or themselves’.781 A cognitive skills program is ‘Think First’.782 Readily 
available on the Corrective Services website is access to a compendium of assessments 
employed by Corrective Services NSW.
783
 The instruments listed include psychological 
and psychometric tests. Relevantly, the eleventh version of the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale (BIS-11) is included under the ‘Criminogenic Needs and Offence Related 
Assessments’.784 An accepted measure of impulsiveness,785 the BIS-11 is the most widely 
used self-report measure of impulsive personality traits.
786
 It includes 30 items that are 
scored to yield six first-order factors (attention, motor, self-control, cognitive complexity, 
perseverance, and cognitive instability impulsiveness), and three second-order factors 
(attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness).
787
  
 
Statewide Disability Services addresses the additional support needs of offenders with 
disabilities. Mental illness is not considered a disability for these purposes.
788
 It is a 
multidisciplinary team that works with all offenders with a disability, whether in custody 
or in the community. It provides: assessments, behaviour management, program 
facilitation support, consultation and advice to staff managing offenders with a disability, 
development of programs for offenders with a disability to address their offending 
behaviour, and advice and consultation to internal and external stakeholders, ensuring 
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that issues impacting offenders with disability are adequately addressed via policy and 
procedure.
789
  
 
Statewide Disability Services focuses on the pre-release planning of offenders with an 
intellectual disability, which includes making referrals to Ageing Disability and Home 
Care including the Community Justice Program and other disability related community 
service providers.
790
 There are also sex offender programs for offenders with an 
intellectual disability.
791
 
 
 
5 Victoria 
 
For individuals entering the Victorian prison system, Corrections Victoria has developed 
a number of targeted interventions aimed at maximizing rehabilitation opportunities for 
offenders and minimizing their risk of reoffending.
792
 Case management is a vital 
component of the prisoner rehabilitation and reintegration process.
793
 Cognitive skills 
programs offered include, ‘Maintaining Change’, ‘Exploring Change’, ‘Cognitive Skills’ 
and ‘Making Choices’.794 There is also a sex offender program for offenders with a 
cognitive disability.
795
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
789
  New South Wales Government, Statewide Disability Services New South Wales (3 September 2015) 
<http://www.correctiveservices.justice.nsw.gov.au/programs/statewide-disability-services>. 
790
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791
  Karen Heseltine, Andrew Day and Rick Sarre, ‘Prison-Based Correctional Offender Rehabilitation 
Programs: The 2009 National Picture in Australia’ (Report No 112, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2011) 16. 
792
  Deborah Glass, ‘Investigation into the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Prisoners in Victoria’ 
(Discussion Paper, Victorian Ombudsman, October 2014) 11. 
793
  Ibid 13. 
794
  Karen Heseltine, Andrew Day and Rick Sarre, ‘Prison-Based Correctional Offender Rehabilitation 
Programs: The 2009 National Picture in Australia’ (Report No 112, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2011) 25. 
795
  Ibid 16. 
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6 South Australia 
 
The South Australian Department for Correctional Services strives to deliver an 
integrated and seamless approach in the delivery of programs and services for sentenced 
prisoners and offenders, from initial to final contact with the department. This approach, 
called Integrated Offender Management, provides for the dynamic and culturally 
appropriate management and rehabilitation of prisoners and offenders.
796
 For example, 
one program offered, ‘Making Choices’,797 is designed to assist male and female 
offenders in adopting an offence-free lifestyle. The program aims to increase participants’ 
understanding of what led them to offending and to understand points where different 
choices could have been made. 
 
The Department for Correctional Services currently offers a number of education 
programs that are available for those people subject to supervised bonds and which are 
designed to address the criminogenic needs of offenders. The programs available are: 
cognitive skills, alcohol and other drugs, literacy and numeracy, anger management, 
victim awareness, domestic violence and sex offender treatment.
798
  
 
 
7 Western Australia 
 
In Western Australia, a specific offence-focused intensive cognitive skills program has 
been developed for use with female offenders. The Western Australian Department of 
Corrective Services conducts ‘a range of programs and interventions which target 
offending behaviour’799 and assists participants to ‘get their lives back on track by better 
                                                 
796
  Department for Correctional Services South Australia, Correctional Programs (2010) 
<http://www.corrections.sa.gov.au/rehabilitation-programs>. 
797
  Karen Heseltine, Andrew Day and Rick Sarre, ‘Prison-Based Correctional Offender Rehabilitation 
Programs: The 2009 National Picture in Australia’ (Report No 112, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2011) 25. 
798
  Legal Services Commission South Australia, Law Handbook (2015) 
<http://www.lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/>. 
799
  Department of Corrective Services Western Australia, Cognitive Skills (18 October 2013) 
<https://www.correctiveservices.wa.gov.au/rehabilitation-services/rehab-programs.aspx#Cognitive-
skills>. 
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understanding their offending behaviour and learning new ways to avoid reoffending’.800 
Cognitive skills programs include ‘Cognitive Brief Intervention’ and ‘Think First’.801 
 
The Directorate’s Disability Services Unit focuses upon services and support for 
prisoners with intellectual disabilities, acquired brain damage, dementia or cognitive 
impairment. The unit also provides advice to staff, prisoners, guardians, advocates and 
external agencies relating to services and policies for people with these disabilities.
802
 
‘Legal and Social Awareness’803 is a cognitive skills program available to intellectually 
disabled persons. 
 
 
8 Tasmania 
 
In Tasmania, anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that motivation/preparatory programs 
promote the likelihood of intensive program completion.
804
 The Integrated Offender 
Management model operates in Tasmania also. Focusing on reducing reoffending through 
case management and reintegration, it is in keeping with the rehabilitation goals of the 
department in the area of offender management. Tasmania also offers the ‘Making 
Choices’ program.805 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
800
  Ibid. 
801
  Karen Heseltine, Andrew Day and Rick Sarre, ‘Prison-Based Correctional Offender Rehabilitation 
Programs: The 2009 National Picture in Australia’ (Report No 112, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 2011) 25. 
802
  Ibid 72. 
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  Ibid 25. 
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  Ibid 26. 
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J FLRT-Utility Post-Release 
 
There is ample evidence worldwide that those leaving prison face significant challenges 
reintegrating into the community.
806
 A recent Australian study
807
 of people released from 
prison found that most participants encountered a number of difficulties when attempting 
to reintegrate into the community. FLRT could be implemented as a form of post-release 
support, in addition to the current initiatives detailed below. 
 
1 The Northern Territory 
 
Post-Release Supported Accommodation (P-RSA) has been established in the Northern 
Territory, focusing on four key areas: employment, education and training, 
accommodation, and living skills. Residents are assisted with creating community 
networks for continuity of support, restoring family and community relationships, and 
confronting any issues that may impact on their rehabilitation. Generally, P-RSA is 
available to all prisoners who have been released upon completion of a full sentence and 
to those released on orders under the supervision of Community Corrections.
808
 
 
2 The Australian Capital Territory 
 
In the Australian Capital Territory, the Transitional Release Centre (TRC) has been 
constructed ‘outside the wire’ as a halfway house for detainees who are completing their 
sentences and are due for release and have met certain stringent criteria. Generally, 
                                                 
806
  Deborah Glass, ‘Investigation into the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Prisoners in Victoria’ 
(Discussion Paper, Victorian Ombudsman, October 2014) 23. 
807
  Louis Schetzer and StreetCare, ‘Beyond the Prison Gates: The Experiences of People Recently 
Released from Prison into Homelessness and Housing Crisis’ (Report, Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre, June 2013). 
808
  Department of Correctional Services Northern Territory, Post-Release Supported Accommodation 
(18 December 2012) 
<http://www.correctionalservices.nt.gov.au/RehabilitationAndIndigenousInitiatives/PostReleaseSup
portedAccommodation/Pages/default.aspx>. 
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detainees accommodated in the TRC will have commenced work experience in the 
community, which they attend daily.
809
 
 
 
3 Queensland 
 
Offender Reintegration Support Service (ORSS)
810
 provides eligible high-needs offenders 
with individually tailored reintegration support during their transition from custody into 
the community. 
 
 
4 New South Wales 
 
The Transitional Support Program in New South Wales provides support and case 
management to men and women transitioning from prison to the wider community. 
Transitional workers meet with clients approximately three months before release to 
identify post-release needs. These needs generally include accommodation, employment, 
welfare, drug and alcohol, debt, relationships and adjusting to life on the outside. 
Transitional workers support clients for up to a year through the stressful transition 
period, with the goal of clients establishing themselves in their community, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of reoffending and returning to prison.
811
 
 
 
5 Victoria 
 
The main form of support for people post-release in Victoria is through Intensive 
Transitional Support Programs funded by Corrections Victoria. These programs are 
delivered by non-government service providers, per prisoner on a set-number-of-hours 
                                                 
809
  Australian Capital Territory Corrective Services, Transitional Release Centre (29 March 2012) 
<http://www.cs.act.gov.au/page/view/863/title/transitional-release-centre>. 
810
  Queensland Corrective Services, Procedure — Reintegration Support (2015) 
<http://www.correctiveservices.qld.gov.au/Resources/Procedures/Offender_Management/documents
/ofmproreintsupportcopy.shtml>. 
811
  Community Restorative Centre, Transitional Alcohol and Other Drugs Project (2015) 
<http://www.crcnsw.org.au/services/transitional>. 
  183 
basis, with prisoners being assigned a worker. Those eligible for the programs meet the 
following criteria: have served a sentence (not for those on remand); are at an increased 
risk of reoffending; have multiple and complex transitional needs; are willing to 
participate voluntarily and be actively involved.
812
 
 
6 South Australia 
 
Offenders Aid and Rehabilitation Services (OARS) Community Transitions in South 
Australia is an innovative non-government Crime Prevention Agency.
813
 OARS 
Community Transitions provides services to many people, including those released from 
prison, their partners and their children. The agency pursues early intervention strategies 
with respect to preventing crime and is represented on many external bodies and 
Government Committees. 
 
7 Western Australia 
 
The Re-entry Link Program in Western Australia is a voluntary program to help prisoners 
improve their life skills, prepare for release, find somewhere to live and link up with job 
network providers, family and community support services. This service operates in 
every prison across the State.
814
 
 
8 Tasmania 
 
The Case Coordination Unit is responsible for assessing prisoners, advising correctional 
case officers about sentence plans, and assisting sentenced prisoners to prepare for release 
into the community. A Reintegration and Transition Consultant works with community 
                                                 
812
  Deborah Glass, ‘Investigation into the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Prisoners in Victoria’ 
(Discussion Paper, Victorian Ombudsman, October 2014) 23.  
813
  Offenders Aid and Rehabilitation Services, Community Transitions (2011) 
<http://www.oars.org.au/index.html>. 
814
  Department of Corrective Services Western Australia, Getting Out (27 May 2013) 
<https://www.correctiveservices.wa.gov.au/prisons/getting-out.aspx>. 
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organizations to provide reintegration support pre- and post-release. This position also 
works with the community to provide additional services to inmates while in prison.
815
 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has advanced the argument for diversifying the therapeutic practice of FLRT 
by widening its jurisdictional ambit. The utility of FLRT as part of court-mandated 
rehabilitative treatment, rather than full diversion, for major indictable offences in 
superior courts was addressed. The use of FLRT in tribunals that assess the continued 
detention of both civilly committed and forensic patients, as well as those that determine 
issues of mental responsibility, were also considered. It was proffered that optimal FLRT-
utilization may extend to other diversionary schemes, including police diversion, drug 
diversion and indigenous-specific diversionary programs. Youth offenders may also 
benefit from FLRT — in a diversionary capacity, as well as in-detention and post-release. 
The value of FLRT in adult custodial programs and post-release programs was also 
promoted. 
 
The compatibility of FLRT with the GLM of offender-rehabilitation was established in 
Chapter 3, as well as the formalities of FLRT becoming a recognized rehabilitative 
treatment. Consideration of FLRT-integration into existing court-mandated opportunities 
for offering rehabilitation through mental health diversionary mechanisms and the regular 
criminal justice system in each State and Territory in Australia was explored in Chapter 
4, and suggestions for its optimal integration have been elaborated upon in this chapter. It 
follows that the next chapter, Chapter 6, will consider the theoretical implications of 
FLRT-integration within traditional and modern conceptions of punishment and 
rehabilitation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
815
  Department of Justice, Integrated Offender Management (24 September 2014) 
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CHAPTER 6  
 
 
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL PERMISSIBILITY OF 
INTEGRATING FLRT INTO THE AUSTRALIAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
To this point, the thesis has considered FLRT-utilization within the existing legal 
framework in Australia — both within diversionary mechanisms and the regular criminal 
justice system. The thesis then proceeded to argue the plausibility of FLRT as an adjunct 
treatment to the various offender-rehabilitative treatments operative within each State and 
Territory of Australia. Two significant questions remain to be addressed: first, what are 
the theoretical implications of integrating FLRT into the Australian criminal justice 
system? Secondly, what are the practical implications of doing so? 
 
This chapter addresses the first of those questions. This requires, first, a consideration of 
how integrating customized rehabilitation for impulse-control management would fit 
within traditional conceptions of punishment. This will in turn include an assessment of 
historical and modern conceptions of punishment, with specific regard to retributivism 
and utilitarianism.  
 
Secondly, the compatibility of the adversarial system with criminal law is also examined 
in this chapter. This is in contrast to the reduced condemnatory emphasis inherent in non-
adversarial systems, where therapeutic jurisprudence flourishes. Treating an offender 
within parameters traditionally established for the punitive ideal, it is argued, is 
problematic. Analysis of offender attitude, rather than the nature of the crime, is 
considered.  
 
Thirdly, rehabilitation theory and recidivism-reduction as theoretical impetuses to the 
scholarship of therapeutic jurisprudence are also considered, as is the relevance of 
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international human rights theory and obligations to FLRT as a rehabilitative treatment 
for criminal offenders. Particular weight is given to the framework for applying human 
rights to correctional practice (in offender assessment and treatment), as developed by 
Ward and Birgden,
816
 and its relevance to the strength-based approach to offender-
rehabilitation, the GLM, as established in Chapter 2. The productive interaction of human 
rights theory with the therapeutic jurisprudence agenda in the promotion of socially 
acceptable and personally meaningful lives for offenders is also addressed.  
 
Fourthly, ethical considerations surrounding FLRT are examined in the light of President 
Obama’s charge to the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 
Bioethics Commission817 to identify core ethical standards in the area of neuroscience. 
Matters surrounding misrepresentations and unjustified inferences that can be drawn from 
neuroscientific evidence are raised.  
 
Fifthly, other theoretical concerns are enumerated, including the relevance of the rule of 
law and, more specifically, the notion of equality before the law. The balancing of FLRT 
as a therapeutic treatment with the maintenance of ‘principled faithful application of the 
law’818 is deliberated. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 7, addresses the second remaining question. This requires a 
consideration of the practical implications of FLRT-integration into the criminal justice 
system, including, inter alia, the role of lawyers and judges acting in a therapeutic 
context, the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence concepts upon judicial integrity, as well 
as the limitations of fMRI equipment. It could fairly be argued that some of the material 
in Chapter 7 properly belongs in the present chapter. However, it can be difficult to 
disentangle theoretical jurisprudential matters from some of the practical considerations 
                                                 
816
  Tony Ward and Astrid Birgden, ‘Human Rights and Correctional Clinical Practice’ (2007) 12 
Aggression and Violent Behavior 628. 
817  Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Presidential Charge to the Commission 
for the Study of Bioethical Issues (1 July 2013)  
<http://bioethics.gov/ sites/default/files/news/Charge%20from%20President%20Obama.pdf>. 
818
  Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, Essays on the Morality of Law and Politics (Clarendon 
Press, 1994) 373. 
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surrounding FLRT-integration in the present context. Accordingly, the burden of analysis 
is spread across two chapters simply to achieve balance in the coverage of each chapter. 
 
It is ultimately concluded that the theoretical and practical implications of FLRT-
integration into the criminal justice system — while challenging established rule-of-law 
principles and natural justice tenets — do not ‘run afoul’819 of the law to the extent that a 
conceptual upheaval would result. Existing legal principles make virtually no 
assumptions about the neural bases of criminal behaviour, and as a result they can 
comfortably assimilate new neuroscientific insights:820 FLRT-integration is not an 
additive for which the law is fundamentally unprepared. 
 
II THE CONCEPT OF PUNISHMENT 
 
Punishment has been described as ‘the authoritative imposition of something regarded as 
unpleasant to someone who has committed a breach of rules.’821 Theories of punishment 
can be divided into two general philosophies: retributivist and utilitarian. Under the 
retributivist theory, offenders are punished for criminal behaviour because they deserve 
punishment. Criminal behaviour upsets the peaceful balance of society, and punishment 
assists to restore the balance. The retributivist theory focuses on the crime itself as the 
reason for imposing punishment. While the utilitarian theory looks forward by basing 
punishment on the perceived resultant social benefits, the retributivist theory looks 
backward at the transgression as the basis for punishment. Each theory of punishment 
will now be considered in turn. 
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  Mae C Quinn, ‘An RSVP to Professor Wexler’s Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence Invitation to the 
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Boston College Law Review 539, 572. 
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  Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, ‘For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything’ 
(2004) 359 Philosophical Transactions Of The Royal Society Of London: Biological Sciences 1775, 
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A The Retributivist Theory of Punishment  
 
 
[P]unishment should be an end in itself.
822
  
 
The modern debate about punishment revolves around the primacy of four components: 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. In the late 1700s, philosopher 
Immanuel Kant
823
  constructed a philosophy of retribution, giving a rational foundation to 
the accepted retributional basis of all punishment.
824
 He argued that the leading goal of 
criminal law must be retribution. Kant’s view was that to punish the criminal defendant 
as a means to any other utilitarian goal, such as deterrence or rehabilitation, was to de-
humanize the defendant by reducing him to a mere object.
825
 Moreover, Kant viewed 
punishment as a purely retributive reaction to the crime itself; therefore, the punishment 
had to be proportionate to the crime.
826
 Philosopher Georg Hegel concurred with Kant’s 
retributionist ideal, adding the notion that punishment annulled the crime.
827
 In Hegel’s 
construct, crime is the negation of moral law, and punishment is necessary to negate that 
negation to restore the moral right.
828
 Hegel continued the Kantian view that criminals 
themselves are moral beings, entitled to have their crimes negated by proportionate 
punishment. 
 
The idea of punishment as moral retribution may have its roots in what some 
anthropologists have called ‘defilement’ — the process by which primitive societies 
interpreted and explained human suffering as punishment by the gods.
829
 Italian jurist 
Cesare Beccaria is generally credited with the first systematic exposition of 
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  Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (Ladd trans, Hackett, 2
nd
 ed, 1999) [trans of:  
Die Metaphysik der Sitten (first published 1797)]. 
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nd
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  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right (T M Knox trans, Oxford University Press, 
1942) [trans of: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (first published 1821)]. 
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  Ibid. 
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  Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (Emerson Buchanan trans, Harper and Row, 1967) [trans of: La 
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proportionality.
830
 He believed that requiring criminal sentences to be proportionate to the 
crime was an important limitation on the powers of government.
831
 Thus, retribution 
achieved an important philosophical structure as the basis for proportionality — the 
governing principle of penal distribution. 
 
 
B The Utilitarian Theory of Punishment 
 
 
The retributionist paradigm continued until the 1800s, when it was challenged by English 
utilitarian Jeremy Bentham.
832
 The utilitarian theory of punishment seeks to punish 
offenders in order to discourage, or deter, future wrongdoing. Under the utilitarian 
philosophy, laws should be used to maximize the happiness of society. Because crime 
and punishment are inconsistent with happiness, they should be kept to a minimum. 
Utilitarians understand that a crime-free society does not exist, but they endeavour to 
inflict only as much punishment as is required to prevent future crimes. The utilitarian 
theory is consequentialist in nature. Consequentialist responses to crime justify 
punishment ‘based on their ability to prevent repeat and future crimes and promote 
specific public policy objectives’.833 Utilitarian theory recognizes that punishment has 
consequences for both the offender and society and holds that the total good produced by 
the punishment should exceed the total evil. In other words, punishment should not be 
unlimited.  
Utilitarians deem that the only purpose of punishment was to prevent crime, that is, to be 
a deterrent.
834
 Deterrence operates on a specific and a general level. General deterrence 
means that the punishment should prevent other people from committing criminal acts. 
The punishment serves as an example to the rest of society, signaling to others that 
criminal behaviour will be punished. 
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Specific deterrence means that the punishment should prevent the same person from 
committing crimes in the future. Specific deterrence works in two ways. First, an 
offender may be imprisoned so as to physically prevent him or her from committing 
another crime for a specified period. Second, the incapacitation is designed to be so 
unpleasant that the offender is discouraged from repeating the criminal behaviour. 
Rehabilitation is another utilitarian rationale for punishment. The goal of rehabilitation is 
to prevent future crime by giving offenders the ability to succeed within the confines of 
the law. Rehabilitative measures for criminal offenders usually include treatment for 
afflictions such as mental illness, chemical dependency and chronic violent behaviour. 
Rehabilitation also includes the use of educational programs, providing offenders with 
the knowledge and skills needed to compete in the job market. 
Naturally, if punishment is viewed as a utilitarian tool to deter future illegal behaviour of 
potential criminals, then it can also be used, though less efficiently, to shape the 
behaviour of the particular defendant being punished. Not only would punishment deter 
the offender from engaging in future crimes, it could also change the offender. The birth 
of the ‘rehabilitative ideal’ thus commenced as an extension of the deterrence model. 
 
Uncoupled to any concept of proportionality, the primary theoretical failure of the 
rehabilitative ideal was that it invested in the state unchecked powers to ‘cure’, which 
were unrelated to any notions of criminal responsibility and fundamental justice.
835
 The 
modest goals of punishment as a just desert, and prevention as the simple act of taking 
criminals out of society, replaced rehabilitation as the dominant penal theory.
836
 Modern 
criminologists acknowledge that each of the four traditional justifications for punishment 
— retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation — must continue to play some 
                                                 
835
  Morris B Hoffman, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: 
The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes the Most Dangerous’ (2002) 29 Fordham Urban Law 
Journal 2063, 2079. 
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Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments (Hill and Wang, 1976); Richard G Singer, Just 
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role in the criminal justice system.
837
 However, synthesising these justifications into a 
cohesive system is challenging, primarily because of the incompatible goals they 
advocate.
838
 
 
C Adversarial Compatibility — Condemnation 
 
 
[T]he application of proportionate punishment explicitly condemns the specific conduct that 
constitutes the offence and the specific offender as a culpable wrongdoer.
839
 
 
 
Criminal law is arguably highly compatible with the adversarial process. In the first 
instance, the expression of condemnation inherent in criminal punishment is facilitated. 
Criminal punishment inflicts harsh treatment on culpable offenders in a manner that 
expresses condemnation, including reprobation and resentment toward those offenders.
840
 
third party theory of punishment considers that ‘[a]pplying tough legal sanctions to 
criminal offending may appease the punitive wishes of the wider public’.841 Applying 
punishment in proportion to the severity of a specific offence and the culpability or 
blameworthiness of the offender emphatically reaffirms the societal condemnation of the 
category of conduct prescribed by the offence definition. This emphasis on the infliction 
of aversive consequences and the accompanying expression of condemnation can 
reasonably be expected to encourage confrontational, rather than mutually cooperative, 
attitudes.
842
  
 
Moreover, an adversarial structure is appropriate to the criminal law, as it enables the 
application of harsh treatment upon the offender. One could imagine an institution that 
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would express condemnation of the crime and of the culpable offender only through an 
emphatic statement of disapproval. In practice, however, criminal punishment expresses 
that condemnation by inflicting harsh treatment, such as incarceration and, in some 
jurisdictions, execution. Reform or rehabilitation might be components in an ideal 
outcome, but criminal punishment ordinarily pursues societal interests at the expense of 
convicted offenders by applying methods such as incarceration that are aversive to 
experience and result in disadvantages that extend beyond release. Thus, it is difficult to 
interpret the criminal justice process of trial and punishment as a cooperative process 
pursuing the converging interests of the offender and of the State. 
 
 
D The Reduced Condemnatory Emphasis in Non-Adversarialism 
 
 
[T]reatment regimes are not punishment, but the restructuring of the defendant’s lifestyle.843 
 
In stark contrast to the notion of harsh punishment, problem-solving courts are designed 
to pursue therapeutic interventions that benefit the offender in a manner that promotes 
societal interests in reducing recidivism. Such courts reflect the criticisms that the 
offenders who appear before them are less culpable than those addressed in conventional 
criminal courts. It is interpreted that this lesser culpability enhances the potential for 
rehabilitation, which, in turn, will reduce the risk of recidivism. Some problem-solving 
courts provide for expungement of the records of offenders who fulfil conditions of their 
suspended sentences. This thereby serves to retract the condemnation expressed by the 
initial requirements of a guilty plea and a suspended sentence as methods to enforce 
conditions of probation. Insofar as problem-solving courts apply suspended sentences, 
expunge records, or use similar approaches, they can reasonably be understood as 
pursuing the converging interests of society and of the defendant in reform and 
rehabilitation, through methods that are less condemnatory than traditional forms of 
criminal punishment. Criminal conviction and punishment, in contrast, might promote 
reform and rehabilitation in some offenders, but the application of serious criminal 
                                                 
843
  Peggy Fulton Hora, William G Schma and John T A Rosenthal, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
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sentences places a strong emphasis on punishment and condemnation of the culpable 
wrongdoer.
844
 
 
The application of FLRT — demonstrative of improved biological understanding of 
human behaviour — will not exculpate people. The retributive elements underpinning the 
criminal justice system will not be removed. Instead, NeuroDiversion places ideas of 
punishment and retribution in their larger biological context, improving the rehabilitative 
customization with which the law can respond to criminal acts.
845
 It is anticipated that an 
emphasis on ‘a more progressive, consequentialist approach’846 will emerge, rather than a 
transformation of the legal praxis: 
 
neuroscience will probably have a transformative effect on the law, despite the fact that existing 
legal doctrine can, in principle, accommodate whatever neuroscience will tell us.
847
 
 
Neurolaw commentator and Professor of Law and Psychiatry at the University of 
Pennsylvania Stephen Morse argues that new neuroscience contributes nothing more than 
new details and that existing legal principles can handle anything that neuroscience will 
throw our way in the foreseeable future.
848
 Our operative legal principles exist because 
they more or less adequately capture an intuitive sense of justice. Neuroscience may 
challenge and ultimately reshape our intuitive sense(s) of justice
849
 — but not to a 
completely radical extent. 
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Consequentialist justification for punishment is ‘merely an instrument for promoting 
future social welfare’,850 and the retributivist justification for punishment is ‘to give 
people what they deserve based on their past actions’.851 The common-sense approach 
has consequentialist elements, but is largely retributivist. Rehabilitative approaches to 
offender behaviour are not in the habit of ‘winning popular acceptance. Many people … 
have a strong retributive impulse: they want to see punishment, not rehabilitation.’852 
Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to give offenders a ‘voice, respect, neutrality and 
trust’.853 Its processes are also associated with ‘active and positive intervention, 
validation and self-worth’,854 and so for many victims of crime and the public, these are 
‘soft’ options. Indeed: 
 
Not only does some form of punishment respond to the needs of victims, being a form of recompense, but it 
is required to affirm the fundamental tenets of the legal system and enforce the sense of ‘justice’ or giving of 
someone’s ‘due’. This would further deter a number of malicious abuses that might come out of a purely 
therapeutic system.855 
 
However, a ‘therapeutic system of justice’ would be about ‘responding to the needs of 
offenders and transforming society into a better place in the process’.856 That is to say, 
‘identifying the cause … loads us with the responsibility of doing something about it — 
treating the offender’.857 FLRT treats the offender, yet this treatment does not equate to 
unbridled exculpation. 
 
Traditionally, criminal law aimed to achieve compliance with the law’s commands 
through the mechanism of deterrence — inducing in the offender the fear that he or she 
will experience more cost (pain of apprehension and punishment) than benefit from 
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illegal activities.
858
 In this way, the law casts blame and punishes, construing the law as 
the antagonist of the offender.
859
 However, judges and legal practitioners take on new 
roles in working together to apply ‘smart punishment’ rather than ‘punishment for the 
sake of retribution’860 and, in fact, ‘[t]he offender’s rehabilitation becomes a focus of the 
legal process.
861
 
 
When primacy is given to an offender’s treatment, therapeutic jurisprudence provides an 
authoritative tone and set of practices that obscure law’s punitive function. Indeed, 
treating an offender within parameters traditionally established for the punitive ideal is 
problematic.
862
 In 1971, the American Friends Service Committee published a scathing 
attack on rehabilitative penology, and included in its criticisms a fundamental objection 
to court-mandated treatment:  
 
When we punish the person and simultaneously try to treat him, we hurt the individual more 
profoundly and more permanently than if we merely imprison him for a specific length of time.
863
  
 
However, the incorporation of FLRT under the therapeutic jurisprudence approach relies 
upon ‘cognitive self-change to improve compliance’.864 In problem-solving courts, the 
attitude of the offender is judged rather than the nature of the crime.
865
 An offender’s 
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responsibility for his or her offending behaviour in these courts shifts to responsibility for 
complying with a treatment program. In this way, success is considered in terms of how 
well a defendant has altered his or her thoughts and behaviours.
866
 
 
 
III THE CONCEPT OF REHABILITATION 
 
Terms such as ‘rehabilitation’, ‘desistance’, ‘reintegration’ and ‘re-entry’ are often used 
to refer to the social and psychological processes employed to assist individuals in the 
cessation of criminal activity and pursuit of productive and socially responsible lives.
867
 
The process of engaging individuals in efforts to change their criminal attitudes and 
dispositions can be viewed as a normative and capacity-building process that primarily 
focuses on assisting them to construct personally meaningful and socially acceptable 
identities.
868
 
 
The normative component of rehabilitation is evident in a number of ways: (i) the 
concept of an offender is a moral one, where individuals have been judged to have acted 
wrongly and illegally, and are punished accordingly; (ii) in order to be able to pursue a 
meaningful life, individuals must be able to identify what they find truly valuable and 
construct ways of living that will help them achieve outcomes, activities and traits that 
reflect their identified values; (iii) risk-reduction is usually a priority for all correctional 
programs and intervention efforts, but it is a value-laden concept in the sense that the aim 
is to reduce, manage and monitor possible negative outcomes for the community and 
offender; and (iv) a diverse range of values (for example, role standards or expectations, 
personal traits, activities, practices) of practical or narrative identities have been found to 
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be important components of successful desistance. The capacity-building dimension of 
rehabilitation is closely related to the normative dimension, as it also emphasizes the 
importance of the provision of resources and opportunities. The capacity-building 
dimension of rehabilitation specifies that offenders need to be provided with the internal 
resources (for example, attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, skills) and external (for example, 
social supports, intimate relationships, education, training, employment, leisure activities) 
to achieve their individually identified goals, which will help them attain better or good 
lives. Good lives are characterized as ones that enable individuals to have a sense of 
purpose, achieve higher levels of well-being, and adhere to socially prescribed norms.
869
 
 
 
A The Rehabilitation Theory: Features of an Effective Forensic Rehabilitation 
Model 
 
The term ‘rehabilitation theory’ refers to the overarching aims, values, principles, 
justifications and aetiological assumptions that are used to guide interventions and help 
therapists translate these principles into practice.
870
 Rehabilitation theories are essentially 
hybrid theories that contain a mixture of aetiological, ethical, methodological and practice 
elements. They can be distinguished from a type of therapy (for example, cognitive–
behavioural or psychodynamic) or treatment theories that are more specific in nature and 
involve the application of principles and practical strategies to change an aspect of the 
behaviour of individuals. In short, a rehabilitation theory provides a comprehensive, 
unifying, explanatory framework for understanding an individual and his or her problems. 
 
According to Ward and Maruna,
871
 the ‘best’ rehabilitation theory is able to account for 
the agreed-upon factors of a problem behaviour (through its aetiological assumptions), 
has sufficient unifying power to incorporate important aspects of correctional or forensic 
rehabilitation (such as motivation, risk reduction and management, therapeutic process 
factors and content of therapy), is comparatively simple, has sufficient explanatory depth 
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to clarify whether certain causal factors should be targeted in treatment, is both internally 
and externally consistent, and results in effective therapy and, ultimately, reintegration. 
 
Moreover, the purpose of offender-rehabilitation, as espoused in the Standard Guidelines 
for Corrections in Australia, is 
 
to assist the rehabilitation of offenders through the adoption of productive, law-abiding lives in the 
community [and to provide] opportunities to address their offending behaviour and actively encourage … 
access [to] evidence-based intervention programs, education, vocational education and work opportunities.872 
 
There is also evidence that, as a rehabilitative mechanism, diversion can result in 
improved mental health outcomes for offenders.
873
 That diversion into treatment for a 
person with a mental health impairment is a public interest, rather than a private interest 
of the defendant, was recognized by the Court of Criminal Appeal in DPP v El Mawas.
874
 
This is in line with the broad idea of using therapeutic jurisprudence to assist offenders to 
assist society and heeds the following: 
 
it must, however, be clear from the outset to all concerned that it is the sentence of imprisonment, 
and not the treatment accorded in prison, that constitutes the punishment. Men come to prison as a 
punishment, not for punishment.
875
 
 
1 Recidivism-Reduction 
 
The overall aim of offender intervention is a reduction in recidivism.
876
 The mode of 
program delivery is crucial in achieving this aim. Programs based on a social-learning 
model of offending that are structured and skills-oriented, delivered with manuals by 
qualified staff, and which operate within supportive environments, can result in a 10–30 
per cent reduction in offending.
877
 
                                                 
872
  Corrective Services Ministers’ Conference, ‘Standard Guidelines for Corrections in Australia’ 
(Corrections, Prisons and Parole, 2012) 2, 12. 
873
  M Parsonage, Diversion: A Better Way for Criminal Justice and Mental Health (Sainsbury Centre 
for Mental Health, 2009) 20; K Sly et al, ‘Court Outcomes For Clients Referred to a Community 
Mental Health Liaison Service’ (2009) 32 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 92, 93. 
874
  Director of Public Prosecutions v El Mawas [2006] NSWLR 93 [71]. 
875
  Sir Alexander Paterson quoted in S K Ruck (ed), Paterson on Prisons (Muller, London, 1951) 23. 
876
  D A Andrews, James Bonta and R D Hodge, ‘Classification for Effective Rehabilitation: 
Rediscovering Psychology’ (1990) 17(1) Criminal Justice and Behavior 19. 
877
  Clare-Ann Fortune, Tony Ward and Gwenda M Willis, ‘The Rehabilitation of Offenders: Reducing 
Risk and Promoting Better Lives’ (2012) 19 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 646, 648. 
  199 
 
Recidivism, or the ‘ugly  excess of the criminal law  adversarial paradigm’,878 can be 
viewed as an imprimatur to the therapeutic jurisprudence movement, which emerged as a 
corrective to ‘the obduracy of recidivism rates’879 and ‘structural and operational 
problems of a fractured justice system’.880 It is known that ‘recidivism concerns ... drive 
the [therapeutic jurisprudence] agenda’.881  
 
According to some researchers,
882
 it is inherently difficult (and unrealistic) to develop 
(and apply) a single definition of recidivism, as the term is constantly being re-defined as 
new and innovative attempts are undertaken to understand reoffending behaviour. 
Recidivism is generally seen as synonymous with terms such as repeat offending and 
reoffending.
883
 Rehabilitative efforts identify causes for offending and reduce reoffending 
by changing thoughts, feelings and behaviours.
884
 FLRT is comfortably housed within 
this desideratum.  
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IV HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
885
 
 
 
The ‘formulation of human rights theory and policies represents an ethical advance’886 in 
offender-rehabilitation. The topic of offender-rehabilitation involves public perception 
around crime and those who commit crime. Attitudes range from the unsympathetic to 
the sympathetic consideration of offenders as valued human beings. While punishment is 
warranted for wrongdoing, offenders ‘do not forfeit their basic dignity as persons’.887 
Running parallel to the discourse on offender status and societal attitudes is the subject of 
human rights. As a rehabilitative treatment for criminal offenders, FLRT is relevant to 
human rights theory and its associated concepts. 
 
The claim that ‘every human being possesses intrinsic value’888 is captured in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
 889
 and the two United Nations 
Covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
890
 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
891
 
 
A human right — ‘a weighty moral concept’892 — is a claim for specific human goods 
made against another person or the State who thereby has a duty to provide the good 
claimed.
893
 Individuals hold human rights simply because they are members of the human 
race and, as such, are considered to be moral agents. Moral agents are individuals capable 
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of formulating their own personal projects and seeking ways of realizing them in their 
day-to-day lives. In other words, agents are able to decide what is in their own best 
interests and act accordingly to secure them.
894
 The relationship between values and 
human rights is described by Michael Freeden, who argues that: 
 
a human right is a conceptual device, expressed in linguistic form, that assigns priority to certain 
human or social attributes regarded as essential to the adequate functioning of a human being; that 
is intended to serve as a protective capsule for those attributes; and that appeals for deliberate 
action to ensure such protection.
895
 
 
Theorists argue that human rights protect what are considered to be essential attributes of 
human beings: needs, capacities and interests that, if guaranteed, respect their dignity as 
persons and, if violated, result in lives of desperation and diminishment.
896
 
 
Human rights in Australia have been developed under Australian Parliamentary 
democracy and are safeguarded by the Australian Human Rights Commission, an 
independent judiciary and the High Court who apply the common law, the Australian 
Constitution, and various other laws of Australia and its States and Territories. Both 
express and implied rights are enshrined in the Australian Constitution. 
 
Australia’s obligations under international human rights law are found in treaties and 
customary international law.
897
 Australia is a party to the ICCPR and the ICESCR, which, 
together with the UDHR are known as the ‘International Bill of Rights’. These have been 
built on by a range of treaties that deal with the rights of individuals and groups with 
particular needs, such as women, children and people with disabilities. Australia is a 
party to, inter alia, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
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Degrading Treatment or Punishment898 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.899 
 
One of Australia’s obligations under international human rights law is to prohibit 
discrimination on a number of grounds. The Federal Parliament has gone part of the way 
toward fulfilling this obligation by passing legislation such as the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), which implements parts of the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)900 and the Convention Concerning 
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.901 A number of other 
instruments of federal legislation protect human rights, among them the Australian 
Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth).  
 
The States and Territories of Australia have each enacted laws prohibiting discrimination 
and also have a variety of other laws that protect individual rights in specific contexts. 
The Australian Capital Territory and Victoria have both introduced statutory human 
rights legislation: the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the Charter of Human Rights 
and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), respectively. 
 
Relevantly, a number of human rights mechanisms exist for addressing access to mental 
health services in Australia, including the ICCPR, the ICESR, the CRC and, more 
recently, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
902
 Taken together, 
these international legal instruments place a responsibility on the federal government to 
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ensure that citizens have access to the ‘highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health’.903  
 
In addition to these international legal human rights mechanisms, the United Nations 
adopted the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care.
904
 These principles, including the right to the same 
standard of health care regardless of the mental or physical nature of illness, and the right 
to be treated in the least restrictive environment, were used to guide the development of 
the Australian National Mental Health Strategy in 1992.
905
 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
906
 was ratified 
by Australia in 2008. Article 4a obliges States ‘[t]o adopt all appropriate legislative, 
administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the 
present Convention’. This includes rights to the same ‘range, quality and standard of free 
or affordable health care’ generally, and specifically mentioned is that people deprived of 
liberty are entitled to the protections afforded in the Convention.
907
  
 
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
908
 (United 
Nations 1957) includes provision for the treatment of people experiencing mental illness. 
Specifically, it recommends that treatment should occur under medical supervision and 
management in specialized institutions. Moreover, it is stipulated that everyone has the 
right to receive the best possible health care. In Victoria, this final point is recognized in 
legislation — that people with a mental illness should receive the highest possible 
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standard of care, in the least restrictive environment. Further, the Mental Health Act 1986 
(Vic) recognizes that this standard of care should be comparable to the standard of care 
provided within the general health system. 
 
In 2002, the National Mental Health Working Group of the Australian Health Ministers’ 
Advisory Council proposed a National Statement of Principles for Forensic Mental 
Health, which has since been endorsed.
909
 The National Statement of Principles 
contained 13 principles for dealing with offenders or alleged offenders who have a mental 
illness. The Statement was endorsed by the National Mental Health Working Group of 
the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council.910 
 
Principle 1 addresses the notion of equivalence — that forensic clients should have the 
same access to and quality of mental health care as non-forensic clients. Principle 7 refers 
to ethical standards and highlights the importance of compliance with various 
international rights instruments.  
 
The National Statement of Principles includes the following statement: 
 
Legislation must recognize the special needs of people with a mental illness involved in the 
criminal justice system and comply with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the United Nations Principles on the Protection of People with a Mental Illness and the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care.
911
 
 
Diversion is also relevant to international human rights obligations, particularly in 
relation to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
912
 Prior to the 
introduction of the Convention, international human rights instruments, such as the 
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United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the 
Improvement of Mental Health,
913
 adopted in 1991, influenced a ‘move towards 
emphasising rights in Australian mental health laws throughout the 1990s’.914 Human 
rights have been particularly important in disability advocacy, both in Australia and 
elsewhere.
915
 For example, the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), which governs the civil 
mental health regime in New South Wales, identifies the protection of the civil rights of 
people with a mental health impairment as one of its objects.
916
 
  
Several articles of the Convention are potentially relevant. Article 5 provides a general 
right of equality and freedom from discrimination, including a guarantee that parties to 
the Convention will take all appropriate steps to ensure the provision of reasonable 
accommodation to achieve equality.
917
 Article 13 guarantees a right to effective access to 
justice for people with disabilities on an equal basis with others,
918
 and Article 14 
provides for a right to liberty and security of person, including a right not to be arbitrarily 
or unlawfully deprived of one’s liberty, or deprived of it due to the existence of one’s 
disability.
919
  
 
These provisions recognize that it may be necessary to provide adjustments for people 
with cognitive and mental health impairments in order to ensure that the rights in 
question are accessible.
920
 As a result, the implementation and use of diversionary 
schemes would align with the rights goals of the Convention, and would assist to promote 
the rights of people with cognitive and mental health impairments. 
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The UDHR consists of a preamble asserting the dignity of human beings and 30 articles 
articulating specific rights to objects. Orend
921
 groups the various rights contained in the 
UDHR into five clusters, each associated with a particular object: personal freedom, 
material subsistence, personal security, elemental equality and social recognition. The 
human rights object of personal freedom refers to a subset of objects such as freedom of 
speech, assembly, movement, association, conscience and religion, and is associated with 
a number of the specific rights contained in the UDHR. Further, it is directly linked to 
individuals’ right to rely on their own judgement when deciding how to live their lives. 
 
The human rights object of security concerns the physical safety and welfare of 
individuals. The subsistence object refers to a subset of objects including rights to basic 
levels of physical health, food, water and education. Equality denotes goods such as 
equality before the law and freedom from discrimination on the grounds of religion, 
gender, disability, or some other feature considered to be irrelevant for the ascription of 
individuals’ moral status. Finally, social recognition is essentially concerned with 
acknowledging individuals’ rights to direct the course of their own lives and to be treated 
in a dignified and respectful manner in accordance with their status as autonomous 
agents. The goods of self-respect and self-esteem are aspects of this category of goods 
and point to the importance of individuals possessing positive attitudes toward 
themselves and their own lives (in a sense, this is the internal component of human 
dignity). Thus, according to the UDHR and the two Covenants, ‘human rights are 
universal entitlements to certain goods that if obtained will result in at least minimally 
decent and dignified human lives’.922 
 
 
B The Universality of Human Rights 
 
 
It is clear that offenders’ freedom rights are typically curtailed in some respects and their 
movements, rights to privacy and association are restricted. Inevitably, incarceration, 
parole conditions and community-based orders will severely limit the enjoyment of some 
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of their rights. However, ‘[o]ffenders endure curtailment not forfeiture of rights’923 as a 
result of the crimes they have committed.  Furthermore, as a non-invasive treatment 
option, FLRT does not constitute an impermissible intrusion upon a person’s autonomy 
and personal liberty.
924
 
 
Ward and Birgden
925
 have developed a framework for applying human rights to 
correctional practice based on the idea that dignity (via vulnerable agency) effectively 
grounds human rights laws and practices. In this model, there are three layers to human 
rights: core values of freedom and well-being protected by rights and derived from the 
notion of vulnerable agency;
926
 unpacking into further subsets of rights or goods;
927
 and 
specific human rights specifications or policies related to corrections.  
 
From a human rights perspective, offenders still possess rights to the well-being goods 
and some of the freedom goods necessary for their functioning as purposive agents. This 
would mean that offenders should either be able to provide for themselves (or have the 
State provide) access to basic educational resources, medical care, self-esteem, adequate 
nutrition, access to leisure activities, healthy living conditions, the opportunity to work, 
access to good psychological and psychiatric services, as much choice concerning 
rehabilitation options and activities as possible within security requirements, just and fair 
disciplinary procedures with due process, and so on. In other words, basic physical, social 
and psychological human needs are to be met. The State is only justified in restricting 
certain freedoms in so far as this is necessary for the implementation of offenders’ 
punishment (loss of certain liberties). The five human rights objects identified by 
Orend
928
 should be guaranteed as a matter of right. 
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1 Offender-Rehabilitation Management 
 
A coherent response to crime requires both (a) holding offenders to account and administering state-
sanctioned punishments in a respectful and proportional manner, and (b) addressing social, vocational, 
or psychological deficits that have made it difficult for individuals to lead pro-social and personally 
meaningful lives. Both the administration of punishment and rehabilitation ought to be delivered in 
ways that reflect the dignity and intrinsic value of human beings.
929
 
 
The application of the concept of human rights to the criminal justice system should 
occur at all three of the layers described above. Starting from the most concrete level, 
countries legally bound by the UDHR, the two Covenants, and other treaties concerning 
the rights of prisoners should ensure that the management of offenders complies with 
their requirements.
930
 This is likely to be reflected in specific polices regulating the 
running of prisons and community correctional services, such as disciplinary procedures, 
home leave entitlements, access to medical care, work opportunities, adequate living 
conditions, educational resources, and so on. For example, the ICCPR, Article 10, states: 
‘All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person.’931 
 
Offenders can be simultaneous human rights violators, duty-bearers and rights-holders. 
The fact that offenders have often violated the human rights of their victims is reflected in 
their punishment and loss of liberty. It is possible to see rehabilitation as centrally 
concerned with offenders as human rights violators, duty-bearers and rights-holders. 
Providing individuals with the core skills or ‘virtues’ that underpin their agency, freedom 
and well-being should both promote human capacity to achieve good lives and also 
reduce their risk to others.
932
 Further, modules such as empathy-training, cognitive skills, 
understanding the offence process, social skills and intimacy-training, and emotional 
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regulation are directly concerned with facilitating the ability of offenders to accurately 
infer, respond to and appreciate the experiences and needs of others. The acquisition of 
the capabilities to improve the quality of their own lives and to respect those of others 
will necessarily involve recognition of the freedom and well-being of other people. 
 
 
2 A Human Rights Framework and the GLM 
 
In terms of offender-rehabilitation, a human rights framework resonates strongly with 
strength-based approaches to offender-rehabilitation, such as the GLM,
933
 for which 
FLRT is considered a consistent treatment, as established in Chapter 2. The GLM is a 
theory of rehabilitation that endorses the viewpoint that offenders are essentially human 
beings, with similar needs and aspirations to non-offending members of the community, 
and, as such, they should be treated with the basic respect that such status implies. The 
GLM is based around two core therapeutic goals: to promote human goods and to reduce 
risk. The GLM aims to: (i) focus on the utilization of individual offender’s primary goods 
or values in the design of intervention programs, and (ii) equip an offender with the 
capabilities necessary to implement a better life plan founded on these values. The GLM 
is an approach based on the pursuit of better lives, ways of living that are constructed 
around core values, and concrete means of realizing individual goals in certain 
environments.
934
 A human rights perspective can be conceptualized as the ethical heart of 
strength-based approaches such as the GLM and by virtue of its emphasis on rights and 
duties, it can deal with the risk-management aspect of rehabilitation alongside goods 
promotion.
935
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All this is to say that human rights protect the core interests and capacities of human 
beings and thereby give them opportunities to live good lives.
936
 Good lives are lives that 
reflect peoples’ capacity to make voluntary choices concerning the nature and pursuit of 
personally valued goals.
937
 The GLM places strong emphasis on the concept of human 
agency and is grounded in universal human rights. In keeping with a human rights 
perspective, the GLM-FM places the patient, rather than risk-reduction, at its core. In 
other words, individual patients are seen as self-determining agents rather than 
disembodied carriers of risk.
938
  
 
Desistance is an active, offender-led process, where the desisting individual is determined 
to follow choices of action by weighing up the pros and cons of continued offending. It is 
an offender’s sense of ownership of the change process and realization of his or her own 
abilities to exercise self-regulation (that is, agency) that leads to crime desistance.
939
 The 
principles of the GLM and its promotion of human rights are all in keeping with the 
established purpose of FLRT-integration into the Australian legal system. 
 
3 Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
 
The impact of the legal system upon those subject to it can also be considered within a 
human rights framework. As a theory, therapeutic jurisprudence employs psychological 
knowledge to determine ways in which the law can enhance well-being in those 
individuals who experience it (including both victims and offenders). Further, therapeutic 
jurisprudence allows an intersection between forensic psychology and human rights.
940
 In 
this context, legal procedures may be anti-therapeutic and so result in reduced well-
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being.
941
 In particular, therapeutic jurisprudence considers the impact of substantive law, 
legal procedures and the role of legal actors.
942
 It is particularly useful in considering the 
therapeutic role of correctional practitioners, as legal actors, in the assessment, treatment 
and monitoring of offenders.
943
 Arguably, therapeutic jurisprudence is underpinned by 
the concept of dignity and enhanced by its elaboration into human rights norms.
944
 
 
4 Human Rights and Ethical Offender Assessment and Treatment 
 
Ethical offender assessment is conducted in a respectful and competent manner that is 
transparent regarding the intrusion of social and moral values in the assessment process, 
and it ensures that the rights of offenders are not automatically assumed to carry less 
weight than those of other members of the community.
945
 
 
Human rights impose significant duties on practitioners concerning offender assessment. 
Practitioners are to ensure that ‘the assessment process culminates in an aetiological 
formulation that is tailored to the individual’s unique features alongside those that they 
share with other offenders’.946 
 
Drawing upon the concept of human rights (core values and objects) facilitates improved 
quality of assessment data and, therefore, better formulated decisions.
947
 For example, a 
collaborative approach involves a genuine commitment from the practitioner to working 
transparently and respectfully, and to emphasizing that the offender’s best interests are to 
be served by the assessment process. Potential issues of risk and need are presented to the 
client as areas for collaborative investigation. The collaborative risk-assessment process 
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is introduced as a conscious strategy, and the early indicators are that relationships 
between practitioners and offenders are greatly improved, with a subsequent positive 
effect on motivation and retention in treatment.
948
 Ideally, rehabilitation should embody 
the twin aims of reducing the likelihood of harm to society and enhancing the well-being 
of offenders.
949
 The aim should be to formulate an intervention plan that respects 
offenders’ agency and personal preferences with respect to their significant projects and 
plans, and does not infringe the rights of others.
950
 
 
Compliance with human rights treaties requires ensuring that there are no discriminatory 
practices evident in the rehabilitation process (for example, excluding individuals from 
programs on the basis of race, class or gender). In addition, offenders should be treated 
with dignity, their agency should be respected, they should only suffer the restrictions of 
freedom that are rationally justified, and they should have access to the basic goods of 
well-being such as education, self-esteem, support, mental and medical resources, and so 
on. Indeed: 
 
Human rights are protective capsules that strengthen valued aspects of human functioning such as 
freedom and the various components of well-being including basic needs, education, mastery, and 
self-esteem.
951
 
 
It is arguable that the various modules offered to offenders actually help them to acquire 
the capabilities or virtues necessary to exercise their human rights and, therefore, to 
function as purposive agents. These modules include problem-solving, cognitive skills, 
social and intimacy skills, affect-regulation, understanding offending-reflective agency, 
lifestyle-planning (relapse-prevention), empathy, and cognitive restructuring. 
Participating in treatment programs that contain modules such as these is likely to help 
offenders both acknowledge others’ rights and value as human beings, as well as enabling 
them to pursue their own personal projects in socially acceptable ways. Thus, a human 
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rights perspective provides practitioners with an ethical framework that allows them to 
select the therapy skills required and to deliver them in ways responsive to an offender’s 
unique issues and needs.
952
 
 
Human rights have bearing upon offender-education and upon treatment design and 
delivery. Human rights provide an ethical scaffold that supports the skills that offenders 
learn and the values that they acquire into one simple idea: pursue one’s own core and 
legitimate interests in way that respects the rights of others to do the same. 
 
Human rights theory constitutes a valued ethical and therapeutic resource in the process 
of rehabilitation and directs attention to the conditions required for offenders to live more 
socially acceptable and personally meaningful lives. The aim is to ensure that offenders 
acquire the capabilities to identify important personal values and projects, to implement 
them in the environments in which they are likely to be living, and, in the process, grasp 
the necessity of respecting the moral status of others. In short, a human rights perspective 
provides an ethical core to the delivery of a skills-oriented rehabilitation program.
953
 
 
 
V THE GREY MATTERS OF NEUROETHICS 
 
Ethics ‘is essentially a means for coordinating the conflicting interests of peoples and 
nations and human rights provide a strong foundation to do this in multiple domains’.954 
Recently, President Obama charged the Presidential Commission for the Study of 
Bioethical Issues Bioethics Commission to ‘identify proactively a set of core ethical 
standards’ in the neuroscience domain.955 In doing so, the Commission is to consider the 
potential implications of new neuroscience discoveries, as well as a series of questions 
that may be raised by those findings and their applications, such as those ‘relating to ... 
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the appropriate use of neuroscience in the criminal-justice system’.956 Bioethics ‘attempts 
to enable the two domains of science and morality to inform and complement each other. 
It deals seriously with the moral and humanistic questions raised by technological 
innovation’.957 
 
In the light of President Obama’s charge, the MacArthur Foundation Research Network 
on Law and Neuroscience (the ‘Research Network’) prepared a consensus statement, 
including 16 specific recommendations, submitted in answer to the Bioethics 
Commission’s call for comments.958 
 
New neuroscientific technologies and findings have raised, and will increasingly raise, 
important ethical implications. These include issues relating to fundamental fairness and 
respect for persons, such as concerns about misrepresentations and unjustified inferences 
that can be drawn from neuroscientific evidence, the uses of neuroscience for lie 
detection or memory detection, and the role of neuroscience in potentially detecting and 
counteracting stereotyping. These also include, as President Obama noted in his charge to 
the Commission, concerns about potential ‘stigmatization and discrimination based on 
neurological measures’.959 There is, therefore, a continuing need for discussion and 
analysis of these issues. The most sensible and effective approach is to conduct such a 
discussion and analysis in parallel with the development of the technologies that give rise 
to them.
960
 
 
                                                 
956
  Ibid. 
957
  Richard N Wolman, Thinking with your Soul (Harmony Books, 2001) 34. 
958
  Federal Register, Request for Comments on the Ethical Considerations of Neuroscience Research 
and the Application of Neuroscience Research Findings (31 January 2014) 
<https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/01/31/2014-02072/request-for-comments-on-the-
ethical-considerations-of-neuroscience-research-and-the-application-of>. 
959
  Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Presidential Charge to the Commission 
for the Study of Bioethical Issues (1 July 2013)  
<http://bioethics.gov/ sites/default/files/news/Charge%20from%20President%20Obama.pdf>. 
960
  Owen D Jones et al, ‘Law and Neuroscience: Recommendations Submitted to the President’s 
Bioethics Commission’ (2014) Journal of Law and the Biosciences 224, 233. 
  215 
Recommendation 14 of the Recommendations Submitted to the President’s Bioethics 
Commission
961
 suggests that the Commission’s Report should caution against over-
interpreting neuroscientific data, given the important legal and ethical issues often 
implicated. This is bolstered by Recommendation 15, which advises that the 
Commission’s Report should caution against misuses of neuroscientific data to enhance 
racial, ethnic, gender or other stereotypes, encourage awareness of the history and risks of 
such misuses, and encourage researchers to take active steps to prevent misinterpretations 
and misuses. Recommendation 16 implores the Commission to recommend that the 
President’s Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) 
Initiative include an explicit and substantial Ethical, Legal and Social Implications 
component, reflected in a dedicated percentage of the overall budget.
962
 
 
VI RULE-OF-LAW PRINCIPLES 
 
Another theoretical hurdle to the incorporation of FLRT into the Australian criminal 
justice system is the conceivable immiscibility of this therapeutic treatment with 
established rule-of-law principles. 
  
A V Dicey, British jurist and constitutional scholar, is considered the father of the 
modern conception of the rule of law.
963
 Although writing about the English Constitution, 
and therefore about a unitary system of government rather than a federal one, such as 
those of Australia, Canada and the United States of America, Dicey’s rule of law is 
nevertheless relevant to both forms of polity. The rule of law ensures that every person 
and organization, including the government, is subject to the same laws,
964
 whereby no 
person is above the law. The rule of law  —  despite ‘dissensus as to [the] meaning’965 of 
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this ‘chameleon-like’ phrase966 and ‘exceedingly elusive notion’967  —  is in fact one of 
the key dimensions that determine the quality and good governance of a country.
968
 
Considered a formalist,
969
 his 1885 construction of the rule of law comprises supremacy 
of law, equality, and privileging judicial process.  
 
 
A Supremacy of Regular Law over Arbitrary Powers 
 
We mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or 
goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the 
ordinary Courts of the land.
970
 
 
Hailed as the ‘core of the rule of law principle’,971 the rule of law is contrasted with every 
system of government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary or 
discretionary powers of constraint. A more concise expression of this first meaning of the 
rule of law was proffered by Thomas Fuller in 1733: ‘Be you ever so high, the law is 
above you.’972 This formalist principle asserts the absolute supremacy of regular law as 
opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and this excludes the existence of 
arbitrariness, prerogative or even wide discretionary authority on the part of the 
government. Punishment can be justly administered only for breach of the law.
973
 If 
anyone is to be penalized, it must be for a proven breach of the established law of the 
land. It must be a breach established before the ordinary courts, not a tribunal lacking the 
independence and impartiality of judges.
974
 In other words, questions of legal right and 
liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not the raw exercise 
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of discretion.
975
 The discretion of law enforcement and crime prevention agencies should 
not be allowed to pervert the law.
976
 Ministers and public officers at all levels must 
exercise the powers conferred on them reasonably, in good faith, for the purpose for 
which the powers were conferred, and without exceeding the limits of such powers.
977
 
 
The principle that the State is bound by the law requires that the State acts on the basis of, 
and in accordance with, the law. This means that all decisions and acts of public officials 
must be authorized by law, and that all legal subjects, especially State authorities and 
officials, should be bound by the law when carrying out official functions. Policy and 
decision-making must respect the limits and the guidance provided by the law.
978
 
 
 
B Privileging Judicial Process 
 
[Thirdly,] the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that the general principles 
of the constitution (as for example the right to personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are 
with us the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases 
brought before the Courts …979 
 
Commenting on the United Kingdom specifically, Dicey’s third principle enunciates that 
the principles of the constitution are the result of judicial decision of the courts. In other 
countries, however, rights, including the right to personal liberty, are guaranteed by a 
written constitution. In the British context, those rights are the result of judicial decisions, 
in concrete cases, arising between parties. Thus, the constitution is not the source, but 
rather the consequence, of the rights of the individuals. 
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C Equality Before the Law 
 
 
We mean in the second place … not only that with us no man is above the law, but (what is a 
different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary 
law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.
980
 
 
In this sense the rule of law ‘excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others 
from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals’.981 The law must apply to everyone equally, without 
making arbitrary distinctions among people.
982
 Put simply, everyone is equal before the 
law, including government officials.
983
 The same law, administered in the same courts, 
applies to all. 
 
1 Generality 
 
[T]he laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences 
justify differentiation.
984
 
 
In line with Dicey’s second principle — equality before the law — the law should apply, 
without exception, to everyone whose conduct falls within the prescribed conditions of 
application. Rousseau described this requirement of generality as being that ‘the law 
considers all subjects collectively and all actions in the abstract; it does not consider any 
individual man or any specific action’.985 Equality before the law means that each 
individual is subject to the same laws, with no individual or group having special legal 
privileges. Notwithstanding this, special legislative provisions can properly be made for 
some categories of people such as children, prisoners and the mentally ill. Yet, in the 
main, the law must be general, both in statement and intent, and must not be used as a 
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way of harming particular individuals.
986
 The law must apply to everyone equally, 
without making arbitrary distinctions among people.
987
 Put simply, everyone is equal 
before the law.
988
 The same law, administered in the same courts, applies to all. 
 
By focusing on individual needs ‘rather than equal justice for all’,989 therapeutic 
jurisprudence arguably abandons the overarching Diceyan principle of equality before the 
law. Dicey himself cautions; ‘any attempt to individualize the law may undermine it.’990 
Indeed the rehabilitative efficacy of FLRT as a healing mechanism is dependent upon the 
degree to which a person’s biology is ‘modifiable’,991 appropriate for rehabilitating those 
who know the proper course of action but cannot resist impulsive behaviour.
992
 There are 
plasticity ‘limitations, and prerequisites — such as healthy brain tissue and the capacity 
for motivation and focus’.993 Some people have brains that are better able to respond to 
classical conditioning (punishment and reward), while other people — because of 
psychosis, sociopathy, frontal maldevelopment or other problems — are refractory to 
change.
994
 Punishment aimed at disincentivizing certain behaviours will only work if 
there is appropriate brain plasticity to receive it. Just as the ‘myth of human equality 
suggests that all people are equally capable of decision making, impulse-control, and 
comprehending consequence’,995 there are varying degrees of brain plasticity and varying 
responsiveness to treatment and punishment. 
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A person’s sentence — their prescribed prefrontal work-out regimen — is based on some 
as-yet-undiscovered measure of neuroplasticity.
996
 The concept of variable 
neuroplasticity is important, Eagleman observes, because contrary to the ideals of 
developed democracies, all people are not created equal: ‘While admirable, the notion [of 
human equality] is simply not true.’997 People vary widely both in nature and in 
nurture.
998
 With this truth in hand, we could ‘tailor sentencing and rehabilitation’ to the 
individual’s specific neurobiological make-up.999 
 
Not all people who increase their capacity for self-reflection will come to the same sound 
conclusions, but at least the opportunity to listen to the debate of the neural parties is 
available. This approach may restore some of the power of deterrence, which can work 
for people who think about and act upon long-term consequences. For the impulsive, 
though, threats of punishment carry little to no weight in decision-making. 
 
Genevan philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau described this requirement of generality as 
being that ‘the law considers all subjects collectively and all actions in the abstract; it 
does not consider any individual man or any specific action’.1000 For example, equality is 
reflected in a substantive way: not just that no one is above the law, but that everyone is 
equal before and under the law, and is entitled to its equal protection and equal 
benefit.
1001
 In this way, the advances of neuroscience would act to further confirm 
principles held dear to the functioning of the legal system, while enhancing the benefits 
for society that may be achieved through the justice system.
1002
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2 Aspirational Rule-of-Law Adherence 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence work seeks to apply psychological and social science theory to 
speculate about the therapeutic consequences of a particular legal rule.
1003
 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that, ‘other things being equal’,1004 positive 
therapeutic effects are desirable and should generally be a proper aim of law, and that 
anti-therapeutic effects are undesirable and should be avoided or minimized. Winick has 
argued that a humane, balanced and respectful process can be extended to the mainstream 
justice system.
1005
 Law properly attempts to further many ends, and therapeutic 
jurisprudence does not seek to subordinate those other ends to therapeutic ones. Legal 
actors are encouraged to apply the law therapeutically, but only when consistent with 
other established legal values,
1006
 such that ‘therapeutic values should not “trump” certain 
traditional values of justice’.1007 
 
Although therapeutic jurisprudence is normative in orientation in that it suggests that law 
should seek to further therapeutic ends, it does not suggest that therapeutic ends are the 
only ones that law should seek to accomplish, or that they are necessarily the more 
important ends. This normative agenda that drives therapeutic jurisprudence research is 
not the neutral, value-free mode of scholarly inquiry that law and psychology and social 
science in law often try to be.
1008
 Countervailing normative considerations may often 
justify a legal rule or practice found to produce anti-therapeutic consequences, and 
therapeutic jurisprudence does not purport to be a method of determining which factor 
should predominate in legal decision-making.
1009
 Rather, the movement simply suggests 
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that ‘[l]egal actors should seek to apply the law therapeutically but only when consistent 
with these values.’1010 
 
When evaluating the conflict between the rule of law and other values, therapeutic 
jurisprudence concedes
1011
 to philosopher Joseph Raz’ statement: ‘conformity to the rule 
of law is a matter of degree, and though other things being equal, the greater the 
conformity the better — other things are rarely equal’.1012 As evidenced, therapeutic 
jurisprudence fails to articulate clear rules for determining exactly when other things are 
equal and whether and under what circumstances therapeutic values must yield to other 
values.
1013
 
 
Winick asserted that therapeutic jurisprudence does not ‘trump’ legal principles, though 
in practice this may not be the case. Australian academic Mark Harris reports that judges’ 
approaches vary despite the view that law is ‘neutral, invariant and consistently oriented 
around a set of legal principles’.1014 Former Western Australian Magistrate Michael 
King’s response is that policy initiatives enforce ‘laws more effectively’, without 
encroaching ‘on the executive or legislative function’1015 whereby ‘therapeutic 
considerations did not necessarily trump other considerations’.1016 There is no clear 
indication of how the word ‘necessarily’ is to be interpreted, and no clear guidelines in 
preserving the executive and legislative functions when a judge imposes policy 
initiatives. 
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3 Beyond Therapeutic Jurisprudence Beneficence  
 
We ought not become robed therapeutic administrators just because we have convinced ourselves 
we are acting for the public good.
1017
 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence urges people to think less of the law in terms of rules and more 
about therapeutic outcomes. It is, for example, less committed to what the ‘Supreme 
Court, or state legislatures might say’.1018 In this manner, the rule of law is subordinated 
in favour of doing things to people for their own good, and because it is deemed to be in 
their best interests or the best interests of the State. While it is laudable to believe 
‘sincerely and passionately in the curative power of their therapeutic mission’,1019 such 
advocates may encounter difficulty when faced with traditional rule of law principles. 
 
Proponents argue that the breadth, inclusiveness, internationalism, cross-disciplinarity 
and modesty of therapeutic jurisprudence are its strengths. It is these characteristics that 
give ‘a fillip to innovative perspectives and new assessments’.1020  Advocates further 
believe that ‘there is no need for therapeutic jurisprudence to yearn for coherence and 
clarity of definition. If it continues to foster new, lively, and sometimes revolutionary 
insights and experiments designed to reduce the counter therapeutic effects of law and 
legal process, it will continue to be a worthwhile lens and catalyst.’1021 However, just 
how worthwhile it is remains the subject of debate. 
 
The notion of therapeutic jurisprudence may be laden with good intentions, yet ‘good 
intentions [a]re no substitute for due process’.1022 It appears that programs utilizing 
therapeutic jurisprudence will be justified more on their beneficial intentions than their 
legal standing. Although it offers a well-intentioned attempt ‘to reconcile or 
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accommodate its paradigm with traditional legal values’,1023 it is more than an innocuous 
approach to law that only ‘recognizes, highlights, and explores, often through socio-
psychological insights, the multifarious potential for positive and negative impacts upon 
stakeholders’.1024 
 
It may be that the ‘simple human desire to help’1025 perpetuates the therapeutic 
jurisprudence movement, but critics assert that therapeutic jurisprudence has been 
‘evangelized loosely and with uncritical fervor — thereby generating claims it cannot 
realistically satisfy’.1026 Moreover, it is not considered ‘a coherent body of scholarship 
with a unified focus that proffers coherent and straightforward answers to complex issues 
in law and practice’.1027 Instead, it offers a rather vague ‘lens’ through which to advance 
its ‘amorphous and ever-shifting claims’.1028 Wexler has contended that it is inappropriate 
to tightly define what is therapeutic, opting rather to ‘roam within the intuitive and 
common sense contours of the concept’.1029 So, although it seeks to reduce anti-
therapeutic outcomes and increase therapeutic outcomes, with regard to actual 
specificities, ‘[therapeutic jurisprudence] equivocates’.1030 Consequently, the ‘uncritical 
enthusiasm with which therapeutic jurisprudence has been embraced should be tempered 
by more critical analysis of the key assumptions made by Wexler and Winick’,1031 so as 
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to avoid therapeutic jurisprudence being ‘called in aid or used as a sword or shield 
illegitimately or uninformedly’.1032  
 
Concerns surrounding FLRT and the theoretical obstacles to its integration may be 
overstated. Indeed, there are invariably problems at the margins of all new concepts, and 
incorporating FLRT for impulse-control management in the rehabilitation of criminal 
offenders, and touting this rehabilitative treatment as a form of therapeutic jurisprudence, 
is no exception. Comfort can, however, be derived from the fact that promotion of the 
therapeutic jurisprudence approach is not tantamount to ‘excessive innovation and 
adventurism by the judges’,1033 as cautioned by Lord Bingham. Neither does it warrant 
the trepidatious counsel of Justice Heydon, formerly of the High Court of Australia, who 
reasoned that judicial activism, taken to extremes, can spell the death of the rule of 
law.
1034
 Indeed, ‘it is one thing to alter the law’s direction of travel by a few degrees, 
quite another to set it off in a different direction’.1035 At its core, the notion of FLRT and 
its therapeutic integration into the criminal justice system is not sublimating the direction 
of the law, or vitiating rule-of-law principles. 
 
VII CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter has considered the theoretical implications of the integration of FLRT as a 
functional constituent of therapeutic jurisprudence. The rehabilitative emphasis of the 
treatment was elaborated with regard to historical and modern conceptions of 
punishment. The compatibility of the adversarial system with criminal law was examined 
in contrast to the reduced condemnatory emphasis inherent in the non-adversarial system, 
where therapeutic jurisprudence thrives. 
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Rehabilitation theory and recidivism-reduction as theoretical impetuses to the scholarship 
of therapeutic jurisprudence were also considered. The relevance of international human 
rights theory and obligations to FLRT as a rehabilitative treatment for criminal offenders 
were additionally identified. Particular weight was given to the framework for applying 
human rights to correctional practice (in offender assessment and treatment), as 
developed by Ward and Birgden,
1036
 and its relevance to the strength-based approach to 
offender-rehabilitation, the GLM, as established in Chapter 2. The compatibility of 
human rights theory with the therapeutic jurisprudence agenda in the promotion of 
socially acceptable and personally meaningful lives for offenders was addressed. Core 
ethical standards in the area of neuroscience, as derived from President Obama’s charge 
to the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, were raised.  
  
A significant portion of the chapter analysed the theoretical implications of integrating 
FLRT into a criminal justice system governed by the rule of law. Indeed, there are 
concerns that therapeutic jurisprudence programs erode basic legal principles. Moreover, 
queries surround the extent to which the doctrine itself may be ‘egregiously flawed’.1037 
‘[M]ordant critique[s]’,1038 such as those posited by American academic Samuel Jan 
Brakel, mantain that the therapeutic jurisprudence philosophy ‘lacks content’, engages 
‘spurious verbal association’, represents ‘epistemological free-fall’ and is ‘mystical, if not 
occult’.1039 It is conceded that the ‘distinction between legitimate development of the law 
and an objectionable departure from settled principles may provoke sharp differences of 
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opinion’;1040 however, therapeutic judges need not be viewed as a ‘bizarre amalgam’1041 
forging an ‘unholy alliance’1042 when operating as part of a treatment team. 
 
Indeed, there are varying degrees of incongruence between rule-of-law principles and 
therapeutic jurisprudence ideals. However, it is important to note that, notwithstanding 
this, both of those conceptions of law are valid, although markedly disparate in their 
bases, application and outcomes. Adopting an extreme perspective promoting unanimity 
with one, to the complete exclusion of the other, is perilous and counter-productive. It is 
unhelpful, for example, to conceive of therapeutic jurisprudence as possessing ‘all the 
attributes of a willed departure from a more direct, commonsense approach to the 
pertinent law’.1043 Rather, the miscibility of therapeutic jurisprudence and rule-of-law 
principles is achieved by adding an emulsifier to stabilise the mixture. A ‘judicial 
emulsifier’ could blend therapeutic jurisprudence with rule-of-law principles in a 
functional legal emulsion. 
 
Fidelity to the rule of law can be maintained despite the reticence of traditional 
adversarialism to accept a new therapeutic philosophy and methodology. Therapeutic 
jurisprudence need not violate independence, impartiality and integrity. Judging in 
problem-solving courts requires an involved judicial officer, some collaborative 
processes, and increased interaction between the judicial officer, participants, court team 
members and community members. If executed with care and consideration, judging in 
these courts in accordance with therapeutic jurisprudence may indeed enhance the 
therapeutic impact of substantive and procedural law, as well as augmenting the 
therapeutic impact of the roles played by judges, lawyers and clinicians,
1044
 without being 
detrimental to the rule of law. These cautionary words of Raz are particularly apposite: 
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On the one hand if the pursuit of certain goals is entirely incompatible with the rule of law then 
these goals should not be pursued by legal means. But on the other hand one should be wary of 
disqualifying the legal pursuit of major social goals in the name of the rule of law. After all the 
rule of law is meant to enable the law to promote social good, and should not be lightly used to 
show that it should not do so. Sacrificing too many social goals on the altar of the rule of law may 
make the law barren and empty.
1045
 
 
Despite their contrasting natures, therapeutic jurisprudence can be reconciled with the 
principles comprising the rule of law, despite the fact that:  
 
The common law, and the kind of deference to tradition and precedent that defines it, is precisely 
this, a beaten path, deviations from which are forged only very slowly, cautiously, and with 
considerable judicial restraint.
1046
 
 
If the judiciary willingly and informedly apply both therapeutic jurisprudence concepts as 
well as rule-of-law principles, the role of courts as ‘the guardians of the longer-term 
tradition’,1047 ‘of an all but sacred flame’,1048 remains unspoiled. This is envisaged to 
assist in the preservation of all that is revered in the rule of law when mixing, as 
illustrated by Raz, ‘the fruits of long-established traditions with the urgencies of short-
term exigencies’.1049 
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CHAPTER 7  
 
 
ON THE PRACTICALITIES OF INTEGRATING FLRT 
INTO THE AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
As foreshadowed in the introduction to Chapter 6, in addition to the question of the 
jurisprudential permissibility of FLRT-integration into the criminal justice system in 
Australia, a second major issue surrounding the recommendations in this thesis concerns 
the practical implications of integrating FLRT into the same. Such practical 
considerations form the focus of this chapter. To be sure, situating FLRT within 
therapeutic jurisprudence in practice illuminates the polarities between natural justice and 
‘therapeutic justice’.  
 
This chapter considers, in particular, the following practical issues that might inform the 
wisdom or merits of integrating FLRT into the criminal justice system: 
  
 How are the roles of lawyers and judges altered in a therapeutic context? 
 How are matters surrounding paternalism and coercion addressed in therapeutic 
justice? 
 What is the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence concepts upon judicial integrity?  
 What sentencing considerations surround the imposition of FLRT? 
 What are the limitations relevant to the use of fMRI equipment and data-
interpretation? 
 
Cautions and criticisms of the emergent science are also examined. Deliberated further 
are staff-training and FLRT-administration in a clinical setting. This chapter also 
emphasizes that because FLRT is not a cure for impulsivity, treatment should be on-
going to prevent relapse. It is ultimately concluded that the practical difficulties, although 
extant, do not on balance outweigh the benefits of FLRT-integration into the Australian 
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criminal justice system, or at least justify our refusing to explore the merits of the 
possibility into the future. 
 
II NATURAL JUSTICE AND THERAPEUTIC JUSTICE COMPARED 
 
Used interchangeably with ‘natural justice’, ‘procedural fairness’ conceives of common 
law principles implied in relation to statutory and prerogative powers to ensure the 
fairness of the decision-making procedure of courts and administrators. It is thus 
necessary to examine the interaction of FLRT, positioned under therapeutic 
jurisprudence, with this established decision-making process. 
 
The three rules of procedural fairness, or, ‘the obligation to accord procedural fairness by 
way of a hearing’,1050 are: the hearing rule, the bias rule, and the no-evidence rule.1051 The 
adjudicative procedures used to determine cases should be fair. The principles of natural 
justice are guarantees of impartiality and objectivity,
1052
 intended to preserve the integrity 
of the judicial process.
1053
 Arguably, natural justice is an embodiment of rule-of-law 
principles operationalized. 
 
When practiced, therapeutic justice comprises therapeutic judging and lawyering, which 
differs substantially from the execution of natural justice in the adversarial system: 
 
players’ roles are altered, modified, inextricably changed … Legal justice becomes therapeutic 
jurisprudence.
1054
 
 
Court practices traditionally are formal, such that procedural fairness or the principles of 
natural justice are observed.
1055
 Indeed, ‘formality does emphasise the solemnity and 
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seriousness’ of court and ‘assists with predictability’,1056 representative of formalist 
indicia to the rule of law. However, it has been suggested that the law can become 
therapeutic only if the ‘culture of critique’ is replaced.1057  
 
Therapeutic justice advocates informality, whereby a casual atmosphere and vernacular 
are employed. In this way, the ‘syntactical construction … in the law’s standard method 
of enquiry’1058 is significantly challenged. The constituents of natural justice — the 
hearing rule, the bias rule, and the no-evidence rule — with respect to therapeutic justice 
are now considered. 
 
A The Hearing Rule and Therapeutic Lawyering Compared 
 
 
The first rule under natural justice or procedural fairness, is the hearing rule, which, it has 
been said, ‘lies at the heart of the judicial process’. 1059 This refers to legal representation 
with no interest in the outcome of the matter. It further considers a right to representation 
by counsel and to the time and opportunity required to prepare a case.
1060
 Based on the 
maxim audi alteram partem, a decision-maker must afford a person whose interests will 
be adversely affected by a decision an opportunity to present his or her case. 
 
Therapeutic lawyering, in contrast, does not adhere to the hearing rule. Legal 
representatives are encouraged to engage in ‘colloquy with the judge’1061 in advocating 
the most therapeutic outcome available to the offender. As proffered by Weinstein, the 
adversarial process and what legal actors do impact upon the psychological well-being or 
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emotional life of persons affected by the law.
1062
 The adversarial process is deemed 
antithetical to obtaining appropriate services for the individual,
1063
 so the roles of all 
actors in the system change. In particular, ‘a variety of psychologically-oriented 
approaches’ are employed, including ‘empathy, respect, motivational interviewing, and 
behavioural contracting to motivate individuals to accept needed treatment and respond 
effectively to it’.1064 Defence lawyers are expected ‘to shed their staunch 
adversarialism’1065 to become ‘therapeutic change agents’1066 representing their clients in 
a manner reflective of the therapeutic goals of the movement. Furthermore, therapeutic 
jurisprudence ‘eschews the argument culture’1067 peculiar to the adversarial system and 
instead advocates the birth of the ‘affective lawyer’1068 and the ‘preventive lawyer’1069 
who quell the otherwise ‘perfunctory manner’ of counsel.1070 Indeed, ‘[what] was so 
sacrosanct’ in the adversarial arena ‘has changed so drastically’. 1071 
 
The need for an independent legal profession, ‘fearless in its representation’,1072 is 
arguably of greater import to the justice system than ‘humanising’ lawyers by viewing 
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law as a ‘helping profession’.1073 The rehabilitation-centred lawyering of the ‘therapeutic 
jurisprudence criminal lawyer’1074 conflicts with the accused’s right to unbiased 
representation.
1075
 Although Wexler and Winick consistently stress that therapeutic 
jurisprudence does not seek ‘to transmogrify lawyers into counselors or mental health 
professionals’,1076 there is legitimate concern surrounding disavowal of the hearing rule. 
Chief Justice Spigelman has suggested that the judiciary and legal profession are 
‘interrelated in a symbiotic manner’.1077 Therefore, a strong and independent legal 
profession contributes to a strong and independent judiciary, the maintenance of which is 
crucial to judicial integrity and wider constitutional considerations. 
 
Like magistrates, lawyers operating in a therapeutic jurisprudence context need to see 
their client’s case in more than simply adversarial terms.1078 Lawyers must understand 
and appreciate the client’s issues and problems and the potential (therapeutic) solution to 
them. In general, proceedings in courts governed by the principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence are non-adversarial; therefore, any factual or legal disputes should be 
disposed of prior to the participant being referred to the program. If this is achieved, it 
will mean that all members of the court, including the prosecution and defence, can focus 
on the same agenda, namely, achieving the most therapeutic outcome for each 
participant.
1079
 In achieving this goal, it may sometimes be necessary for the lawyers to 
work closely with a number of mental health professionals (for example, Forensic Mental 
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Health Court Liaison Officers).
1080
 This enables practitioners to be aware of the issues 
surrounding the treatment and care of the defendant. 
 
 
B The Bias Rule and Therapeutic Judging Compared 
 
 
The bias rule is the principle that a decision-maker must not have an interest in the 
outcome of the decision or an appearance of bias.
1081
 Bias is a pre-existing favourable or 
unfavourable attitude to an issue when impartial consideration of the merits of the case is 
required. As Lord Bingham has observed, adjudicative procedures provided by the state 
should be fair.
1082
 Fairness further dictates that decisions are made by adjudicators who, 
however described, are independent and impartial. Independence signifies the freedom to 
decide on the legal and factual merits of a case as they see it, free of any extraneous 
influence or pressure. Impartiality connotes open-mindedness, unbiased by any personal 
interest or partisan allegiance of any kind. ‘[Impartiality is] the supreme judicial 
virtue’1083 and ideally, ‘a judge should stay out of the arena’.1084 
 
The bias rule also speaks to judicial integrity, addressed below, which concerns 
independence, impartiality and certainty. This requires that there be no conflict of interest 
and no actual or apprehended bias.
1085
 It also requires judicial decision-makers to alert 
themselves to, and to neutralise as far as practicable, personal predilections or prejudices 
or any extraneous considerations that might pervert their judgement.
1086
 Manifested 
through the bias rule, the judiciary is not to be personally interested in the outcome of the 
case in favour of any of the participants. 
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The philosophical basis of judicial integrity is most succinctly found in the judicial oath 
by which judges swear or affirm to act ‘without fear or favour, affection or ill will’.1087 
This is a strong promise of impartiality. The oath also contains a promise to ‘do justice 
according to law’, which is a clear requirement that the judge is to apply the law rather 
than follow personal inclination or preference.
1088
 
 
The concept of a judicial officer as an impartial and uninvolved arbiter of adversarial 
proceedings endures as a measurement for proper conduct of judicial officers. This is 
evident in the Australian Guide to Judicial Conduct, where the elaboration of judicial 
conduct centres around conduct in trial. It equates the judicial value of impartiality with 
the judicial officer seeking to ‘avoid stepping into the arena’.1089 Chapter 4 of the Guide 
also stresses moderation in judicial involvement in the proceedings: 
 
It is common and often necessary for a judge to question a witness or engage in debate with 
counsel, but the key to the proper level of such intervention is moderation. A judge must be careful 
not to descend into the arena and thereby appear to be taking sides or to have reached a premature 
conclusion.
1090
 
 
 
In contrast to the bias rule, therapeutic jurisprudence calls for emotionally intelligent 
judging
1091
 requiring ‘empathy, respect, active listening, clarity, a positive focus and non-
paternalism’.1092 Adopting a coach-like role, the ‘ambitious scope’1093 of therapeutic 
judging requires judges ‘to wear the hat of lawyer, sociologist, psychologist and even 
psychoanalyst’.1094 In this way, the adversarial ‘court-craft’1095 known to the judiciary 
and embodied in the bias rule is abandoned. In its place the judge plays a role as a 
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member of a treatment team, the lawyers are not partisans, and the non-legal team 
members enjoy interaction with the participant.
1096
 This departure from the customary 
adversarial system reflects the design of the specialty court, which discourages any 
challenge, argument or assertion of rights that may interfere with the course of 
treatment.
1097
 Rather, ‘[d]irect engagement, empathy and communication’1098 are 
promoted. 
 
In general, Australia’s adversarial legal system is purported to have a deleterious effect 
on the mental health and emotional well-being of offenders.
1099
 Legal processes are 
considered ‘alienating and disempowering’, as offenders are rushed through the court 
system without an opportunity to voice or explain their position. Court processes deny 
defendants an opportunity to express what might be appropriate for him or her to curtail 
offending behaviour.
 1100 ‘Managerial and interventionist in its approach’,1101 therapeutic 
jurisprudence emboldens court players to act therapeutically.
1102
 Accordingly, the 
importance of voice and validation
1103
 in the court context is highlighted. Voice 
encompasses an environment where the participant can tell his or her story to an 
attentive court.
1104 Validation involves the court acknowledging that it has heard the 
participant, values his or her contribution, and will take his or her story into 
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account.
1105
 Extensive literature
1106
 on the psychology of procedural justice demonstrates 
that when people are treated fairly, with dignity and respect, and given a sense of voice 
and validation, it is more likely that greater therapeutic efficacy will be achieved. In some 
instances, judges may also be required to exercise cultural sensitivity, employing vision 
and expertise beyond legal skills to understand participants’ needs, based on cultural, 
social and geographical differences.
1107
 It thus follows that therapeutic judging converts 
‘dispassionate, disinterested magistrates’ to ‘sensitive, emphatic counsellors’.1108 
 
Judge Van de Veen of Canada and Professor Wexler claim that in the therapeutic 
jurisprudence context, the criminal act must be condemned, not the offender.
1109
 
Relatedly, disparaging remarks in court are viewed unfavourably. Therapeutic judging 
suggests that if a judge plants a ‘helpful seed’1110 at a ‘teachable moment’1111 in the 
offender’s presence,  reoffending rates will decline, community fears will allay, and trust 
in the criminal justice system will be restored.
1112
 However, the principles guiding 
judicial conduct generally are influenced by the concept of an adversarial trial
1113
 
whereby ‘rule-oriented’ judges find difficulty in ‘deviating from the usual process of 
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decision-making predicated upon legal rules’.1114 It is argued that judges cannot 
effectively act as impartial and detached magistrates to hear and rule on the competing 
claims of adversaries when they also function as advocates and defenders of the very 
programs and procedures under scrutiny.   
 
It follows that increased judicial interaction with a participant heightens the possibility of 
partiality.
 1115
 Emotional engagement involved in therapeutic judging, especially judicial 
monitoring of success and failure in a treatment program, may conflict with neutrality. 
Advisedly, James Duffy recommends that judicial impartiality should be assessed 
according to the quality of involvement and intervention rather than the quantum.
1116
 
Essentially, each individual problem-solving court judge is charged with the task of 
ensuring that the processes they administer and the behaviour they present are consistent 
with the aspirational ideals of impartiality.
1117
 Indeed, it is the ‘romantic judge’ who 
employs therapeutic justice: 
 
The classical judge characterized by impartiality, prudence, practical reason, mastery of craft ... 
and above all, self restraint has given way to the romantic judge who is disposed instead to be 
bold, creative, compassionate, result-oriented, and liberated from legal technicalities. The romantic 
judge is less bound by tradition, by precedent, and by a cautious and careful approach to judicial 
decision making. The traditional ideals of disinterest, humility, and restraint have given way to the 
new ideals of judicial boldness, energy, and compassion.
 1118
 
 
The adversarial system ‘reflects values that respect both the autonomy of parties to the 
trial process and the impartiality of the judge’.1119 This system of law relies on the skill of 
each advocate in representing the interests of the client and shielding the client against 
self-incrimination. The rules of evidence are upheld to avoid prejudicing the trier of fact. 
In this manner, facts and culpability surrounding the commission of an offence form the 
bases of adversarialism. Therapeutic judging, however, adopts a non-adversarial 
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approach. The legal fraternity is ordinarily reluctant to act in a non-adversarial setting, as 
it may threaten the judicial values of impartiality, fairness and certainty.
1120
 However, the 
goal of therapeutic judging is based on treatment and attaining therapeutic outcomes, not 
upon an impartial final determination. An interactive judge and treatment team 
collectively devise a treatment plan maximizing the therapeutic outcomes to advance the 
well-being of the offender. 
 
Wexler asserts that therapeutic jurisprudence avoids ‘doctrinal niceties and symmetries in 
favour of looking at a problem and ... develop[ing] reasonably workable solutions’.1121 At 
its core, therapeutic jurisprudence advocates the departure from the ‘argument culture’ 
characteristic of the adversarial system toward ‘a culture of dialogue, cooperation, and 
other approaches of intellectual inquiry’.1122 Considered to be ‘centrist’, therapeutic 
jurisprudence strives to ‘probe beneath a rhetoric of rights and to focus instead on needs 
and interests, all the while seeking a creative convergence or compromise’.1123 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to give offenders a ‘voice, respect, neutrality and 
trust’.1124 Its processes are also associated with ‘active and positive intervention, 
validation and self-worth’.1125  
 
Studies and reports have shown that how a magistrate or judge behaves at a hearing can 
affect whether an offender complies with the particular order handed down.
1126
 Wexler 
argues that the level of language the magistrate uses, and the amount of direct dialogue 
that he or she chooses to engage in with the offender, can have a direct impact on the 
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offender’s understanding of, and compliance with, any order made against them. Open 
and inclusive communication is one of the key principles in a problem-solving court 
system. Speaking in simple terms, including the offender in discussions about his or her 
case and ensuring the comfort of all parties are some of the simple, yet essential, 
therapeutic jurisprudence approaches that ought to be adopted by magistrates in problem-
solving courts.
1127
 
 
Other reports highlight the need for the magistrate, as well as prosecution and defence 
lawyers, to be able to listen to, and understand, the offender’s view of the world. The 
magistrate may also need to make direct enquiries of the offender’s personal 
circumstances.
1128
 This will allow the magistrate to understand and/or have an 
appreciation of the (subjective) motivation and actions of the offender.
1129
 It is also seen 
as preferable to have the same magistrate throughout the operation of the bail order, that 
is, ensuring that the same dedicated magistrate conducts the reviews and finalizes the 
case. Having a ‘rapid succession of reluctant and unsympathetic judges or magistrates’ is 
particularly counter-productive and detrimental for the participants in a therapeutic 
problem-solving court.
1130
 
 
Sanctioning or rewarding particular behaviour is another important part of the therapeutic 
jurisprudence approach to particular offenders. Magistrates (and other officers of the 
court) need to be aware that paying too much attention to non-compliant offenders may 
reinforce or encourage such behaviour, while ignoring or paying too little attention to 
cooperative behaviour may discourage the kind of positive behaviour they seek from 
offenders.
1131
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The introduction of therapeutic judging has required judicial officers to adapt to a 
different way of judging. Legislation and court rules governing these court processes 
generally provide little guidance as to how the judicial officer is to interact with 
participants. Traditional legal education, judicial education and the legal literature has not 
provided guidance to judging in a therapeutic manner, although some judicial officers 
have at times taken a therapeutic approach. Judging in a therapeutic manner should, as 
with other forms of judging, be based upon proper principles rather than the unfettered 
discretion of the judicial officer. There is an emergent literature suggesting proper 
principles to be applied in judging in problem-solving courts and in taking a solution-
based approach to judicial conduct in mainstream courts based on evidence from 
procedural justice research and the behavioural sciences. It is likely that these ‘care-based 
judicial alternatives’1132 require legal education and professional development to instil 
‘wise ways of dealing with the emotions’ and responses to ‘conflicts in a less adversarial 
way’.1133 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence requires a different approach to the administration of justice, 
albeit a definitive description of personnel re-education and a radical departure from the 
adversarial legal process. These effects, which Nolan refers to as ‘judicial reorientation’, 
call into question ‘the saliency of concepts that once more profoundly define the 
substance and scope of criminal law’.1134  Judges and lawyers would be less constrained 
than by having to be impartial in an adversarial system governed by clearly defined roles, 
robes, schedules and power relations. 
 
Problem-solving courts have used processes that promote goals far broader than the 
handing down of a judgment or the imposition of a sentence resulting from the 
determination of the facts and the application of the relevant law to the facts. With these 
new processes come new forms of judging and advocacy, and the application of 
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interpersonal and intrapersonal skills that historically have not been associated with the 
judiciary or the legal profession. Arguably, judging in these contexts requires the judicial 
officer to be mindful of the effect of the processes they use on the well-being of those 
involved. In addition, the novel situations faced by judicial officers when judging in these 
courts or in certain situations when interacting with others outside court raises issues 
concerning the values that underlie these forms of judging, whether the processes are 
consistent with the judicial function, and how to resolve particular challenges without 
compromising judicial values or the goals of these programs. 
 
Problem-solving courts appear to depart from core aspects of the judicial function of 
resolving legal problems by a determination of the facts and the applicable law and the 
application of the law to the facts to reach a judgment. However, it is argued that they 
enhance the fact-finding and decision-making processes.
1135
 Creative strategies generate 
therapeutic outcomes while operating within the parameters of ‘just’ decision-making. In 
fact, ‘[p]roblem solving courts emphasise traditional due process protections during the 
adjudication phase of a case and the achievement of tangible, constructive outcomes post-
adjudication. In doing so, problem-solving courts have sought to balance fairness and 
effectiveness, the protection of individual rights and the preservation of public order.’1136 
For these shifts to have support, therapeutic jurisprudence proponents have outlined the 
required re-education process for judges and lawyers. King and Wilson advocate 
therapeutic jurisprudence training as ‘part of the education of legal practitioners and law 
students’.1137 Tapper proposes that legal education and professional development instil 
‘wise ways of dealing with the emotions’ and responses to ‘conflicts in a less adversarial 
way’.1138  
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By recognizing differing needs, implementing alternatives and assessing outcomes, 
therapeutic jurisprudence is declared a viable alternative to the adversarial system. A 
‘holistic’1139 perspective is posited as empowering offenders to address their own 
rehabilitative needs. Therapeutic jurisprudence in Australia has required considerable 
modification at each stage of the process — recognition, practice and assessment — and 
to the philosophical approach, court structures and roles, and work-loads of court 
personnel. New skill sets are required that ‘deliberately embrace the emotional 
dimensions of the dynamic between lawyer and client’.1140 
 
The benefits to an offender of being part of a therapeutic environment are plain, yet 
matters surrounding coercion and voluntariness are routinely raised. Advocates of 
therapeutic jurisprudence acknowledge the increased involvement of the judiciary in a 
therapeutic context and emphasize that the offender, too, has an interactive role in the 
process. Myths of coercion are dispelled by the ventilation of concerns around program-
participation and expectation — executed with transparency and vigour.  
 
1 Paternalism and Coercion 
 
Some problem solving court judges [employ] “benevolent coercion,” and extol the virtues of 
judicial coercion as an essential ingredient in the rehabilitative enterprise.
1141
 
 
While conventional, high-volume lower courts may be ‘routinized, impersonal, and 
anonymous, [they are] also much less intrusive and paternalistic’.1142 Therapeutic 
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jurisprudence adopts an ‘arguably paternalistic’1143 approach. To ‘strive to avoid the 
perception of coercion’,1144 judicial attention should be paid to ensuring that individuals 
are explicitly informed when deciding to enter the court’s jurisdiction. This is not only 
because of a philosophic commitment to voluntary treatment, but also because agreement 
to participate in the court may often mean the waiver of speedy trial and other rights 
available in a criminal context.
1145
  
  
The deployment of therapeutic jurisprudence can lead to the behavioural manifestation of 
partiality and bias on the part of problem-solving court judges. Unsurprisingly, this 
approach is considered to be ‘legally sanctioned coercion’. 1146 Coercion is a contentious 
matter, especially in the mental health diversion court, for example, which concerns 
mental impairment and voluntariness. Voluntariness is based on the rights of the 
individual to refuse treatment, and upon the premise that people are more likely to 
succeed on such a program if they actively choose to be part of it, rather than being 
coerced into participation.
1147
 However, Winick claims that diversion into treatment ‘is 
not legal coercion, and, if properly applied, the individual may not even experienced it as 
psychologically coercive’.1148 
 
The ‘voluntary’ nature of the participation of the offender in diversion programs has been 
questioned and it has been suggested that the more severely impaired individual may not 
be competent to make decisions about participation.
1149 
Most critics of the mental health 
court system argue that the effect of offering treatment instead of imprisonment leaves 
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little room for choice by the offender.
1150 
The MacArthur study of coercion found that 
‘mentally ill offenders who freely choose to obtain treatment rather than being treated 
against their will may be more committed to treatment objectives, thus benefiting more 
consistently from it’.1151 
 
The offender has an important role in any therapeutic jurisprudence approach to court 
proceedings. For a problem-solving court to be successful, it is essential that each 
offender understand his or her role, and that of every other key player in the process. In a 
problem-solving court, the offender often has an active, not passive, role and it is 
important that they appreciate that how they behave while participating in the diversion 
program will have particular consequences. 
 
It is imperative that every participant in a problem-solving court has been fully informed 
of the process and has freely consented to take part in the process. People who are 
coerced or forced into treatment may resent such intrusion and be less likely to want to 
resolve the underlying issues (such as addressing their mental health problems or 
substance abuse issues) that relate to their offending behaviour.
1152
  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence emphasizes the importance of self-determination in relation to 
addressing such problems. The principle of self-determination can be promoted within 
the curial context in a number of ways: giving an offender the (coercion-free) option of 
participating in a diversion program; encouraging the participant to contribute to the 
setting of goals and treatment strategies; and allowing the participant the opportunity to 
report on his or her own progress.
1153
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Some research indicates that participants in problem-solving courts are more compliant 
with the orders they receive, and benefit more from the whole process, if they are 
encouraged to view the process as entering into a kind of ‘social contract’ that they have 
made a (public) commitment to comply with.
1154
 Their level of compliance can be 
heightened by the fact that the contract is made with someone in authority (a magistrate) 
who is above and beyond those who they normally make such ‘contracts’ with (a health-
care provider).
1155
 
 
The structure of the program and the requirement for regular reviews mean that a 
successful referral to a MHDCt may actually increase, rather than minimize, the number 
of contacts a participant has with the criminal justice system. By agreeing to participate in 
a MHDCt, defendants have generally accepted a much higher level of involvement with 
the criminal justice system. In some circumstances this will include greater intrusion into 
their personal lives than they would have experienced if their matters had been dealt with 
in an ‘ordinary’ manner.1156 
 
2 Guilty Plea — Unnecessary  
 
The diversionary mechanisms operative in Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia 
and Tasmania all stipulate that program participation is voluntary and entry is not 
conditional upon a guilty plea. Yet, treating an offender for his or her own good without a 
guilty plea may subvert an offender’s rights to autonomy and voluntariness. As 
therapeutic jurisprudence courts institute ‘voluntary’ treatment programs, attention is 
diverted from the court system, with the guilt and innocence of parties as its essence.
1157
 
Lamentable are the perspectives that consider ‘[t]hese various methods of applying court 
treatment without a full and fair judicial trial of the issue of guilt of a particular offense, 
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... to be peculiarly hazardous’.1158 As previously stated, operating in a therapeutic 
jurisprudence framework does not disregard judicial process or offender rights — it is the 
shift in emphasis upon rehabilitation and treatment that are promoted. 
 
 
C The No-Evidence Rule and Therapeutic Evidence Compared 
 
 
The principle that an administrator’s decision must be based on logically probative 
evidence
1159
 is the basis of the no-evidence rule. A hearing by an impartial tribunal is 
required to act on the basis of evidence and argument presented formally before it, in 
relation to legal norms that govern the matters such as the imposition of penalty.
1160
 This 
rule further concerns the following: a right to an assurance that the evidence presented by 
the government has been gathered in a properly supervised way;
1161
 a right to present 
evidence on one’s own behalf;1162 a right to make legal argument about the bearing of the 
evidence and about the bearing of the various legal norms relevant to the case;
1163
a right 
to hear reasons from the tribunal when it reaches its decision, which are responsive to the 
evidence and arguments presented before it;
1164
 and some right of appeal to a higher 
tribunal of a similar character.
1165
 
 
The evidence accepted under the therapeutic jurisprudence model, in contrast, is broad 
and encompasses societal matters. In this way, traditional rules of evidence are not 
employed. It is argued that, ‘[a]llow[ed] in evidence [are] matters which would be 
considered prejudicial, incompetent, and irrelevant for purposes of proof in the usual 
criminal trial.
1166
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Furthermore, it is necessary that courts should bear in mind the prevention of abuse of 
process and the power of judicial review.
1167
 This also ensures conformity to the rule of 
law, as courts should have supervisory jurisdiction to review both parliamentary and 
subordinate legislation, as well as rules and executive action.
1168
  
 
 
D Judicial Integrity 
 
 
Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more advised than 
confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper virtue.
1169
 
 
Natural justice, operative under the omnipotent Diceyan principles, as addressed in 
Chapter 6, must also strive to uphold judicial integrity, comprising independence, 
impartiality and certainty. Impartiality has been addressed under the bias rule above. 
 
1 Independence 
 
According to Raz, ‘the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed’.1170 Faithful 
adherence to independence, impartiality and certainty sustains the integrity of the 
judiciary. Judicial independence is freedom from direction, control or interference in the 
operation or exercise of judicial powers by either the legislative or executive arms of 
government.
1171
 Accordingly, judicial independence is considered a safeguard of 
individual liberty and a fundamental attribute of constitutional government.  
Independence relates to the constitutional situation of the judiciary and to the approach 
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and actions of individual members of the judiciary:
1172
 legally trained judicial officers 
whose independence of other agencies of government is assured.
1173
 
 
On an individual level, judges must be and be seen to be independent of the influence of 
the executive and legislative branches of government. Being independent of outside 
influence is also an aspect of impartiality and speaks to the integrity and character of the 
judicial officer. The integrity and function of the executive and legislative branches of 
government are also be respected by the judiciary. 
 
An essential component of a system governed by law is the existence of an independent 
and impartial judiciary to apply the law to cases brought before it and whose judgment in 
those cases is final and conclusive.
1174
 There must be separation between executive and 
judicial functions.
1175
 The legislature cannot confer upon the judiciary, executive or 
administrative functions incompatible with the essential and defining characteristics of 
courts and the courts’ place in a national integrated judicial system.1176 The legislature 
cannot confer judicial functions upon the executive.
1177
 The legislature is constrained in 
removing or confining the judiciary’s supervisory jurisdiction over executive conduct.1178 
The judiciary cannot engage in legislative rule-making.
1179
 
 
At its core, therapeutic justice is less concerned with the partitioning of executive and 
judicial functions, than with seeking to promote offender-rehabilitation. FLRT, arguably 
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an apt embodiment of this impetus, necessitates court and community service interaction  
— a collaboration outside the strictures of the traditional judicial function — and thus 
reinforces and facilitates the notion of the law as a therapeutic agent. 
 
(a) Therapeutic Jurisprudence Interdependence 
 
The interdependence inherent in therapeutic judging, especially apropos of service 
provision, is arguably a matter that is the function of the executive. Therapeutic 
interdependence relies upon the ‘integration of treatment services with judicial case 
processing, ongoing judicial intervention, close monitoring of and immediate response to 
behavior, multidisciplinary involvement, and collaboration with community-based and 
governmental organizations.
1180
 This teamwork approach applied in problem-solving 
courts may have the capacity to undermine the judicial independence from the executive. 
 
 
(b) Multidisciplinary and Collaborative Treatment 
 
The principle of judicial independence could be compromised by a judicial officer 
improperly seeking to adopt a therapeutic approach. The area where violation of the 
principle of judicial independence is most likely to occur in relation to judging in a 
problem-solving court is where judicial officers step into areas connected with 
determining service provision — a matter that is the function of the executive. 
Independence not only requires independence from government but also independence 
from all influences external to the court that might lead it to decide cases otherwise than 
on the legal and factual merits. Lord Bingham has stated that the principle of 
independence requires the judiciary to be 
 
independent of anybody and anything which might lead them to decide issues coming before them 
on anything other than the legal and factual merits of the case as, in the exercise of their own 
judgment, they consider them to be.
1181
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This statement of the principle of independence is particularly apt to problem-solving 
courts where therapeutic jurisprudence is implemented, as there is high potential for 
significant external pressures whereby the ‘traditional adversarial approach of court 
procedures [is] replaced by a collaborative style of case management.
1182
  
 
The problem-solving approach is interdisciplinary, informed by literature from 
psychology, psychiatry, clinical behavioural sciences, criminology, and social work.
1183
 
There is a focus on ‘cooperative therapy rather than adversarial trials’1184 through the 
promotion of integration of treatment services with judicial case processing, close 
monitoring of, and immediate response to, behaviour, multidisciplinary involvement, and 
collaboration with community-based and government organizations. When ‘insights from 
the clinical behavioural sciences’1185 influence ‘the development of law’,1186 the legal 
system morphs to an ‘arena of multidisciplinary networks’.1187 
 
Legal scholars are ‘striking out in a new, highly interdisciplinary direction’1188 that may 
threaten constitutional values. Promoters of therapeutic jurisprudence acknowledge that 
judicial collaboration is regarded as more important than judicial independence.
1189
 A 
teamwork approach, as used in problem-solving courts, is said to threaten judicial 
independence from the executive.
1190
 The judiciary may take or appear to take on 
executive roles, or the executive may appear to have too much influence on judicial 
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decisions or individual cases.
1191
 This may also raise constitutional concerns about 
limitations on judicial power.
1192
 
 
Introducing multidisciplinary teams into courts is required to address complex issues, but, 
in doing so, the rule of law becomes diffused. In such courts, deviations from the rule of 
law are considered ‘innovative [regarding] legal procedure and rules’.1193 It is noted that 
‘in some instances fundamental legal and procedural safeguards may be diminished’.1194 
 
The reaching of interdependent resolutions, informed by collaboration with agencies and 
professionals, is further problematic. When judges become the central focus of the effort 
as the enforcer of the treatment team’s decisions and ‘act in concert to identify and 
promote therapeutic values’,1195 rather than an independent adjudicator of the facts and 
the law, the appearance of bias cannot be avoided. This challenges the valued notion of 
independence, further widening the gulf between natural justice and therapeutic justice. 
 
 
(c) Therapeutic Outcome-Maximization 
 
The altered forum also complements the aspiration to ‘connect defendants to therapeutic 
interventions including rehabilitative … mental health treatment’.1196 The focus of the 
court is shifted from its traditional adversarial nature to issues of therapy, thereby 
‘focusing on treatment and future improvements in a person’s mental health and general 
quality of life rather than on the criminal charge and assessing the level of culpability and 
                                                 
1191
  Ibid. 
1192
  Michael S King et al, Non-Adversarial Justice (Federation Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2014). 
1193
  Mark Harris, ‘The Koori Court and the Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2006) (1) Special 
Series eLaw Journal: Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 130, 134 
<https://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/archives/issues/special/the_koori_court.pdf >. 
1194
  Morris B Hoffman, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: 
The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous (2002) 29 Fordham Urban Law Journal 
2063, 2075.   
1195
  John Petrila, ‘A Review of Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1993) 10 New York Law School 
Journal of Human Rights 877, 893. 
1196
  Greg Berman and John Feinblatt, Good Courts: The Case for Problem-Solving Justice in Andrea 
Odegaard, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Impact of Mental Health Courts on the Criminal Justice 
System’ (2007) 83 North Dakota Law Review 225, 227. 
  253 
punishment’.1197 In other words, it is hypothesised that a rehabilitative response is 
conducive to generating therapeutic outcomes, along with ‘focus upon the maximization 
of the therapeutic consequences upon individuals.
1198
 
 
Therapeutic outcome-maximization upholds the notion that the law can be seen to act as a 
therapist, with legal rules, procedures and the roles of legal actors constituting ‘social 
forces’ that precipitate therapeutic or anti-therapeutic outcomes. Promoters of therapeutic 
jurisprudence refer to it as a form of court-intervention that focuses on the behaviour of 
criminal defendants in connection with the imposition of some form of treatment. While 
the traditional role of courts and judges is to provide a fair process in dispute resolution, 
under the therapeutic justice model ‘the process and the rules may be regarded as 
secondary, and what is preeminent is the provision of some form of treatment, and the 
outcome of that treatment’.1199 
 
When the focus of the court is shifted from its traditional legal emphasis to issues of 
therapy, conflict with traditional legal outcomes ensues. For example, the importance of a 
fair process free of undue influence is subordinated to the attainment of desired 
therapeutic outcomes.
1200
 Adopting the therapeutic perspective has been described as 
‘remarkably anti-intellectual’1201 and ‘completely inimical to the judicial function’,1202 
whereby the focus is ‘not to ensure that the litigants have a meaningful mental health 
experience’.1203 While it is conceivable that the ‘legal system should consider but not 
simply defer to research conclusions regarding the therapeutic value of certain legal 
                                                 
1197
  Nancy Wolff and Wendy Pogorzelski, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts’ 
(2005) 11 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 539, 554. 
1198
  LeRoy Kondo, ‘Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision 
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence for Mentally Ill Offenders’ (2001) 28 American Journal of Criminal 
Law 255, 265. 
1199
  P M Casey. ‘Position Paper on Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (Paper presented at the Conference of 
State Court Administrators, Williamsburg, Virginia, 5 August 1999) 1. 
1200
  Ibid. 
1201
  Morris B Hoffman, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: 
The Least Dangerous Branch becomes the most dangerous’ (2002) 29 Fordham Urban Law Journal 
2063, 2067. 
1202
  Ibid 2084. 
1203
  Ibid. 
  254 
principles or processes’,1204 some ‘dispute the assumption that an attempt to obtain 
therapeutic outcomes should play a dominant role, or indeed any role in judicial decision 
making’.1205 
 
 
(d) Individual Rehabilitation 
 
Authors Michael King, Arie Freiberg, Becky Batagol and Ross Hyams consider that the 
approach taken by problem-solving courts ‘reflects a realisation by courts and legislators 
that social problems may require social as well as legal solutions and that existing 
forms of judging need to be reconsidered’.1206  Addressing individual underlying social 
or psychological problems associated with offending behaviour necessitates the adoption 
of approaches and outcomes that are best suited to each participant. In this manner, social 
sciences inform the judge’s role in achieving this end,1207 thereby honouring the 
‘enormous potential’ of law to heal.1208 
 
Regarding offenders, therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to ‘resolve the underlying problems 
that led to their court involvement in the first place’,1209 thereby promoting offender-
rehabilitation to the focus of the legal process. Those judging therapeutically develop an 
‘orientation to the social value of their work’1210 and by dealing with the story behind a 
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participant’s offending, problem-solving court judges facilitate social solutions to social 
problems.
1211
 
 
Addressing societal issues, whereby courts become a ‘one-stop’ social problem-solving 
centre,
1212
 fashioning solutions to social problems, gives them cause to turn to individual 
cases rather than case law and culturally relative positions in place of legal maxims. It is 
arguable that attempting to remedy societal problems, as opposed to observing the rules 
of natural justice, is futile. In the words of Judge Morris B Hoffman, it is a ‘fiction that 
complex human behaviours can be dealt with as if they are simple diseases’.1213 
 
The conventional positivist or formalist framework of the judicial role is usually 
understood to limit the ability of a judicial officer to address the wider social needs of 
those coming before a court. It is understood that ‘a judiciary that concerns itself with 
offenders’ social and psychological problems may undermine established legal 
principles’.1214 As Chief Justice John Doyle of the South Australian Supreme Court has 
stated, the judicial role 
 
is to decide disputes [and to] administer justice according to law ... [and to] decide cases on the 
material presented. ... It is not for us to pursue social policies, or to press for social change. We 
have no charter to remedy social problems.
1215
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One of the claimed advantages of this limited approach to the judicial role is to insulate 
the legal actor from personal responsibility, as explained by author Candace McCoy: 
 
[T]here is little to nothing the criminal justice system can do to alleviate poverty or the conditions 
that breed it. ... Economic structure and social attitudes cause inequality, and the justice system 
simply reacts to what is already there. ... [O]ur job is only to impose the rule of law carefully. …  
We can do little more, because we can’t change the world.1216 
 
The reality is that no judge would be ‘so smug as to claim to be able, let alone authorized, 
to solve all of modern society’s ills’.1217 However, ‘once all these social failures coalesce 
into an individual [offender], some judges suddenly think they can “fix” the individuals 
whose behaviour is a product of these failed systems’.1218 It would be misguided to think 
employing therapeutic jurisprudence in this way enables problem-solving enthusiasts to 
get to the ‘causes’ of the problems.1219 Judge Hoffman reasons: ‘One link in the causal 
chain does not a cause make.’1220  
 
Justifiably, therapeutic jurisprudence does raise concerns about judicial integrity. 
However, it is not insensitive to established legal principles; nor does it advocate for their 
subordination to all therapeutic ideals. This discussion proceeds to consider the principle 
of legal certainty and the impact of enhanced discretion — evident in therapeutic judging 
— upon such certainty. 
 
2 Certainty 
 
Legal certainty
1221
 means that the State has the duty to respect and apply, consistently, 
laws it has enacted: ‘like decisions … given in like cases limits the discretion of 
judges.
1222
 In a formalist context it is important that laws that confer a discretion on a 
State authority indicate the scope of that discretion, along with the manner of its exercise, 
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and with sufficient clarity. Moreover, legal certainty requires respect for the principle of 
res judicata whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is ‘final and 
conclusive as to the rights and duties of the parties involved’, constituting ‘an absolute 
bar to a subsequent suit for the same cause of action’.1223 
 
In addition, it must be seen that the existence of conflicting decisions within a supreme 
court is contrary to the principle of legal certainty. It is therefore required that the courts, 
especially the highest courts, establish mechanisms to avoid conflicts and ensure the 
coherence of their case law. The principle of legal certainty is essential to the public’s 
confidence in the judicial system and the rule of law. 
 
(a) Therapeutic-Jurisprudence-Enhanced Discretion: Potentially Inequitable Decisions 
Threaten Certainty 
 
[N]o discretion should be unconstrained so as to be potentially arbitrary. No discretion may be 
legally unfettered.
1224
 
 
Individualized treatment arguably vests too much power and discretion in an individual 
judge and is not consistent with the rule of law.
1225
 The rule of law is not only enforced 
by courts, it also controls the operation of courts themselves.
1226
 Just as unchecked 
administrative discretion runs counter to the rule of law, so too does unrestrained judicial 
discretion. ‘[T]o live under the rule of law is not to be subject to the unpredictable 
vagaries of other individuals’, 1227 whether they be legislators, government officials or 
judges. 
 
Proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence argue that rarely can there be certainty in the 
legal system and that in fact therapeutic jurisprudence work will increase the knowledge 
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base and thus enhance the quality of legal decision-making, even though its conclusions 
may lack certainty.
1228
 However, various rules have emerged to direct the exercise of 
judicial discretion. These include: judges should find, interpret correctly and apply the 
appropriate legal rule;
1229
 judicial decisions should be made according to legal standards, 
rather than undirected considerations such as fairness or policy;
1230
and judges should 
observe fidelity to the law, that is, the inherited, enacted and judge-made law, and not 
create what they perceive to be better law according to subjective or personal 
preference.
1231
 Similar cases should be treated similarly, save where objective differences 
justify differentiation.
1232
 
 
Under the ‘old’ concept of law, the ‘law’ was conceived of as judge-made and, before 
legal realism, as ‘judge-discovered’. Such judge-made law developed incrementally, on a 
case-by-case basis. Courts would carefully examine prior precedent, reason by analogy, 
and try to extract overarching principles from previously decided cases. More recently, 
judges have been explicitly willing to consider policy arguments in developing 
doctrine.
1233
 With or without policy arguments, the overall goal of the common law is to 
achieve an intellectual coherence.
1234
  
 
The broader and more loosely textured a discretion, whether conferred on an official or a 
judge, the greater the scope for subjectivity and hence for arbitrariness, which is the 
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antithesis of the rule of law.
1235
 Discretion should ordinarily be narrowly defined and its 
exercise capable of reasoned justification. 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is considered to advance in a manner ‘that is catalytic rather 
than preclusive’;1236 however, by extending the discretionary powers for sentencing 
judges, the chances of inequitable decisions increase. That is to say, increased judicial 
discretionary powers, outside legislated parameters, increase the possibility of two 
offenders who have committed similar offences being issued with different sentences. 
 
Judges require discretion within legislative limits to mobilize and preserve the concept of 
equality before the law. It is noted that ‘in some instances fundamental legal and 
procedural safeguards may be diminished’.1237 This runs counter to the requirement of a 
level of legal certainty built on precedents, and overrides the traditional discretion that 
judges enjoy as keepers of the law and defenders of justice. Conventional approaches to 
sentencing already allow for a nuanced approach when dealing with offenders.
1238
 
Inappropriate use of judicial power is said to be justified because ‘judicial authority … is 
not the only repository of wisdom’1239— while true, such wisdom is subject to restrictions 
for good reason. 
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E The Incommensurability of Therapeutic Justice with Natural Justice 
 
 
The roles of legal actors in applying the therapeutic jurisprudence method are altered to 
such a degree as to pose an affront to the existing rules consistent with natural justice. 
Therapeutic lawyering obviates the hearing rule, as legal representatives in the 
therapeutic arena represent clients in a manner reflective of the therapeutic goals of the 
movement. Therapeutic judging does not sit comfortably within the confines of the bias 
rule, as the arbiter has an interest in advancing the well-being of the offender through 
interactive deliberations and collaborative solutions. Voice and validation are considered 
highly. Therapeutic jurisprudence concepts facilitate, indeed encourage, a variety of 
factors to be considered. Evidence is not considered in the light of the no-evidence rule 
above, where logically probative evidence is the standard. Therapeutic jurisprudence has 
incongruent values with those upheld by judicial integrity. The interdependence inherent 
in therapeutic judging, especially in relation to service provision, is a matter that is the 
function of the executive. The teamwork approach applied in problem-solving courts may 
have the capacity to undermine the judiciary’s independence from the executive.  
 
Therapeutic outcome-maximization is seen as paramount to the movement, and matters 
such as the importance of a fair process are not as revered. Furthermore, the emphasis on 
individual rehabilitation disavows the Diceyan principle of equality before the law. The 
judicial role is usually understood to limit the ability of a judicial officer to address wider 
social implications. Furthermore, the enhanced judicial discretion attaching to therapeutic 
jurisprudence application threatens the idea of judicial certainty by widening the scope 
for subjectivity and, consequently, arbitrariness. Indeed, ‘the explicit use of judicial 
authority to motivate individuals to accept needed services and to monitor their 
compliance and progress’1240 is a contentious phenomenon, but certainly not a completely 
inappropriate or meritless one. 
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The practicalities of integrating FLRT into the criminal justice system are not limited to 
its impact upon natural justice. Other valid implications include sentencing considerations 
and the actual use of fMRI equipment and data interpretation. These matters are now 
addressed.                                                                                                                  
 
III SENTENCING 
 
The rationales supporting the imposition of punishment for criminal offences arise 
through common law principles as those prescribed in legislation that are to be 
considered by a sentencing court during the sentencing process. Retribution ensures the 
offender is adequately punished for the offence. Adequate punishment is a sentence that 
is proportional to the gravity of the offence. In sentencing, the degree of the seriousness 
of the offence, alongside other relevant sentencing considerations (including deterrence, 
rehabilitation and the safety of the community), are considered in determining an 
appropriate penalty for each defendant. 
 
 
A General Deterrence 
 
  
As a sentencing principle, general deterrence may have little or no relevance in 
determining the sentence where the defendant suffers a mental illness.
1241
 The rationale is 
that it would contribute little to the deterrence of the general public by making an 
example of a defendant suffering from a mental abnormality.  
 
It is now accepted in all Australian jurisdictions that, for the purposes of sentencing, the 
principle of general deterrence may be given less weight where an offender is suffering 
from a mental illness or condition, on the basis that he or she is an inappropriate vehicle 
to use as an example to others.
1242
 In addition, a second line of emergent authority 
suggests that to justify a mitigation in the penalty imposed, the mental disorder or 
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disability must have some causative role in the commission of the offence so as to reduce 
the offender’s culpability.1243 
 
Leniency in sentencing may be appropriate in a case where a person suffers a mental 
health disorder. Any such disability should be explained to the court in submissions on a 
plea of guilty. Where some causal connection exists between the mental health condition 
and the commission of the offence, the degree of moral culpability may be diminished, 
such as where the person has a low level of intellectual functioning due to retardation or 
brain damage or other malady beyond the person’s control.1244 
 
 
 
B Rehabilitation  
 
 
The principle of rehabilitation is given considerable weight in such cases, and the court is 
apprised of details of any treatment, counselling or beneficial change in medication that 
has occurred since the date of the offence.
1245
 Where a program of treatment is available, 
or the offender has shown a willingness to address his or her condition — such as by 
seeking psychiatric treatment or counselling — this may be taken into account as 
demonstrating a willingness to accept responsibility and work towards rehabilitation. In 
such cases, a sentence may be structured in such a way as to best allow the offender to 
advance his or her path to rehabilitation. 
 
In the Tasmania Mental Health Diversion List, the magistrate, when finalizing a matter, 
will take into account a number of different factors including: the defendant’s compliance 
or otherwise with the bail order conditions, the defendant’s level of engagement with 
relevant care and health service providers and the defendant’s progress (in terms of his or 
her mental health issues) while involved in the diversion process. In delivering sentence, 
the magistrate retains the full option of sentencing orders available under s 7 of the 
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Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas). Generally, successful or compliant diversion list participants 
can expect a lesser sentence than they would have received if they had their case heard on 
a regular court list. 
 
In South Australia, where a defendant has successfully completed the program the court 
may treat the defendant’s participation and achievements favourably, as relevant to 
leniency in sentence.
1246
 However, the fact that a defendant has not participated in, or has 
performed badly in, or has failed to make satisfactory progress in, an intervention 
program cannot be treated as an aggravating factor relevant to sentence.
1247
 Where a court 
sentences a defendant following participation in the diversion program, any applicable 
mandatory sentence must still apply.  
 
In R v Verdins,1248 the Court of Appeal of Victoria stated that mental impairment was 
relevant to sentencing in at least five ways. It could: 
1. reduce the offender’s moral culpability (but not his or her legal responsibility) for 
the offence — this could affect the weight given to just punishment and 
denunciation as purposes of sentencing the offender; 
2. influence the type of sentence that could be imposed and the conditions under 
which the sentence could be served; 
3. reduce the weight given to deterrence as a purpose of sentencing — this would 
depend on the nature and severity of the mental impairment and how this 
impairment affected the mental capacity of the offender at the time of his or her 
offending and at the time of sentencing; 
4. increase the hardship experienced by an offender in prison if he or she suffered 
from mental impairment at the time of sentencing; and/or 
5. justify a less severe sentence where there was a serious risk that imprisonment 
could have a significant adverse effect on the offender’s mental health. 
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Judges and magistrates may consider the Verdins principles when sentencing an offender 
who has a mental impairment at the time of the offence and/or at the time of sentencing. 
 
C Treatment Reports 
 
 
At the sentencing phase, neuroscientific evidence is already contributing, and may 
continue to contribute, to the determination of sentences and treatment.
1249
 
 
This thesis suggests that a (neuro)psychologist will analyse an offender’s performance 
during FLRT (over a course of several sessions). As they are, current imaging techniques 
show structural and functional features of an offender’s brain and results of FLRT can 
show where impulsivity is being inhibited and potential changes in neural pathways. The 
results would then be interpreted by a neuropsychologist and provided in a report to the 
court for use in sentencing or as a progress report to the magistrate or judge (depending 
on the situation). 
 
This suggestion would follow the process adopted in the South Australian Mental Health 
Diversion Program, where progress reports are provided by the Clinical Advisors 
(registered psychologists) to the Magistrate at approximately two month periods outlining 
progress, success and any difficulties or set-backs faced by the defendant for each review 
period. The court has discretion to extend the defendant’s participation in the program 
beyond the usual six months where the defendant may benefit from a longer period of 
participation. At the end of the defendant’s participation in the program, the court is 
provided with a report summarizing the defendant’s progress and achievements during 
the course of the program. This report is considered during the subsequent sentencing of 
the defendant. 
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Further exploration into the compilation of such reports and their compliance with 
established policy considerations would be instructive when employing FLRT from the 
outset. This of course represents another practical implication of FLRT-integration that 
may be in the remit of a dedicated steering committee with expertise in existing reporting 
protocols, as well as their legal function and utility. 
 
IV LIMITATIONS OF FLRT-INTEGRATION 
 
 
This fascinating [neuroscientifc] field needs to street a narrow path between exuberance and 
anxiety.
1250
 
 
This thesis acknowledges the limitations of the emergent science. One constraint to 
expanded use of neuroscientific evidence is the prohibitive costs of brain-scanning. To 
the extent that the costs of fMRI and other neuroscientific technologies drop significantly 
in the coming years, as brain-scanning facilities continue to quickly proliferate, it is 
anticipated that resource limitations will decline as a barrier to entry — both for 
researchers and for legal stakeholders.
1251
 
 
At present, the utility of neuroimaging is limited due to its being inadequately 
understood, difficult to accurately interpret (as it displays a complex image depicting 
multiple variables, including medication, nutrition, and hormones), interpreted 
subjectively (as results are influenced by the views of the interpreter), and equivocal (as it 
does not provide an unambiguous depiction of brain activity whereby different scanners 
produce different results, affected by the way in which the subjects behave while being 
scanned). Images can be no better than the manner in which the researcher designed the 
specific task or experiment, deployed the machine, collected the data, analysed the 
results, and generated the images.
1252
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While fMRI can accurately measure changes in blood flow and oxygen levels, 
interpreting those changes as reliable indicators of particular types of thought, or as 
reliable indicators of what a region of the brain is actually doing, requires a series of 
inferential steps that are not entirely straightforward.
1253
 
 
The ability of fMRI to resolve the timing of brain activity is hampered by its reliance on 
the sluggish responses of blood vessels to changes in blood oxygenation. In contrast to 
the good spatial and poor temporal resolution of fMRI, electroencephalography (EEG) 
and magnetoencephalography (MEG) measure the tiny electrical or magnetic fields 
produced on the surface of the scalp by brain activity. As they measure electrical activity 
directly, they have much higher temporal resolution but relatively poor spatial resolution. 
As a consequence, neuroscientists sometimes use EEG/MEG in combination with MRI to 
secure converging evidence with complementary strengths in spatial and temporal 
information. These techniques therefore offer good, but still indirect, measures for what is 
actually happening in the brain. Findings from neuroscience will often need to be 
complemented with other techniques and approaches (such as behavioural observations) 
to reach rounded conclusions.
1254
 It is important to note that this remains a relatively 
crude technology considering such imaging methods make use of highly processed blood-
flow signals, which cover tens of cubic millimetres of brain tissue. In a single cubic 
millimetre of brain tissue, there are one hundred million synaptic connections between 
neurons.
1255
 
 
Individualized inferences from group-averaged neuroscientific data presents problems for 
courts.
1256
 For instance, just because a particular pattern of neural activity is associated, 
on average at the group level, with impaired decision-making, it does not necessarily 
follow that a defendant before the court whose brain scans produce the same neural 
patterns necessarily has such a cognitive deficit. As neuroscientists begin to further 
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explore individual differences in brain activity,
1257
 the ‘group to individual’ inference 
problem will remain central in applying neuroscience to law.
1258
 Hence, ‘[a] treatment of 
[these clinical neuroimaging studies] that is either too glibly enthusiastic or over-critical 
will be damaging for this emerging science in the long run’.1259 
 
 
A Cautionary Remarks about FLRT-Integration  
 
 
We should be neither so sceptical that we miss useful opportunities nor so enthusiastic that we 
undermine functioning institutions.
1260
 
 
This thesis acknowledges that there is a need to proceed with caution, and that ‘any 
experimental finding needs to be independently replicated, and be the result of adequate 
experimental design’.1261 Regarding neuroimaging and the frontal lobe work-out, ‘there 
are no verifiable peer reviewed results that validate this as the therapy of the future and 
the future of therapy’.1262 However, these neuroscientific insights may provide a new 
model in rehabilitation and certainly offer ‘an alternative to the belief that incarceration is 
the only way to deal with law-breakers’.1263 Accordingly, ‘[a]ny employment of 
neuroscience would require legislated regulation to mitigate … complex concerns.’1264  
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In keeping with the maintenance of a cautious approach, this thesis is similarly mindful of 
the perils of ‘neuromania’ and does not advocate neuroscientific insights with uncritical 
fervour. To be sure, 
 
[t]he current engagement of the criminal justice system with now arriving neuroscience is messy, 
unsystematized, undertheorized, underinvestigated.
1265
 
 
A reformation of the entire criminal justice system is consequently not suggested either. 
Indeed, criminologists Lutze and van Wormer foreshadow the difficulties of adopting 
complex new technologies as part of attempts to reform offender treatment and 
corrections programs by reflecting on historical changes in rehabilitative approaches 
adopted by enthusiastic and well-meaning reformers.
1266
 ‘Change often resulted in what 
was convenient to the existing institutions and their practices resulting in the 
abandonment of the components of the innovation that were too complex or required an 
expertise beyond the capabilities of the implementers.’1267 Such a prediction seems 
particularly prescient with respect to complex technologies such as brain-based predictive 
measures. Despite their sophistication, none of these technologies may be expected to 
work as a magic bullet for the complex psychosocial, cultural, economic and other factors 
that precipitate and sustain antisocial behaviour, and all will require careful integration 
with other support mechanisms that are the key components of problem-solving courts. 
Moreover, such technologies will require advanced medical expertise and a theoretically 
coherent integrated treatment paradigm:  
 
the first frontier of impact requires consideration of the relationship between science and law, and 
the conceptual limitations of using fMRI data. Even after settling these questions, and introducing 
legislation there would be consequences for many central tenets of justice in the legal system.
1268
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B FLRT-Administration 
 
 
None of these applications is ready yet … all are being pursued’1269 and ‘neurologic techniques 
will be subject to high levels of interrogation before it becomes a legal mainstay.’1270 
 
Another practical consideration relating to the integration of FLRT into the Australian 
criminal justice system is the training of clinicians to administer FLRT to offenders. As 
part of the crime-reduction effort, criminal justice agencies encourage interagency 
collaboration and promote staff-training and development.
1271
 Jurisdictions within 
Australia have developed significantly detailed program manuals that include detailed 
theoretical and empirical rationales, descriptions of therapeutic principles, and notes for 
facilitators on individual sessions. Mechanisms for staff-accreditation in the area of 
FLRT will need to be developed, and perhaps program integrity will need to be 
monitored through video reviewing of treatment sessions by supervising staff. 
Mechanisms for recording program-involvement would likely involve the documentation 
of program-inclusion, attendance and program-completion data. In keeping with good 
practice, processes for outcome-measures documentation would be useful to inform 
future clinical practice and further intervention needs.1272 
 
Similarly, Community Corrections Officers (CCOs) and Probation and Parole Officers 
(PPOs) would benefit from FLRT education and may indeed enhance the therapeutic 
outcomes of the treatment. It is suggested that those involved in offender supervision who 
utilize the social-learning theory of offending behaviour can effect behavioural change in 
offenders through pro-social modelling, positive reinforcement and problem-solving.
1273
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Furthermore, CCOs and PPOs are required to perform a variety of statutory functions in 
relation to the supervision of offenders in the community. They provide pre- and post-
sentencing advice to the courts and the Parole Board regarding the management and 
compliance of offenders in the community. Those in offender supervisory roles gather 
and analyse relevant information for the submission of reports to the courts and the 
Parole Board, to assist them in determining whether offenders should be placed on 
community-based orders or recommended for parole.
1274
  
 
Correctional Officers manage a caseload of offenders and are responsible for assessing 
each offender’s risks and needs in order to develop individual plans designed to address 
their offending behaviour. They work directly with offenders, but may also involve 
employers, families, significant others, and program service providers when developing 
goals and strategies to reduce the risk of the person reoffending. Officers monitor an 
offender’s compliance with their court or Parole Orders and prepare breach 
documentation for consideration by the court or Parole Board as required.
1275
 Knowledge 
of FLRT and its application would benefit offender supervisors in furtherance of a 
cohesive and holistic approach to offender-management and rehabilitation. 
 
A multidisciplinary team would be involved in both the court procedure and the clinical 
administration of FLRT and would ideally be educated in FLRT eligibility and suitability. 
Eligibility refers to the availability of FLRT to offenders before courts of summary 
jurisdiction and higher courts. The imposition of FLRT as a court-mandated rehabilitative 
mechanism would be available both pre- and post-sentence. Legal stakeholders as well as 
clinicians would be aware of the categories of impulse-control and the appropriateness of 
the treatment to the specific offender and his or her plasticity capabilities. 
 
Another practical implication of FLRT-integration is the inter-jurisdictional differences in 
justice-sector funding, sentencing and program infrastructure. Traditionally this has led to 
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service gaps in forensic health services and inadequate connections between health and 
corrections services within jurisdictions.
1276
 The federal government has made a 
commitment to a program of national mental health reform. This program recognizes the 
high incidence and cost of mental illness in Australia and the structural arrangements that 
inhibit effective and efficient mental health service delivery.
1277
 In recognition of the 
consensus among international and Australian commentators regarding the high numbers 
of prisoners experiencing mental illness, FLRT may function as a support to this 
initiative, along with the employment of safeguards against previous failings. 
 
 
 
C FLRT is Not an Immediate Cure 
 
 
Relapse rates are common among those with a mental illness, especially if the individual 
is in remission but does not continually challenge negative thought patterns. For this 
reason, FLRT is on-going and is not an immediate ‘cure’.  
 
‘The majority of neurofeedback studies employ a similar experimental framework and 
schedule.’1278 The physiological target and response is defined: in the case of FLRT, the 
frontal lobe is anatomically specified as the region to be trained. As established in 
Chapter 2, neurofeedback of the physiological target response and measurement of 
subject performance involves the participant being presented with online information on 
the activity of the physiological target to be trained and he or she attempts to learn to 
control the activation in the target brain area through the use of mental strategies. Studies 
undertaken by Sulzer et al suggest that ‘feedback training may span several minutes, 
hours, or repeated sessions over days’.1279 
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Based on the work of Sulzer et al, it is suggested that a FLRT session would consist of 
five ‘runs’ or exercises, with each run being approximately 15 minutes in duration. A 
total of 10 sessions is considered appropriate.
1280
 The overall aim is for a participant to 
practice volitional control activation in specific parts of the brain. The participant’s 
assignment then is to work on this brain activity and gain control over it using the given 
feedback. Studies in rt-fMRI studies have shown that learned control over brain activity 
in certain areas responsible for motor, sensory, cognitive and emotional processing can be 
acquired in relatively few neurofeedback sessions.
1281
 
 
The experimental framework of neurofeedback studies also include ‘transfer after 
successful training’, which refers to the testing of a participant to demonstrate whether he 
or she is able to maintain the skill of controlling brain activation or performing a task in 
the absence of feedback and/or in a different setting or task.
1282
 Indeed, ‘in clinical 
applications an important goal will be to maintain skills practiced and acquired during rt-
fMRI sessions and be able to apply them to real-life situations’.1283 
 
‘Testing of behavioural effects’ refers to whether a participant’s ‘learned effective 
regulation’ results in specific behavioural effects, typically before and after learning.1284 
It is reported that ‘off-line’ mental training between sessions could be advantageous 
towards accelerating learning.
1285
 Anecdotal evidence provided by neuroscientist R 
Christopher deCharms suggests that when explicit strategies are suggested, offline 
coaching by the experimenters could also have a positive effect on participant motivation 
and performance.
1286
 For sustained efficacy in impulse-control management, it is thus 
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crucial for an offender to practice the skills gained from FLRT-engagement — not only 
throughout the court-mandated treatment period, but beyond as well. 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has detailed some of the practical implications of integrating FLRT into the 
criminal justice system. FLRT is an example of therapeutic jurisprudence in practice, and 
its incorporation into a court system exercising the principles of natural justice was 
reviewed. The disparate natures of natural justice and ‘therapeutic justice’ generated a 
discussion about the role of lawyers and judges in a therapeutic context. The impact of 
therapeutic jurisprudence concepts upon judicial integrity, an important cornerstone in the 
administration of justice, was also considered. Sentencing principles and the utilization of 
treatment reports to monitor offender progress were explored. Limitations surrounding 
the use of fMRI equipment and data interpretation were also reviewed. The perils of 
‘neuromania’ and criticisms of the emergent science were observed. Staff-training and 
clinical FLRT administration was briefly canvassed. This chapter also underscored the 
necessity of continued treatment and skill-maintenance and application outside of 
prescribed treatment to prevent a relapse into previous impulsive behaviours.  
 
As the science develops, FLRT, through NeuroDiversion, has the potential to 
productively inform the law. In fact, scientific advancements better position stakeholders 
to shape law to achieve its criminal justice objectives. While there are practical 
difficulties to the incorporation and utilization of FLRT — and it is not a ‘cure all’ or 
panacea to the problem of impulse-control among offenders — they are not intractable, 
and do not, on the whole, outweigh the potential therapeutic benefit to the law that FLRT 
may present.  
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Despite the adoption of a different ‘craftsmanship in office’1287 peculiar to the common 
law adversarial judge, the therapeutic jurisprudence approach need not be ‘dichotomous 
with traditional notions of open courts and natural justice’.1288 It is to be borne in mind 
that the fact of judicial officers taking a therapeutic role does not entitle them to depart 
from the core function of judging and to stray into areas that are the province of the 
executive or community groups. It does not entitle them to transgress the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers or to engage in activities that are beyond their 
professional expertise. Further, it does not entitle them to be treatment-providers. A 
therapeutic approach to judging does not mean that other considerations are ignored in 
the process.
1289
 All forms of judging should be conducted within constitutional limits and 
the confines of statutes and the common law. In therapeutic court programs that promote 
addressing underlying issues relating to the legal problem before the court, the judicial 
officer also must be mindful of the need to hold participants accountable for their actions, 
to protect team members and to promote the integrity of the program.
1290
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
I THESIS SUMMARY 
 
This thesis has explored the possibility, and the theoretical and practical implications, of 
utilizing FLRT for impulse-control management in the rehabilitation of criminal 
offenders in Australia, with a view to reducing crime, the prison population and 
recidivism rates. 
 
In recognition of the role of impulse-control in criminal offending, the general 
ineffectiveness of incarceration, and the prevalence of mental illness among offenders, 
NeuroDiversion — a concept born of neurolaw — has been proffered as an example of 
therapeutic jurisprudence in action. Therapeutic jurisprudence — ‘the study of the role of 
the law as a therapeutic agent’1291 — is concerned with therapeutic outcome-
maximization through collaborative treatment and individual rehabilitation to further the 
well-being of an offender. This thesis has argued that responsible incorporation of the 
rehabilitative mechanism of FLRT would advance the therapeutic agenda both generally 
and also specifically in relation to MHDCts in the diversion of mentally ill offenders 
away from the criminal justice system and into treatment. 
 
It has been argued that the neural understanding of human behaviours has the potential to 
redefine offender-rehabilitation and address recidivism in support of societal reintegration 
for offenders. Proven to align with accepted models of offender-rehabilitation, FLRT 
perpetuates the holistic perspective of the GLM, whereby offenders are empowered to 
address their own rehabilitative needs. On this basis, FLRT is poised to provide an 
adjunctive role to existing offender-rehabilitation opportunities and mechanisms within 
the modern Australian criminal justice system.  
                                                 
1291
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FLRT-utilization for categorized impulse-control, as informed by the DSM-5, within 
Australian diversionary processes and methods and the regular criminal justice system 
advances the desirable goals of a mature, productively discriminating criminal justice 
system. Complemented by the NeuroDiversion test to determine the utility of FLRT for 
an offender suffering from poor impulse-control in the absence of a mental disorder, 
NeuroDiversion offers a nuanced and sophisticated approach to offender-rehabilitation. 
At the same time, it accentuates the importance of impulse-control management in 
criminal offending. In this way, it would be particularly beneficial if the public, 
lawmakers and practitioners in the mental health support and criminal law communities 
could ‘reconceive the nature of mental illness and … imagine new responses to someone 
whose mental health problems are leading to run-ins with the law’.1292 
 
The jurisdictional ambit of the therapeutic practice of FLRT, it has been suggested, 
extends to the utility of FLRT as part of court-mandated rehabilitative treatment, rather 
than full diversion, for major indictable offences in superior courts in Australia. The use 
of FLRT in tribunals that assess the continued detention of both civilly committed and 
forensic patients, as well as those that determine issues of mental responsibility, have also 
been considered. Optimal FLRT-utilization may extend to other diversionary schemes, 
including police diversion, drug diversion and indigenous-specific diversionary 
programs. Youth offenders may also benefit from FLRT — in a diversionary capacity, as 
well as during detention and post-release. The value of FLRT in adult custodial programs 
and post-release programs has also been advanced. 
 
The jurisprudential permissibility of integrating FLRT into the Australian criminal justice 
system also invited an examination of relevant theoretical considerations, such as 
reconciling the integration of customized rehabilitation for impulse-control management 
with traditional conceptions of punishment. The compatibility of the adversarial system 
                                                 
1292
  R J Bonnie and J Monahan, ‘From Coercion to Contract: Reframing the Debate on Mandated 
Community Treatment for People With Mental Disorders’ (2005) 29 Law and Human Behavior 485; 
Henry T Greely, ‘Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility But Treatment’ (2008) 56 
Kansas Law Review 1103; H T Greely, ‘Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at 
the Field’ (2009) 42 Akron Law Review 687. 
  277 
with criminal law was also examined. This was in contrast to the reduced condemnatory 
emphasis inherent in non-adversarial systems, where therapeutic jurisprudence flourishes.  
 
Rehabilitation theory and recidivism-reduction as theoretical impetuses to the scholarship 
of therapeutic jurisprudence were also considered, as was the relevance of international 
human rights theory and obligations to FLRT as a rehabilitative treatment for criminal 
offenders. The framework for applying human rights to correctional practice and its 
relevance to the strength-based approach to offender-rehabilitation, the GLM, was also 
explored. Specifically, it was emphasized that treating offenders with dignity is likely to 
result in greater treatment compliance and responsiveness,
1293
 as ‘successful treatment is 
contingent upon promoting individuals’ well-being and ensuring that they are able to 
meet a multitude of important needs’.1294 Indeed, working collaboratively with offenders 
in developing treatment goals is likely to result in a stronger therapeutic alliance. As the 
GLM literature confirms, ‘motivating offenders and creating a sound therapeutic alliance 
are pivotal components of effective treatment’.1295 
 
This thesis also addressed the ethical considerations of employing neuroscientific insights 
in the development and implementation of legal initiatives. The relevance of the rule of 
law and, more specifically, the notion of equality before the law, were examined. The 
integration of FLRT into the criminal justice system was also seen to generate practical 
implications. Theses were considered and they included the role of lawyers and judges 
acting in a therapeutic context, the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence concepts upon 
judicial integrity, and the limitations (both fiscal and functional) of fMRI equipment. 
Matters relevant to staff-training and FLRT-administration in a clinical setting were also 
deliberated. It has also been emphasized that because FLRT is not a cure for impulsivity, 
treatment should be on-going to prevent relapse. 
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As the chapters of this thesis have revealed, integrating FLRT into the Australian 
criminal justice system demonstrates how the law can use mental health information to 
improve therapeutic functioning without impinging upon justice concerns.
1296
 Although 
the work of many judicial officers presiding over problem-solving courts mainly resides 
in court processes rather than adversarial trials, the greater involvement of the judicial 
officer necessitated by problem-solving courts may threaten the notion of judicial 
impartiality. However, if specific criteria are laid down by the rules relating to a court 
program concerning the use of rewards and sanctions, and if the judicial officer applies 
those rules dispassionately, then, it is suggested, there should be little cause for concern. 
In terms of judicial involvement in planning, this most commonly relates to matters 
concerning the court program or associated matters. It is appropriate for a judicial officer 
to provide input into matters concerning the court and its program given the unique status 
and role of the judicial officer in such programs.  
 
Undeniably, when employing natural justice and therapeutic justice simultaneously, the 
courts traverse difficult terrain. Adopting a more informal approach and engaging with 
the court to actively and collaboratively promote individual rehabilitation doubtless 
challenges matters surrounding judicial independence, impartiality and certainty. Indeed, 
judging in a matter that promotes law a therapeutic agent is arguably exigent. However, it 
is not impossible for the discerning judge to act therapeutically, thereby enhancing the 
therapeutic value of the law while respecting and observing fairness and good justice. 
Advocates for therapeutic jurisprudence concur with Magistrate King who states that 
‘judging is not static’, for many forms and active judicial case-management are now 
widely accepted within a conventional adversarial framework of legitimacy.
1297
 This can 
be ensured by the discretion and deliberations of a magistracy and judiciary who 
willingly apply the therapeutic lens and observe existing rule-of-law principles. 
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This thesis has endeavoured to promote neurolaw as a valid avenue to address areas of 
deficiency within the ambit of offender-rehabilitation and it concludes that the 
incorporation of this neuroscientific insight may enhance the efficacy of the criminal 
justice system in terms of reducing recidivism and increasing offender-rehabilitation for 
the betterment of society. As a practical recidivism measurement,  FLRT furthers the 
notion that sanctions and incarceration alone are unlikely to reduce rates of 
reoffending
1298
 and may even result in increased recidivism,
1299
 because punishment-
oriented treatments for offenders are deemed ineffective and do not reduce the number of 
reoffenders.
1300
  
 
II FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS — SHAPING THE FUTURE OF NEUROLAW 
 
Professor Hank Greely suggests that it is not too early to talk about neuroscientific 
issues
1301
 and that they ‘should be discussed and debated well before existing techniques 
and technologies are further refined’.1302 This ‘may also help to funnel resources towards 
research and development of those interventions which are (even at a conceptual level) 
likely to achieve their aims, and which (at a normative level) are likely to be permitted 
and maybe even endorsed, recommended, requested and required’.1303 Neuroscientific 
results are currently considered more prejudicial than probative in the courtroom, but, 
with time, it is predicted that the findings will become sufficiently robust to be used in 
legal proceedings.
1304
 It is anticipated that the future of neurolaw will include the 
development of applications for law and policy, such as prediction tools and data-based 
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interventions of treatment and punishment.
1305
 In particular, it is recommended that 
further insight be directed towards neurolegal harmonization, public education and 
judicial education. This may assist in the promotion of a neuroscientific footing for 
therapeutic jurisprudence. It would also be productive if FLRT administration could be 
recognized in the existing best practice guide for jurisdictions seeking to implement 
successful mental health court and diversion programs. These matters are addressed in 
turn. 
 
A Neurolegal Harmonization 
 
 
As neuroscientific techniques push therapeutic boundaries with respect to invasiveness 
and irreversibility, concerns arise about protecting an individual’s autonomy and due 
process rights when rehabilitative treatments are offered and delivered via the coercive 
powers of the criminal justice system.   
 
As long as the criminal justice system is a primary mode of delivering treatment and 
rehabilitation through quasi-judicial institutions such as MHDCts, policy-makers and 
stakeholders must establish clear and consistent guidelines that protect each individual’s 
constitutional rights. Relevant rights include the right to refuse medical treatment, the 
right to retain effective counsel, the right not to be subject to disproportionate 
punishment, and the right to make informed and voluntary decisions about one’s criminal 
defence and/or participation in a MHDCt. The integration of therapies that are directly 
invasive into neural systems heightens the necessity for MHDCts to articulate how their 
operation accords with established legal principles and with adequate safeguards to, inter 
alia, constitutional rights and individual autonomy. This will also help quieten scholars 
who spar over the benefits of therapeutic jurisprudence and the risks of institutional 
overreach. 
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B Public Education 
 
 
We need to do a much better job of educating people about what neuroscience is, including its 
methods and limitations.
1306
 
 
Arguably, the most important arena in which a greater knowledge of neuroscience is 
needed is the criminal justice system,1307 and legitimacy of the legal system will depend 
upon public acceptance of the proposed neuroscientific technology.
1308
 The public may 
question whether the law is the appropriate mechanism for actualizing offender well-
being through the administration of FLRT, ‘especially given the function of legal 
language, thought, logic and reasoning’,1309 and we may further question ‘whether it can 
be persuasively argued that law is “healthy for people”’.1310 It is necessary to reassure the 
public that justice is being served when a matter such as this requires attention.
1311
 
Gummow CJ (as he then was) has said that the maintenance of public confidence in the 
administration of justice ‘in present times, is the meaning of the ancient phrase, “the 
majesty of the law”’.1312 
 
 
C Judicial Education 
 
 
Judges’ chambers are the crucible for th[e] interaction between neuroscience and law.1313 
  
As the field of law and neuroscience expands, it will require new training for judges.
 1314
 
Already a significant number of Federal and State judges in the United States of America 
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have sought training in the area.
1315
 The Dana Foundation in the United States of America 
funds a grant to the American Association for the Advancement of Science to hold 
seminars for judges on emerging issues in neuroscience.
1316
 In addition, the Law and 
Neuroscience Project at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, has partnered 
with various institutes and research networks
1317
 to sponsor major conferences for 
American judges. The topics covered at the conferences included, among other things: an 
introduction to neuroscience; presentations on frontal lobe function, including decision-
making, behavioural control and counter-factual thinking; and presentations on 
measuring individual variation and subjective states, including lie detection, pain 
assessment and punishment.
1318
 Indeed, as Eagleman predicts: 
 
lawyers and judges of the future will be handed a very different set of tools before entering their 
field. In addition to their current studies of legal history and concepts, these future practitioners 
will also possess a bedrock understanding of science, mental illness … opportunities for 
rehabilitation, and realistic ideas of how our brains process both … good and bad decisions.1319 
 
Acquainting judges, lawyers, legislators, legal scholars and the public with 
neuroscientific insights
1320
 is one of the recommendations submitted to the President’s 
Bioethics Commission:1321 
 
The Commission should recommend federal funding for training programs to aid judges (as well 
as parole officers, others in the criminal justice system, and legal educators) in understanding the 
neurotechnologies (as well as related issues in science, hypothesis testing, and statistics) in order 
to improve the likelihoods of suitable decisions regarding proffers of neuroscientific evidence.
1322
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The Recommendations continue: 
 
The Commission should call for development — perhaps under the auspices of a standing 
committee of the National Academy of Sciences — of “best practices” and advisable review 
mechanisms with respect both to the presentation of neuroscientific evidence in court and to its 
interpretation.
1323
 
 
In Australia, judicial training may include the application of the suggested 
NeuroDiversion test to determine the utility of FLRT for an offender in the absence of a 
mental disorder. Educating the judiciary in the execution of therapeutic change
1324
 is ‘not 
an insurmountable obstacle’.1325 Training in this area would prepare the judiciary for the 
vicissitudes of MHDCts and their idiosyncratic adjudication, without imperilling the rule 
of law, or ‘the predominance of the legal spirit’.1326 It would be advantageous if Australia 
adopted this approach to neuroscience in general, and to FLRT specifically: 
 
By being forced to become repeat players in specific areas, judges and lawyers are more likely to 
understand that the intersection of an individual’s motivations and capacities allows more refined 
treatment options, presumably with better societal and financial outcomes.
1327
 
 
 
 
D Toward Collaboration between Lawyers and Scientists 
 
 
One of the future challenges for offender-rehabilitation providers in Australia is to ensure 
that a high standard of program delivery is maintained and that new programs are 
developed for particular offender groups. Crucial to these challenges is the enhancement 
of inter-jurisdictional resource-pooling and information-sharing.
1328
 Moreover, the future 
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of neurolaw will be more productive if challenges to collaboration between lawyers and 
scientists can be resolved:
1329
  
  
We need to make sure that scientists understand the legal relevance of what they’re doing well 
enough to be able to constructively contribute to discussions about it. Make sure that lawyers 
understand the science well enough not to have too much naïve faith in it or be too suspicious of it. 
Working together is going to guide us towards the right integration of science and law.
1330
 
 
Given that ‘[l]aw has some deeply rooted peculiarities of conception and method’,1331 
NeuroDiversion and the research comprising this thesis could encourage discussions 
among scientists and lawyers in an effort to collaboratively engage neurolaw questions in 
a process that ‘satisfies both the rigorous demands of investigative science and the 
professional and ethical duties of the legal profession to produce results that further the 
interests of justice’.1332 
 
 
E A Neuroscientific Basis to Aid Clarification of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Ambiguity 
 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence reformers assume that a cause-and-effect relationship exists 
between therapeutic interventions and a decline in recidivism. Thus, to justify therapeutic 
jurisprudence on the basis of its effects on recidivist rates alone is purposeless and a far 
more persuasive measure is required.
1333
 Accordingly, therapeutic reforms that attempt to 
deal with complex issues in the courts require careful consideration. Caution is advised in 
assuming that adversarial processes produce recidivism. As such, explanations for 
recidivism that focus on the pathologies of offenders have been found wanting.
1334
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Difficulties are associated with measuring the therapeutic effect of a given rule. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence relies on social science theory and research, in particular 
mental health and behavioural work, to answer this question. However, social science has 
often proved inadequate to the task of investigating legal assumptions. Even if this 
general concern can be surmounted, the types of empirical questions that therapeutic 
jurisprudence asks may be difficult to answer.
1335
 Hence, the indeterminacy of the 
empirical information on which therapeutic jurisprudence relies may be exacerbated by 
the paucity of its definition. The uncertainty of social science, although frustrating, does 
not vitiate its usefulness to the law.
1336
  
 
At its broadest, the word ‘therapeutic’ could simply mean ‘beneficial’, whereas ‘counter-
therapeutic’ or ‘anti-therapeutic’ could mean ‘harmful’. Another definition of the word 
‘therapeutic’ could be ‘beneficial’, in the sense of improving the psychological or 
physical well-being of a person. After all, enhancing individual welfare is the commonly 
understood intent of therapy. Under this definition, therapeutic jurisprudence becomes the 
use of social science to study the extent to which a legal rule or practice promotes the 
psychological and physical well-being of the people it affects:
1337
 
 
By incorporating promising behavioural science developments such as insights from research on 
rehabilitation into the day-to-day work of lawyers and judges, the law’s anti-therapeutic effects 
will be reduced.
1338
 
 
The imprecise words peculiar to the therapeutic language, such as ‘healed’, ‘restored’ and 
‘cured’, are ‘simply incapable of being subjected to rigorous testing’,1339 thereby 
rendering unusually uncertain the social science generated by therapeutic jurisprudence. 
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In this way, therapeutic jurisprudence is likely to remain more in the sphere of the 
speculative rather than the definitive. Regarding the inexact nature of the philosophy, it is 
opined that ‘in the maturation phase of therapeutic jurisprudence those who identify its 
advantages have an intellectual responsibility to be clear about the parameters and limits 
of therapeutic jurisprudence’.1340 The explication of neuroscientific insights gives 
credence to therapeutic jurisprudence as a relevant foundation to MHDCts and 
rehabilitation promotion. 
 
 
F The Existing Best Practice Guide 
 
 
It may be plausible for FLRT to be assimilated into the existing ‘best practice guide’ for 
jurisdictions seeking to implement successful mental health court and diversion 
programs. Reproduced in an Australian Institution of Criminology publication,
1341
 this 
guide integrates two frameworks — one from Steadman, Morris and Dennis,1342 and 
another from Thompson, Osher and Tomasini-Joshi1343 — into 11 elements of successful 
mental health court and diversion programs. It contains the following principles: 
 
 Integrated services (multidisciplinary approach integrating mental health and 
social services with the criminal justice system); 
 Regular meetings of key agency representatives (administrative meetings 
regarding program-operation and funding and meetings between service-providers 
and stakeholders about individualized treatment plans); 
                                                 
1340
  Ian Freckelton, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks 
of Influence’ (2008) 30 Thomas Jefferson Law Review 575, 576. 
1341
  Australian Institute of Criminology, ‘Court-Based Mental Health Diversion Programs’ (Tipsheet No 
20, Australian Institute of Criminology, June 2011) 1. 
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1630. 
1343
  M Thompson, F Osher and D Tomasini-Josh, ‘Improving Responses to People with Mental 
Illnesses: Essential Elements of a Mental Health Court’ (Council of State Governments Justice 
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 Strong leadership (appointment of program director/co-ordinator with excellent 
communication skills and an awareness and understanding of all elements of the 
mental health diversion program); 
 Clearly defined and realistic target population (clear eligibility criteria suitable to 
the treatment-capacity of the community and offenders’ circumstances); 
 Clear terms of participation (clear terms of program-participation and 
individualized to suit offenders’ circumstances); 
 Participant-informed consent (decision to participate based on offenders being 
fully informed about the process and the consequences of participation — this can 
be facilitated through rigorous legal representation, specially trained case 
managers and/or the presence of an advocate); 
 Client confidentiality (notwithstanding mandatory reporting requirements, 
confidentiality and privacy of offenders must be preserved); 
 Dedicated court team (development of a team of court staff who are trained in the 
identification and management of a broad range of mental health issues); 
 Early identification (identification of suitable participants to be made at the 
earliest possible stage of offenders’ interactions with the criminal justice system); 
 Judicial monitoring (participant program engagement is closely monitored by the 
court and subject to sanctions and rewards); and 
 Sustainability (formalization and institutionalization of the program to ensure 
long-term sustainability). 
 
If FLRT-availability were to be considered within these 11 elements of successful mental 
health court and diversion programs, it would further promote awareness of the role of 
impulse-control in offending and solidify attempts to manage its implication in the 
aetiology of criminal offending. 
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III CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The ultimate conclusion of this thesis returns to Holmes’ sentiment cited in Chapter 2, 
namely, that ‘[t]he life of the law has not been logic’;1344 rather, ‘it has been 
experience’.1345 It is this ‘experience’ and ‘intuitive sense of justice’1346 that 
NeuroDiversion captures: integrating FLRT — which relies upon the ‘exquisite capacity 
of the human brain to process information that is both externally and internally 
derived’1347 — as a rehabilitative treatment for criminal offenders represents a natural 
extension of the many diversion mechanisms already implemented in Australia. The 
success of diversionary mechanisms is inferred from their proliferation and perpetuation. 
Through their rehabilitative emphasis, problem-solving courts reflect societal needs and 
advancements and it may well be that therapeutic jurisprudence is well on its way to 
forming part of the ‘judicial lexicon’.1348 FLRT represents but one of the ‘types of 
interventions in problem-solving courts [which include] motivational interviewing’.1349 
Consequently, accommodating FLRT into the current criminal justice system in Australia 
would not be deleterious or inconceivable, but rather may in fact may be felicific to the 
concept (and administration) of offender-rehabilitation on the whole: 
 
The legitimacy of the law itself depends on its adequately reflecting the moral intuitions and 
commitments of society. If neuroscience can change those intuitions, then neuroscience can 
change the law.
1350
 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine the theoretical and practical implications of 
incorporating FLRT (under the auspices of NeuroDiversion) for impulse-control 
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management in the rehabilitation of criminal offenders in Australia. An invitation now 
exists to those more scientifically able and policy-equipped to germinate the seed planted 
and to foster its growth as merely another incremental step in the evolution of the law. 
The integration of FLRT and its therapeutic benefit may, in the words of the leading 
world expert in the field of neurolaw, Professor Owen Jones, ‘advanc[e] the pursuit of a 
maximally fair, rational, and effective criminal justice system’.1351 
 
 
                                                 
1351
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Bioethics Commission’ (2014) Journal of Law and the Biosciences 224, 226. 
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